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ABSTRACT 
The central thesis of this dissertation is that war and militarism have been 
formative in the development of Western education from its inception in 
Classical Greece until the present. The secondary thesis is that the formative 
influence of warfare on education and on society more generally was 
neglected by the AngloAmerican academy during the twentieth century. 
This is not to suggest that twentieth century AngloAmerican scholarship and 
research was not war related. Rather, it is to suggest that the theoretical 
and critical study of the formative role of warfare was neglected in inverse 
proportion to the academic effort devoted to war during that century. The 
author posits that this critical and theoretical avoidance was a function of the 
confluence of material conditions, the Cold War for instance, with the 
academic perception of society as generally peaceful, a perception largely 
based in the influence of Marx and Spencer. 
This neglect is compared to the formative role assigned to warfare in the 
early twentieth century German academy, to war as a theme central to 
twentieth century American literature, and to the focus on war in French 
poststructural theory. Chapter 1 is comprised of a brief history of the 
academic construction of warfare in the twentieth century. The author 
proffers some reasons for the war aporias that he locates in the 
AngloAmerican academy. The second chapter outlines method. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to a theoretical analysis of the development of 
mass media, the state, mass schooling, mass warfare and education. The 
author posits that war was totally blended into quotidian existence between 
~ 
1870 and the end of the twentieth century. The influence of military 
considerations on the development of the research university is explicated by 
iv 
tracing the development of organic chemistry, propaganda, computers, and 
instructional technology and educational psychology. In Chapter 5, the 
author argues that these industrial processes were superseded after World 
War II, the change evident in the production of "postindustrial learning." He 
concludes by asking if education as warfare is a permanent condition. 
V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Firstly, I would like to acknowledge my lifelong access to the Canadian 
university. I took such access for granted when I first attended university. 
Since then, however, I have come to understand how unusual it is for a state 
to provide relatively open access to high quality university education. In 
particular, I would like to acknowledge Simon Fraser University in British 
Columbia. Secondly, I would like to acknowledge the good offices of Dr. 
Roland Case, Professor, Curriculum and Social Studies, Faculty of Education, 
Simon Fraser University. 
Foremost and finally, gratitude does not begin to capture the positive 
sentiments I hold regarding the role Bonnie Lillies played in this production. 
This dissertation is as much a function of her love, support and tolerance as 
it is of the statist expansion of higher education in Canada that coincided 
with the Cold War (1945-1990). 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Approval .............................................................................................. ii 
Abstract .............................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................ v 
Table of Contents ................................................................................. vi 
Dedication ......................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1: WAR SATURATED SOCIUS ........................................... 1 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
Statement of Purpose ........................................................................ 1 
Redefining Education ......................................................................... 3 
Education and War ................................................................................ 6 
Anglophonic War Aporias ................................................................. 11 
Historicizing the Aporia .................................................................... 22 
Aporias Contradicted ............................................................................ 28 
Knowledge Accessibility ................................................................... 33 
Education as Credulity ..................................................................... 36 
Thesis Outline ..................................................................................... 38 
Chapter Notes ..................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER 2: OFFENSIVE POSITIONING ........................................ SO 
Introduction ........................................................................................ 50 
Mise-en-scene ................................................................................ 51 
Mise-en-abyme ............................................................................... 53 
Working Method .................................................................................. 56 
Dialectical Thinking ......................................................................... 59 
The Ideological Moment ................................................................... 63 
Chapter Notes ..................................................................................... 71 
CHAPTER 3: WAR MACHINE .......................................................... 73 
Introduction ........................................................................................ 73 
Franco-Prussian War ............................................................................ 73 
Total War ........................................................................................... 80 
Entropy ......................................................................................... 82 
The Origination of the Military Industrial Complex ............................... 86 
Permanent Warfare ......................................................................... 89 
War Machine Inverted ... ..,. ..................................................................... 99 
Postrealist Fabrications .................................................................. 101 
War Machine Conversion ................................................................ 110 
Chapter Notes ................................................................................... 118 
vii 
CHAPTER 4: TEACHING MACHINE (ASSEMBLAGE) ...................... 129 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 129 
Tele-graphic Warfare ......................................................................... 129 
Electro-mechanization of Subjectivity ................................................... 137 
Industrialization ................................................................................ 143 
Militarization ..................................................................................... 146 
Nationalization .................................................................................. 153 
Capitalization .................................................................................... 162 
Chapter Notes ................................................................................... 175 
CHAPTER 5: POSTINDUSTRIAL LEARNING ................................. 186 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 186 
Weaponization .................................................................................. 186 
Organic Chemistry ........................................................................ 188 
Propaganda .................................................................................. 190 
Educational Psychology and Instructional Technology ........................ 192 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) ...................... 198 
Education as Warfare: A Permanent Condition? ..................................... 202 
Chapter Notes ................................................................................... 211 
References ....................................................................................... 212 
DEDICATION 
There is no doubt about the presence of aggressive and destructive tendencies 
in the human psyche which are of the nature of biological drives. 
However, the most pernicious phenomena of aggression, 
transcending self-preservation and self-destruction, 
are based upon a characteristic feature of man above the biological level, 
namely his capability of creating symbolic universes 
in thought, language and behavior. 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (as quoted in Fromm, 1973, 186-87) 
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives 
at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; 
humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules 
and thus proceeds from domination to domination 
Michel Foucault (1977, 151) 
Out of the oil-smooth spirit of the last decades of the nineteenth century, 
suddenly, throughout Europe there arose a kindling fever. 
Nobody knew exactly was what was on the way, 
nobody was able to say whether it was to be a new art, 
a New Man, a new morality or perhaps a reshuffling of society .... 
The Superman was adored, and the Subman was adored, 
health and sun were worshipped; 
people were enthusiastic hero worshippers and 
enthusiastic adherents of the social creed of the Man in the Street, 
one had faith and was skeptical, 
one was naturalistic and precious, robust and morbid. 
Robert Musil (as quoted in Megill, 1987, 112) 
The First World War signals the turning point in modern cynicism. 
With it the up-tempo phase of the decomposition of old na'ivetes begins 
-such as those about the nature of war, the nature of social order, 
of progress, of bourgeois values, indeed, of bourgeois civilization itself. 
Since this war, the diffuse schizoid climate around 
the major European powers has not become any less intense. 
Since then, those who have spoken of cultural crisis, etc., 
have had that mental disposition of postwar shock 
unquestionly in mind that knows that 
the na'ivete of yesterday will never exist again. 
Peter Sloterdijk (1987, 122) 
The homogenizing of European man is the greatest process 
that cannot be obstructed: one should even hasten it. 
The necessity to create a gulf, distance, order of rank, 
is given eo ipso [by that itself] 
~ -not the necessity to retard this process. 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1913, 1968, 898) 
viii 
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CHAPTER 1: 
WAR SATURATED SOCIUS 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the topic of education and warfare. A 
working definition of education that differs markedly from usual idealist 
invocations of the term, the "immaculate conception" challenges conventional 
concepts of education as an inherently beneficial process and of "educated" 
as a preferred condition of being. It places education and war in context, 
providing a brief intellectual history of the theoretical study of warfare, and 
of the way theoretical study of warfare has been neglected in the 
AngloAmerican academy. It demonstrates that there has been much more 
interest in war and the way it relates to the academy, to knowledge 
production-though not necessarily dissemination-since the end of the Cold 
War than at any other time since World War I ended. It offers some possible 
reasons for this neglect, suggesting that it is not at all accidental. 
Statement of Purpose 
War as a discourse and social practice has been academically developed, 
functionally analyzed and historically examined more extensively than any 
other human endeavour. At the same time, the socially constitutive role of 
war has been ignored by the Anglophonic academy until very recently. This 
is especially so regarding historic and systemic relationships between war 
and education. 
When the relationship between the two social practices has been 
~ 
academically addressed, the address usually has been limited to the 
formative effect of warfare, and the preparation for it, on educational 
2 
institutions-on schools, universities, colleges and research institutes-and, 
more occasionally yet, on pedagogy and "educational technology," However, 
even that limited address has been sporadic, as if "going there" is outside 
academic boundaries. 
The purpose of this thesis is to "go there," to expose and explicate 
academically inarticulate systemic and historical relationships between war 
and education. This work will demonstrate that war has been socially 
formative from "pre-history," and in spite of a lack of awareness, has 
continued to be so throughout "history." War-and the preparation for it-
became even more inextricably tied to "history"-to quotidian human 
existence-from the rise of Protestantism through the age of Enlightenment. 
Industrialization exacerbated rather than mitigated the European 
militarization of existence notwithstanding the prevailing history, philosophy 
and theory developed in Anglophonic jurisdictions that reflect the opposite. 
The argument put forward purports that the collusion of industrialism, the 
state, education, capitalism and war (and Protestantism) led to quantity 
become quality (new forms of social differentiation), saw to a dialectical 
inversion whereby war became peace and peace became war in the twentieth 
century. 
Indeed, historical change evident from the late seventeenth to the late 
twentieth century, when taken as a whole, can be read in exact opposition to 
the prevailing ideological interpretation of civilization advancing through the 
global imposition of Western practices, values and culture. In this work a 
case is made to the opposite, that "modernity" has been retrograde in that it 
has institutionalized previously unknown forms of violence in ways unheard 
of and impossible until the twentieth century. 
3 
Redefining Education 
It is a commonplace that education is a field of study rather than a discipline. 
This field, in turn, is comprised of two elements, namely knowledge 
dissemination and the production of knowledge devoted to it (it too called 
Education). 1 Education, like medicine, law and accounting stands with feet in 
two camps, the material economy of practice-application-and the 
theoretical economy of academic "know how."2 
Ruth Jonathan (1997, 4) says: "education is the one social practice that both 
reflects and produces social circumstances and values." While that comment 
may not do justice to the profundity of the operation, it points in the right 
direction. Education no doubt significantly contributes to the production of 
social circumstance (reality), but it reflects and produces much more than 
"values"; it reflects and produces human subjectivity. 3 As Sloterjidk (1987, 
72) says: 
From the first look we take at our experiences we believe we can say 
who we are. The second look will make it clear that education is 
behind every particular way of being. What seemed to be nature, on 
closer observation reveals itself as code. 
On this reading, education (Education) is defined as the production, 
representation, regulation and distribution of codified knowledge and practice 
intended to produce specific (ideal) forms of subjectivity-the human 
"subject" that is itself a contingent and performative site (sight) that cannot 
but physically, affectively, intellectually and cognitively embody what it has 
been taught. 4 This definition encompasses educational practices as diverse 
as military training and the subjective installation of ostensible Bi/dung (or 
liberal education), practices that are usually separated out ideologically, 
epistemologically and rl;}etorically. As such, the definition does not privilege 
certain forms of subjectivity over and above others. 5 As well, it removes the 
privileging distinction between the manual and the mental initially 
promulgated by Aristotle. 
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Education, as defined above, is by its very nature formative of subjectivity 
that cannot but express certain forms of power that delimit human 
possibility, whether it be adjudicated as Bildung or trades training, vocational 
or professional. This definition, which could be categorized as cultural 
materialist, is grounded in Gur-Ze'ev's (1998) concept of "normalizin§ 
education": 6 
Control of the legitimization, production, representation and 
distribution of knowledge enables the reduction of the human subject 
into a "subject" who will function as an object or an agent of "her" 
system. In this sense the control of knowledge enables much more 
than the possibilities of policing social behavior: it provide the means 
for establishing an unchallenged legitimization for a certain hegemonic 
version of the production of the "subject," the normalized subject, her 
possibilities and limitations. Such a control is usually called 
"education." 
Like Gur-Ze'ev's definition, this one too is indebted to Foucault, in this 
instance specifically to his concept of discourse as a set of practices 
comprised of text (knowledge), institutions and activity, especially as regards 
specialized social activity grounded in expert knowledge. 7 This definition is 
intended as a counter-definition that lays the groundwork for a counter-
history of education based in counter-factual approach to knowledge 
production. 8 As well, this counter-definition is intended as an instance of a 
performative pedagogy, an exercise in a de-familiarization (Verfremdung) 
intended to produce a counter-education based in a rhetorical astringent. 9 
As well as leaving out difference defined in the manual/mental division, this 
definition does not distinguish between forms of education on the basis of 
delivery either. For example, difference based in Coombs (1973) 
categorization of formal, informal, non-formal education is not subscribed to 
because such differentiation makes even less sense in the contemporary 
electronically induced multi-modal (blended) environment than it did when 
extra-personal social mediation was more strictly mono-modal (face-to-face 
or bookish). 
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The same holds for conventional demarcations between education, training, 
religion and propaganda, those categorizations that are so important to 
Anglophone idealist philosophers of education (cf. Deardon, Hirst & Peters 
1972, Peters 1973). Indeed, the author maintains that hiving off a portion of 
the means for subjective constitution and naming it education, while other 
forms of subjective formation like training and propaganda are set in a binary 
opposition to education, this division working rhetorically and ideologically, in 
the large sense of that term, to perpetuate an "immaculate conception" of 
the great Western project termed Education. In turn, this "immaculate 
conception" (Spanos, 1993) performs rhetorically to maintain and hide the 
specific material and cultural investments that are embedded in all 
education. 
This is not to suggest a constructionist relativism whereby forms of 
"education" are theoretically or morally equal, and their social imposition 
simply a matter of power or preference. It is the opposite, an intent to 
understand the educative process profoundly by working around its usual 
discursive construction. For education as conventionally constructed, is a 
concept so imbricated with ontological baggage as to be of no analytical 
value. It has no ontological status independent of the agentic factors 
(human beings, machines that carry systemic logic, etc.) that put "education" 
into play in the quotidian environment. Education is not the institutions that 
comprise it except in as much as they are expressive of the social relations 
and practices that humans create and institutionalize (e.g. schools as carriers 
of interested knowledge~expressive of class, gender, etc.). Education is not a 
"thing" or an ideal state but a social process with no existence independent 
of or prior to its manifestation in quotidian practice. Importantly, moving 
beyond the material/ideal divide to a cultural materialist definition allows for 
the historicization of education-as a discourse and social practice-and of 
the educational product, which is nothing other than human subjectivity .10 
Education and War 
6 
The effects of technologies, religion, nationalism, the state and capitalism on 
education have been noted and studied extensively. However, the effect on 
education of the various social practices subsumed within the term "war" are 
marked by academic aporias and lacunae that are entirely exceptional. For 
war is so much a part of Western civilization, knowledge and education that 
the "rise" of Western civilization is itself coincident with writing being used 
originally to produce renderings of foreign warfare for the home audience. 
Even the technology of writing/reading-especially its mechanization in the 
nineteenth century and electronic transformation in the twentieth-is rooted 
in warfare, can be read as a function of it (cf. Kittler, 1999). And, indeed, 
the avoidance of the theoretical study of the influence of warfare on social 
practices and products seems more an AngloAmerican peculiarity than a 
general academic predilection. 
This AngloAmerican peculiarity itself requires investigation when it is 
recognized that the constitutive influence of warfare on all aspects of human 
endeavour much predates the formal codification of the practice of warfare in 
Antique empires as Greece, Rome and Egypt. The anthropologist Lawrence 
Keeley (1997,49) even claims that "total war" was waged during prehistory, 
stating, "if nonstates could be said to have implemented strategies in war, 
they were of the attritidnal and total-war varieties." According to this 
reading, total war much predates its supposed generative realization in the 
mass industrial warfare of the twentieth century (World War I and II). 
As Keeley ( 174) puts it: 11 
The facts recovered by ethnographers and archaeologists indicate 
unequivocally that primitive and prehistoric warfare was just as 
terrible and effective as the historic and civilized version ... Peaceful 
prestate societies were very rare; warfare between them was very 
frequent, and most adult men in such groups saw combat 
repeatedly ... In fact, primitive warfare was more deadly than that 
conducted between civilized states because of the greater frequency of 
combat and the more merciless way it was conducted. 
7 
Keeley (3-11) explains how academic constructions of warfare, evidence to 
the contrary, were framed within a misleading dichotomy. The Hobbesian 
condition of "war of everyman against everyman" provided the 
anthropological paradigm during the nineteenth century, the "heyday of 
European imperialism and colonization," while Rousseau's peaceable Noble 
Savage provided the prevailing academic paradigm during the twentieth 
century. However, this twentieth century academic "pacification of the past" 
extends well beyond its manifestation in the discipline of anthropology. 
Similar claims have been made in the disciplines of psychology, sociology and 
history, and in this work are being made regarding education and knowledge 
production more generally. 12 
Bruce Porter (1994, xvi), in War and the Rise of the State: The Military 
Foundations of Modern Politics, the contemporary "book of record" on the 
pervasive influence of warfare, addresses the way in which the war continued 
to prove formative during the era of civilization. Addressing the generative 
thought of the German historian Otto Hintze, Porter writes: 
Hintze argued that [>\all state organization was originally military 
organization," and that the form and spirit of the modern state derived 
primarily from its organization for war. Hinzte's insights, regrettably, 
have not had the impact they deserve on contemporary political 
analysis. The causes of war continue to receive far more scholarly 
attention than its effects, the role of war as an independent variable 
remains neglected. 
In this regard, Hintze, Sombart and Weber were in agreement, each 
conceiving of war as constitutive of capitalism in part, not a function of it as, 
for example, Engels and Lenin had postulated. This particular excursus 
follows the former in this regard, conceptualizing war as an independent 
variable, overdetermined by other social practices, but not reducible or 
subsumed in any of them, by capitalism or religion, for example. 13 
8 
Yet, this revisionist reading of the "Great Western project" of knowledge 
production and dissemination is not based in Hobbes' view of "natural" life as 
necessarily fraught with "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the 
life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," or Heraclitus' more 
proto-realist view that "war is common and strife is justice, and all things 
happen according to strife and necessity." It is to say however that warfare 
until now has been endemic to the human condition. It is to say that 
investigations into the socially formative role of warfare have been conducted 
only rarely in the contemporary AngloAmerican academy, and that the 
neglect of theoretical study of the influence of war is no academic accident, 
but lacuna that is ultimately ideological, the interested selling of a specific 
perception of existence as increasingly pacific. 
As Porter said, "the role of war as an independent variable remains 
neglected." The author claims the neglect concerns not only the constitution 
of the modern state that forms the focus of Porter's study, but also in terms 
of the constitution of education. He claims that the institution in the 
nineteenth century of national, military, industrial, statist systems of formally 
compulsed "primary" aijd "secondary" education, and the development of 
informally compulsed "tertiary" education in the twentieth century, were vital 
components of "military/industrial/educational" complexes that emerged in 
9 
every nation-socialist or capitalist-that industrialized during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. While Porter speaks of understanding the state as 
"creature of war," this work extends that analysis to examining education as 
a similar "creature." 
Interestingly, the "academic pacification of the past," as Keeley (1997) 
described it, has enjoyed recent renovation in most every academic discipline 
or field of study. Critical commentary and analysis of the Cold War period 
(1945-1990) specifically have been prodigiously produced in the U.S. since 
that war ended. The U.S. historian Robert Griffin writes (2001, 150): 
A little over a decade ago, there were relatively few studies of Cold 
War culture; fewer still that sought to explain the Cold War as a 
cultural phenomenon. Today, all this has changed, prompted by the 
entry into the field of scholars trained in literature, American studies, 
sociology, anthropology, communication and media studies, as well as 
by a somewhat belated turn toward culture among Cold War historians 
themselves. The result has been an extraordinary outpouring of books 
and articles on virtually every aspect of American culture and how that 
culture shaped and was in turn shaped by the Cold War. 
However, even in this rapidly developing corpus, the few studies that 
examine the relationship between education and war usually limit their 
examination to educational institutions, concentrating on the linkage between 
education and war made evident when "education" was added to the 
felicitous phrase "military/industrial complex" (Port Huron Statement of the 
Students for a Democratic Society, 1962). This new work mostly concerns 
the production of various forms of knowledge, while its dissemination is 
relegated to the edges of the analyses. However, a more systemic historical 
position regarding education than those developed in the studies referred to 
above is evident in the work of two sociologists of education, Ramirez and 
Bali (1987, 2). While they place education into a formative relationship with 
~ 
warfare, they do not address education in other than its statist, industrial, 
national, secular manifestation: 
... most comparative studies of education entirely overlook the historical 
origins of state systems of schooling, thereby ignoring the sociological 
institutionalization of the social innovation ... We show that in some 
cases military defeat or a failure to keep pace with industrial 
development in rival countries stimulated the state to turn to 
education as a means of national revitalization to avoid losing power 
and prestige in the inter-state system. 
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Ramirez emphasizes this point, explaining "the general thesis regarding war 
and education is that military defeat and related setbacks from the 19th 
century onward often call for national revitalization with education as a core 
feature of the revitalization program."14 This address of the systemic, and 
perhaps structural relationship between war and education is however very 
much the exception. 
While it may be a commonplace that the Prussian schoolmaster won the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, or that compulsed social studies in British 
schools was designed to instill mass militarist fervor, oddly, theoretical 
analyses of the influence of war on education as it concerns the development 
of subjectivity are virtually non-existent. The belated consideration of war 
and education proffered in this thesis, as the reader can imagine, leads to a 
revision whereby education appears a less beneficent process than that given 
in the positive renditions that comprise most of the discourse. 
None of this is, however, to suggest that war is an overriding social driver, 
something akin to the role played by the "economy" in Marx's dialectic. Nor 
is it to suggest that subjective creativity and energy are linked intrinsically to 
overt or covert violence, mass or select, random or organized, or to the 
threat of it. It is to suggest, however, that existential development 
(recorded civilization) in the West has followed-indeed has been the path of 
war from inception, and that this path has been left uncharted on the 
~ 
cognitive maps drawn in the contemporary AngloAmerican academy. 
Indeed, Western education from the Greeks has been imbricated with 
warfare-a function of warfare in many instances. 
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This study focuses on modern education (circa 1500-2000), demonstrating 
how it began as a statist-ultimately secular-investment in the production of 
preindustrial military subjectivity that, ironically, was grounded in religious 
justification. The author claims this early modern (preindustrial) educational 
discourse (circa 1500-1800) was supplemented (circa 1800-1950) by 
military/industrial education that expressed national, national-imperial, urban 
and capitalist concerns. This trajectory is evident for example in the work of 
Fichte, Hegel, von Humboldt, Spencer, Ruskin, Mann, Dewey and Ryerson. 
Industrial education was dedicated to the production of military/industrial 
subjectivity. In turn, the work will focus on how that modern system of 
education has been supplemented once again (circa 1950-2000), 
transformed into a postindustrial system for the perpetual education of 
postindustrial populations performatively maintained on "psychic high alert," 
on a perpetual/perceptual military/economic war footing. 15 
Ang/aphonic War Aporias 
As mentioned, the avoidance of the theoretical study of the influence of 
warfare on contemporary social practices and products seems more an 
AngloAmerican peculiarity than a general academic predilection. Some 
investigation of this state of academic affairs is necessary if this thesis is to 
be situated within a political economy of knowledge production. For 
academic war aporia is an anomaly in terms of the history of knowledge 
production, for the most part a phenomenon peculiar to the twentieth 
century and the AngloAmerican academy. 
0 
Though Anglophonic academic disregard of the influence of warfare on social 
development was evident from the end of the First World War (1914-1918), 
it peaked during the Cold War (1945-1990). This is not to suggest that the 
most immense academic effort ever was not devoted to the functional, 
historical and analytic study of war and the preparation for it during the 
twentieth century (Keeley, 1996, 114). It is to suggest, however, that war 
and military institutions were ignored theoretically and critically in inverse 
proportion to their social and academic influence. The limited critical 
theoretical address that did obtain in the Anglophonic academy was most 
often limited to the field of sociology, for example the work of Mary Kaldor, 
Martin Shaw, Anthony Giddens, Barton and Sally Hacker and Michael Mann. 
12 
However, following World War II, the Anglophonic academy was not the only 
one to suffer from "war aporias." In Germany, the last thing academics 
seemed to want to do was dredge up the violent "past," especially as many 
of them had been "implicated in it" in one way or another. Indeed, popular 
and academic aporias became notorious in Germany when the "children of 
the perpetrators" (Westernhagen) noisily forced German society to confront 
its past behaviours. With that, new work addressing warfare began to be 
produced. Much of this work concerned the "loss of collective memory," a 
theme that was central to postcolonial literature and theory as it was 
developing at that time in various locations around the world. 
The German atrocities of World War II exacerbated the theoretical avoidance 
of war theory in the Anglophonic academy as well-though for different 
reasons. These atrocities served to re-vilify and re-demonize German 
thought that already had been demonized thoroughly, not the least because 
of the strategic vilification of all things German that was so central to 
Anglophonic propaganda strategies developed during World War I. As most 
of the academic work produced during the twentieth century that did 
recognize the influence bf war on society was produced in Germanic 
academy, the Anglophonic avoidance of German theory doubly reinforced 
13 
Anglophonic war aporias. Yet, there may be another more perfidious reason 
for the aporias of the postwar academy. 
After World War II, the U.S. government employed former high ranking Nazis 
to spy on the U.S.S.R. and actively collu9ed in resettling Nazis (as did 
Canada) who otherwise would have been prosecuted for war crimes. The 
specious "information" gathered by these operatives may have been 
instrumental in inducing Cold War fever in the U.S. after the Second World 
War. As the Cold War provided the primary means for population control for 
forty years, this was a matter of no small significance. Regardless, the 
U.S.-and the British and French governments, and no doubt others-had 
many reasons to hide military, economic and political links to Nazi Germany 
and to the Nazis they employed and assisted before the war and after it (see 
Chapter 2). Aporias were more likely when supported by a limited or falsified 
historical record. 
Notwithstanding these induced silences, it would seem the field of study 
termed feminism that developed after the war would have gravitated toward 
the study of the military more generally. However, with a few exceptions, 
notably Hacker (1989), Enloe (1988) and Lutz, (2000, 1999, 1997), feminist 
scholars remained remarkably disinterested in war. 16 As Sally Hacker (1989, 
11-12) stated, "It is surprising so little so little feminist attention is directed 
toward military institutions. We puzzle over the "takeover," the "worldwide 
subordination of women," the "creation of patriarchy." Yet we rarely analyse 
military organizations, primary models of patriarchal forms of social 
organization, which were most salient in these processes." Hacker, however, 
goes on to do just that, providing one of the few texts that dealt directly with 
the connections between the military and education. 
Another of these texts, and equally as notable, is Noble's (1991) The 
Classroom Arsenal: Military Research, Information Technology, and Public 
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Education (see Chapter 5). The other is The Handbook of Research for 
Educational Communications and Technology (1996), edited by David H. 
Jonassen. This edited reference book provides the only source for any 
comprehensive listing of contemporary theoretical or historical work in the 
field of education related to warfare. The Handbook evidences that 
instrumental work in education based in pedagogy, communications 
technology and content developed through military research is voluminous, 
while theoretical and critical address of the relationship between the military, 
war and education is virtually non-existent. 
Jonassen (1996, 240) says that "only Noble has written critically and at any 
length about the contradictions and social difficulties associated with the 
military's being responsible for so much technology in education." However, 
Noble's work, which took him ten years to produce, does not go beyond 
"technology in education." Noble (19) states there is little research on the 
"interplay between public education and military research," that there is a 
"paucity of scholarship in the area." Jonassen and Hacker concur, their work 
providing the only exceptions. 
Turning to sociology once again, oddly it is Giddens (1987, 113-14), Britain's 
most prominent (functionalist) theorist of the state, who foregrounds the role 
of the military in the constitution of the "state apparatus and other 
organizations including, at a later date, business firms." He explicitly 
foregrounds the formative impact of the "military revolution" of the sixteenth 
century on contemporary society: 
In the expansion of administrative power, the organization of the 
military played a prime role, influencing both the state apparatus and 
other organizations including, at a later date, business firms. For it 
was to a large extent in the military sphere that administrative power 
in its modern guise was pioneered. The innovations of Maurice of 
Nassau, the Prince of Orange, are both the most prominent example of 
this and at the same time exemplify more long-term trends in military 
organization. Maurice helped initiate two connected administrative 
changes later seen in all more bureaucratized organizations-the 
formation of a body of experts holding exclusive knowledge of certain 
essential administrative techniques, and the simultaneous creation of a 
"de-skilled" population of ordinary soldiery. There is a very real sense 
in which, through Maurice's interventions, the techniques of Taylorism 
became well embedded in the sphere of the armed forces several 
hundred years before, in industrial production, they came to be known 
by such a label. 
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This formulation of the state and the organization of labour as a militarist 
exercise is, however, quite recent and very much the exception. 
Interestingly, the lack of critical and theoretical academic address of the 
socially constitutive role played by warfare seems inversely related to the 
quotidian influence of warfare in the twentieth century. 17 At the same time 
as the Anglophonic academy, that constellation of institutions of higher 
learning and research that use English as the primary working language, was 
ignoring the formative social and academic influence of war-and ostracizing 
those that did, for example Mumford and various German sociologists and 
historians-that influence was becoming increasingly invasive. 
From the war movies made by the score during the latter half of the century, 
to missile gaps and races in space and hot wars the world over, to the 
protest songs of the "60s" and the counterculture they inspired, war more 
than any other cultural theme and existential reality influenced the social 
context and content of popular culture. Popular culture was made possible 
by war, the technologies that flowed from war and the spacial and cognitive 
dislocations informed by it. Materially and culturally, popular culture is an 
offshoot of warfare (cf. Kittler, 1999, Winthrop-Young, 2002). 
Commercial radio was based on wireless communication technologies 
developed for warfare; advertising was based in the propaganda techniques 
developed in Britain and the U.S. during World War I; behaviourism in 
psychology-and much of psychology itself-like computer science and 
cybernetics-was based in military research. By the 1940s, broadband radio 
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was being used extensively to deliver education at a distance. After World 
War II, educational delivery was based on the instructional design 
technologies developed by the U.S. during the Second World War. The 
pedagogical pride of place occupied by instructional technology has only been 
reinforced by the coming on-line of electronic delivery technology. At the 
same time, inside the academy and out, the fact that these developments 
and many others were functions of warfare was studiously neglected. 
The same, however, cannot be said about Anglophonic literature. Warfare 
was foregrounded in this arena of endeavour, no doubt attesting to a number 
of cultural peculiarities, not the least of which was the fact that warfare-and 
literary production-was a masculine domain, which, depending on the lens 
employed, could be read as symptomatic of many and varied personal and 
cultural phenomena. Consider some of the "seminal" (generative) literary 
productions of the era. Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms (1929) and For 
Whom the Bell Tolls (1940), Lawry's Under the Volcano (1947), Mailer's The 
Naked and the Dead (1948), Orwell's 1984 (1949), Heller's Catch 22 (1961), 
and, the great postrealist war work, Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow (1973). 
Interestingly, each of these works concerned the horror of war, the toll it 
took on the participants. Indeed, each of these books are "anti-war" novels. 
In them, the romance or heroicization of war had been superceded literarily. 
In the latter two works, the absurdity of war as well as its intimate 
relationship to capitalism figure prominently. 
Then there is the popular culture of warfare-"comic" books, G.I. Joes, Star 
Wars, "Westerns," the Alamo, John Wayne, Ronald Regan, Davy Crockett, BB 
guns, 22's, newspaper headlines, the Berlin Airlift, the Cuban "missile crisis," 
the Korean War, war correspondence, Pentagon briefings, the NATO, the 
Warsaw Pact, Maoism, tJN police actions, TV reportage, Elvis drafted, the 
John and Yoko bed-in, Vietnam, Cambodia, a daily televised dead body 
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count, and Cold War rhetoric emanating from various "informed sources" 
broadcast daily. Consider these as the contemporary cultural and material 
manifestations of a martial patriarchal capitalism that did not change in its 
essentials from its inception in North West Europe four hundred years 
earlier-consider the continuity rather than the difference. Consider common 
perception as upside and inside out-as in Marx's camera obscura-witness 
war, material and psychic, where perceptions of peace previously existed. 
Consider the rise of the national security state, the vast network of 
electromechanical intelligence gathering and population surveillance 
instruments that was institutionalized in industrial states during the Cold War 
period. Consider the growth of the academy itself, its focus on military 
research and development, its expansive reach in the form of "think tanks" 
into the innermost sanctuaries of power, of soi-disant democratic 
governance. Consider that those born after 1945 have lived under conditions 
of constant material and virtual warfare. 18 Consider that we, all of us in the 
phrase of Deleuze and Guatarri (1988), know nothing other than "a peace 
more terrifying still than warfare." 
Stanley Kubrick's film Dr. Strange/ave or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying 
and Love the Bomb (1964) provides one of the few popular critiques of 
nuclear war produced during the Cold War era. For the most part, however, 
critical address was generated outside the Anglophonic world. Paul Virilio 
(1989), a member of the Francophonic academy, was one of the first post-
World War II theorists to critically address the relationship between war and 
perception. Virilio pointed to the distancing of war from Western human 
experience, even while its lethality multiplied exponentially. For Virilio 
(2000, 6) "the tragedy of war is mediated through technology. It is no 
longer mediated through a human being with moral responsibilities. It is 
mediated through the destructive power of the atomic bomb, as in Stanley 
Kubrick's film Dr. Strange/ave." 
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The permanent informal war (world wars III and IV) under way since World 
War II ended has lasted ten times longer already (see Chapter 3). The 
limited wars (e.g. Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua) and the state of generalized 
warfare that have marked the entire postwar period up until today were 
bound to rearrange old institutional patterns, to modify law and conceptions 
of social order, to alter civic systems of beliefs, refashion the economy. The 
Cold War (1945-1990) even sired a new form of governance. In the U.S. 
and in all other industrial democracies, a parallel civil and martial governance 
structure that worked in tandem and outside formal statist and democratic 
principles was institutionalized in the 1940s. Until recently, to suggest such 
a thing was considered conspiracy. Interestingly, unearthing this parallel 
governance has become a minor industry recently. 19 
Regardless of the lack of critical analysis, the trend was evident to some from 
its inception. Hanson Baldwin (in de Reincourt, The American Empire, 1968), 
military writer for the New York Times, expressed concern in 1947 about the 
"militarization of our government and of the American state of mind"-what 
can be characterized as military mental mobilization. Perhaps nothing so 
much attests to the intensity of the Cold War and its militarization of the 
quotidian as the development of the hydrogen bomb, a device of much 
enhanced destructive power as compared to the atomic bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima. The hydrogen bomb was developed in the United States by a 
group of researchers led by Edward Teller, another European ex-patriot 
(University of Leipzig). The bomb was first tested in 1952. Other countries 
soon followed with their own hydrogen bombs: the Soviet Union in 1953, the 
United Kingdom in 1957: China in 1967 and France in 1968. 
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This exponential growth of the destructive power of war weapons (hydrogen 
bombs were more powerful than atom by orders of magnitude) coincided 
with the exponential growth of codified knowledge and the unprecedented 
growth of every type of educational and research institution. It coincided 
with the development of new knowledges based in military research such as 
cybernetics, its development enabled by large academic funding increases 
justified by appeals to military, social and economic Cold War preparedness. 
Yet, the war aporias continued, evidenced for one in the common perception 
that World War II was followed by a generally peaceful era, marked by 
limited wars that were not routine but exceptional. Yet, wars, literally 
hundreds of wars, were a constant; wars were the rule not exception. From 
1945 to 1990, some thirty million persons, mostly non-combatants, died 
from the Cold War directly (see Chapter 3). No doubt, academic war aporias 
in part were induced by McCarthyite terror and transnational Cold War "chill," 
by the politics of quotidian fear and by professionalization and 
specialization-the inculcation of certain knowledges and roles that preclude 
acceptance of knowledge outside a (restrictive) norm that delimits social 
expression. 20 
Academic professionalization in the 1960s was itself a form of military, 
industrial mental mobilization-the placing of expert knowledge within the 
control of the state and capital. Speaking of scientists specifically, Schmidt 
(2000, 82) writes: 
A large fraction of these scientists are employed by one or another 
institution of the military-industrial complex, but they do not raise 
questions about the social function of their work. And they can't plead 
ignorance either, because as we have seen, to do what is expected of 
them they have to be at least somewhat aware of their employers' or 
funders' interests. They don't challenge their employers' goals; they 
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don't question the social structure that they bolster; they don't offer 
an alternate view of what scientists should be doing on the job. They 
have an internalized willingness and ability to be directed in the most 
important areas. They concentrate on how best to carry out their 
assignments-only here do they use their creativity, and then only 
within the limits of the dominant paradigms. In short, these scientists 
are professionals. 
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Described this way, specialization and professionalization can be read 
symptomatically as the endocolonization of knowledge producers, the 
successful result of information warfare waged on the home population. As 
Sally Hacker (1989, 60) says, "Military influence continues today, visible in 
social distance or antagonism between men and women, as well as in 
hierarchy and specialization in all major institutions," which would include the 
academy of course. 
Colonel Richard Szarfranski (1995, 60), in his article A Theory of Information 
Warfare, describes just this possibility: 
The target system of information warfare can include every element in 
the epistemology of an adversary. Epistemology means the entire 
"organization, structure, methods and validity of knowledge." In 
layperson's terms, it means everything a human organism-and 
individual or a group-holds to be true or real, no matter whether that 
which is held as true or real was acquired as knowledge or as belief. 
Described this way, the Cold War "chill" was a form of "information warfare" 
against the "home front." The overt censorship of the World War II period 
never really lifted. In the U.S., the National Security Act of 1947 (Truman 
doctrine) legislated the statist incursion into behavior and thoughts that 
previously were considered outside the purvey of the state unless a formal 
state of war existed. 21 The hearings of the House Un-American Activities 
Committee in 1951, Hollywood "witch hunts," academic purges, blacklists in 
various industries, all these forms of social control materially affected the 
range of academic investigation. This social control encouraged the 
technicization of knowledge production, and with that, encouraged the 
bypassing of "values issues." 
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This "chill" was, of course, global, infusing Canadian, Australian and British 
institutions in the same way as it did institutions in the U.S. Roger 
Fieldhouse (1951) in Adult Education and the Cold War: Liberal Values under 
Siege, 1946-1951 documents the effects of the "chill" on adult education 
everywhere in the British Commonwealth. His analysis even extends to 
Africa where academic practices were modified to account for Cold War 
imperatives. 
Waging "information warfare" on one's own producers circumscribed 
knowledge production severely, tied it ever more closely to the ostensible 
needs of the state and capital for docile populations and war-making 
capabilities. This included bizarre knowledge production activities as 
measuring the effects of psychotropic medications on persons hospitalized for 
mental illnesses, deliberately infusing populations with various viruses to 
gauge the pathological effect of various toxins, and exposing soldiers to 
nuclear radiation to measure the pathological effect over extended periods 
(cf. Moreno, 2000). 
Producing academic knowledge that critiqued the prevailing social ethos of 
fear, of militarism and the concomitant glorification of warfare, to say the 
least, was institutionally unpopular and career threatening for academics 
during the first decades of the Cold War. Yet this trajectory had been in 
place since World War I; it was not so much a matter of imposing a new form 
of social control on the academy and the population at large, but of 
extending and institutionalizing one that had already been developed (see 
Chapter 4). Gary (1999, 7) in the The Nervous Liberals, offers a plausible 
explanation for this contemporary quietism that strikes to the heart of the 
paternal qualities that attach to the educational project: 
I want to suggest that the propaganda anxieties that beset U.S. 
culture in the era from WWI to the cold war might not have resulted in 
such ideological constriction had the nation's political and intellectual 
classes perceived the U.S. public as being capable, rational, and 
responsible. The pessimistic assumptions about public incompetence 
and susceptibility that pervaded much liberal intellectual culture for 
most of the twentieth century deepened as the totalitarian powers-
with their dictatorship cults, international fifth columns, and mass 
followings-grew as national security threats. If leading liberal thinkers 
and policy makers had had a higher estimation of public capacity 
would they have offered a more principled defense of democratic 
institutions? Would they have contributed to the national security 
state's enormous growth had they been less fearful of the supposed 
machine-age power of propaganda? 
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Yet some "public intellectuals," a vanished breed according to Jacoby (1987), 
spoke directly to the "people." At the height of the Cold War, U.S. sociologist 
C. Wright Mills produced The Causes of World War III, (1958), a tract that 
addressed militarism and war. 22 British academics, Bertrand Russell and E. P. 
Thompson most notably, actively campaigned against the practice of nuclear 
war. However, a socially ordained quietism is perhaps the most fitting term 
to describe the academic intellectual aporias. Antiwar protests and ban the 
bomb marches did little to change the trajectory of academic knowledge 
production. U.S. President Eisenhower's injunction (Farewell Speech to the 
Nation, January 1961) to "guard against the acquisition of unwarranted 
influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex," 
went academically unheeded.23 
Historicizing the Aporia 
Reasons for Anglocentric war aporias stretch well back into nineteenth 
century and to the Enlightenment (Mann, 1988, 147). Though mass war as 
exemplified by universal conscription (levee en masse) originated in France 
after the Revolution of 1789, the inter-statist peace in Europe from the 
Congress of Vienna (1815) to the wars of German expansion (1864-1871) 
obscured the recognition of the continuing influence of warfare on society. 
As well, European indusfrialization coincided with the period of relative peace 
that followed the Napoleonic upheaval, this coincidence itself leading some 
social theorists to view war as anachronistic in an age of unprecedented 
material progress. 
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In The German Ideology published in 1846, Marx (Tucker, 1972, 126-129) 
tellingly wrote about war in his discussion of the historical dialectic, "Up till 
now [the time of communitarian tribal society] violence war, pillage, murder 
and robbery, etc. have been accepted as the driving force of history." With 
the coming of private property and division of labour, Marx concluded that 
war became archaic (German Ideology in Marx-Engels Reader, 126-129). 
This beneficent view colored academic perceptions of warfare from the late 
nineteenth century, and still grounds the Utopian trajectory in much "left 
academic labour." 
Daniel Pick (1993, 52-53) writes, "Marx shared with Cobden [Victorian anti-
militarist] the view that militarism as such was fundamentally anachronistic 
and atavistic." The influential British sociologist Herbert Spencer viewed war 
very similarly. Pick (77): 
Spencer divided society into two types-the "militant" and the 
"industrial" types. Despite their commingling in practice, he believed 
that they displayed an opposite character in principle. The industrial 
form was thus, in its essence, opposed to war. In the militant society 
(exemplified by Russia and Prussia), the state appropriates industry, 
above all railways for military functions. Political control gradually 
slides back towards the army. In the industrial society (such as 
Britain) on the other hand, the historical trajectory is towards free 
trade, liberalism and a gradual decline in the role of the state. 
Yet, at the same time, the formative role of war in human history was 
recognized almost without exception. Hacker et al (1987, 753): 
Spencer more forcefully than Marx insisted on a military model for 
industrial organization, and more forthrightly than Engels traced 
women's subordination to the male monopoly of arms. By nineteenth 
century's end, the idea that government ultimately originated in 
military institutions had become widely accepted. Some believed with 
Marx and Spencer that militarism declined as industrialism advanced; 
others shared the view often linked to social Darwinism that military 
institutions remained as vital as ever. Virtually no one, however, 
questioned the historical primacy of military institutions. 
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That, however, changed quickly. While Spencer himself was aware his 
positive evolutionary social model had been overtaken by events in his own 
lifetime, it was the positive views of war's obsolescence that carried forward 
into the twentieth century Anglophonic academy. Robert M. Young (1998, 
179) in Herbert Spencer and "Inevitable" Progress"writes: 
When he (Spencer) first put forward his ideas in the 1850s the acme 
of civilisation could be glimpsed. In the early 1860s and subsequently 
his hopes were dashed. One need only think of the Crimean War 
(1854-6), the American Civil War (1861-5), the Great Depression 
(1876-96), and the Boer War (1899-1902). 
This is not to suggest that war did not have powerful military/academic 
supporters. For military leaders such as Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth 
Ludwig von Moltke (1800-1891) and the social Darwinist British Brigadier-
General Sir Reginald Clare Hart (1848-1931) war was a necessary and 
desirable social practice, a moral social cleansing that was inherently 
progressive. While such views fell into disfavour in the twentieth century, 
the positive view that war had been conquered did not. Hacker et al (1987, 
757) state: 
Military institutions as a subject of comment or study, however, 
declined sharply after World War 1 (1918). One reason was reaction 
against the excesses of social evolutionism, with which historical 
interest seemed closely allied. All the social sciences stressed a more 
narrowly conceived scientism centered on studying structure. Military 
studies might well have benefited from such an approach, but a widely 
felt revulsion against war debarred them from such consideration. 
During the next two decades and more aging scholars whose 
intellectual roots antedated World War I still assumed the military 
origins of civilized society, but these ideas grew less and less relevant 
to current concern~. Only since mid-century has interest in these 
subjects revived .... 
The military theorist Martin Shaw (1988, 12) chronicles the way these 
academic war aporias were built into the very structure of the Anglophonic 
conceptual apparatus, this particular perceptual formation of necessity 
disallowing an appreciation of the formative role of war: 
Despite a wide acceptance of the social character of war, it is widely 
excluded from the basic models of modern society that are on offer in 
social science. The concept of "industrial society" which has informed 
mainstream sociology from Saint-Simon, Comte and Durkheim 
onwards was defined by contrast with the military hierarchy of feudal-
agrarian society. It was proposed by Comte, for example, in the belief 
that a rational scientific social organization of labour-the basic sense 
of "industry"-must imply peace. It has long since been proven that 
this optimism was utterly displaced: but the concept of "industrial 
society" has survived, minus the assertion of pacifism, as a de facto 
model of warless society. 
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Marxism, of course, could not conceptualize war/militarism as the "prime 
mover," that role reserved for the mode/means of production. Shaw writes 
(13): 
Later Marxism confronted the twentieth century experience of war by 
adapting the model, to theorise about the state, imperialism and 
nationalism. These code words have entered the wider sociological 
parlance, generally permitting their users to skirt round the problem of 
war by examining the wider economic, political and ideological 
relations: rarely the social process of war itself. 
This particular "blind spot" in Marxism may have contributed more than any 
other discursive construct to war aporias in the Anglophonic academy. "Left" 
critics otherwise may have concentrated more on exposing the formative 
social and economic influence of warfare and military institutions.24 A 
singular economic determinism as compared to an inter-active (reciprocal) 
multiple determinist model may have held more explanatory power, at least 
in understanding the continuing socially constitutive nature of warfare. The 
sociologist Warren Spro'ule (1997) in Virtual Battlefields: Informatics, 
"Irreality" and the Sociology of War: 
... mainstream sociology has taken from classical nineteenth-century 
theory two kindred assumptions about contemporary society: That 
military imperatives have been separated from and no longer play an 
important role on wider social activity; and that the incidence of 
warfare decreases and eventually disappears under conditions of 
modernity. 
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The sociologist of war, Michael Mann calls this neglect of war "shameful" 
(1988, 146). Mann divides sociology into two camps, the liberal/Marxian and 
the militarist. The liberal/Marxists camp won out over the militarist camp for 
a simple reason, liberal/Marxists won World War II. He writes (148): 
Since 1945 the militarists have been forgotten, the waverers purged 
on their most violent side (e.g. Weber's Herrschaft became not 
"domination" but "authority" in English translation), and the "classic 
tradition" of liberal/Marxist pacific transnational sociology has been 
enshrined in pedagogy [italics added]. 
Jacques von Doorn (1973), a noted sociologist and historian of war, writes: 
With the exception of the social origins of the officer corps, little 
cumulative research has been undertaken [in military sociology], and 
in fact much of what is carried out amounts to further argumentation 
of the body of empirical knowledge with no further theoretical 
processing [italics added]. 
Martin Shaw (1998, 12) writes similarly: 
For virtually all schools of social thought, wars are exceptional phases 
in social life, abnormal phenomena that interrupt the fundamental 
social patterns. On this point there is no serious disagreement 
between, say, a functionalist sociologist like Talcott Parsons, for whom 
society is essentially consensual and harmonious, and a Marxist 
theorist of modes of exploitation and class struggle. War is as much a 
disturbance of the ordinary pattern of capitalist development and class 
conflict as it is of the self-equilibrating social system. 
However, the academic refusal to view war and militarism as unexceptional, 
pervasive and endemic ~may be based on more than a simple "winner writes 
history." The military theorist Sir Michael Howard points out in his recent 
essay The Invention of Peace (2001) that at no point since 1648 when the 
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modern statist system was instituted with the Peace of Westphalia has that 
system ever led to stability or peace. The historian Niall Ferguson (2001, 28) 
writes similarly, "No twenty-five year period since 1495 has been entirely 
without war." At the same, however, he writes (393), "Such beliefs [in the 
end of war] have proven remarkably resilient in the face of repeated and 
bitter disappointment." 
Keeley (1996, 121) identifies academic roots of what he identifies as the 
"trade-raid opposition": 
One common assumption made by many people concerning the 
contexts for war and peace is that if societies are exchanging goods 
and marriage partners with one another, relations between them are 
likely to remain peaceful. This assumption underlies the often-voiced 
opinion that increasing trade and "cultural exchanges" between 
otherwise hostile nations will lessen the chances of war. This attitude 
reflects some social anthropological observations about what has been 
called the trade-raid opposition. Following the lead of the great French 
structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, anthropologists have 
characterized trading and raiding as structurally opposed forms of 
social relations: "war is exchange gone bad, and exchange is a war 
averted. 
This commonsensical equation has, however, been proven wrong, during 
World Wars I and II especially. The modern state system, contrary to the 
"academic pacification of the past," has witnessed wars of increasing 
magnitude and lethality. Yet, the common view of industrial (and 
postindustrial) society as generally peaceful still informs academic production 
generally. 25 Mann (1986, 402) writes: " .... the unusual period of geopolitical 
and social peace dominating the west since World War II has led sociology to 
neglect the importance of military organization for modern society." 
Yet immediately after World War II, the British Empire fought off an 
indigenous independence movement to maintain control of the rubber trade 
in Malaysia, this tenacious hold on the rubber trade allowing the Empire to 
pay off its U.S. war debts. War in the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, 
Indonesia, in Korea, in China and in Indochina, in Palestine, in India and 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, in Greece and Cyprus marked the "peaceful era" 
immediately after World War II ended (1945-1955). 
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There were, of course, many other wars to follow, leading to 30 million actual 
cold war casualties (Coronil, 2000). When this list of wars, which is far from 
exhaustive, is combined with the wars for independence in Africa, with 
numerous coup d'etats throughput the world that led to deaths of more 
millions of people, for example in Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Iraq, Iran and Panama, the argument for the existence for academic war 
aporias is compelling. However, even Mann, a prominent contemporary 
sociologist of war, falls prey to the post WWII "peace thesis," to the "optical 
illusion." 
Contradictorily however, Mann concludes the chapter on "the autonomy of 
military power" stating ( 440): "Military power-despite its neglect by 
twentieth century sociology-proved to have massive and murderous effects 
on twentieth century society. Its world-historical moment of 1914 was 
actually to last rather longer." 
Aporias Contradicted 
Hacker and Hacker (1987, 744-745) identify this academic war aporia: 
Military institutions have strongly and persistently affected other social 
and economic institutions, a larger reality often ignored by modern 
scholars of whatever political persuasion. The problem begins with an 
inability-or unwillingness-to understand military institutions on their 
own terms. Conservative and Marxist theorists alike, for example, can 
offer no theory to explain either the cause or effects of innovation in 
military technology .... That war often promotes technological change 
has become somet"ing of a truism since the Industrial Revolution 
allowed ideas to become weapons swiftly enough to reshape the war in 
progress-when, of course, money flows most freely. Yet the 
constant, though often far from obvious interactions of military 
institutions with other aspects of society have consequences 
potentially far greater [italics added]. 
More powerfully, the noted U.S. scholar Bruce Porter (1994) writes: 
"The decisive means for politics is violence," wrote Max Weber, 
"Anyone who fails to see this is ... a political infant." But if a randomly 
selected group of educated Americans and Europeans were asked to 
list the five words that best characterize Western civilization, it is a fair 
bet that only a handful would include "violence." We resist 
acknowledging, much less squarely confronting, the pervasive role of 
war in our history and politics, conditioned as we are by three 
centuries of Enlightenment vanity to think of the history of the West as 
a tapestry of progress, a steady ascent from Medieval darkness to the 
light of reason. When faced with the nonetheless undeniable 
prevalence of violent conflict in the modern era, we shrink, ostrichlike, 
from the implications of our own history. The tendency of scholarship 
has been to marginalize the study of war into compartmentalized 
niches of military history and international security, to treat war as 
anomaly, an interruption on the development of the West. Should we 
not rather discard evolutionary and progressive models of change and 
humbly acknowledge this tragic-and fundamental-thread in Western 
Civilization? 
Levidow and Robins (1989, 160) write similarly: 
"The discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline." The military 
serves as a model for the organizational imperative "that the 
obedience of a plurality [mass] of [sic] men is rationally uniform." 
From that base, Weber argued, it has developed a pervasive impact 
upon the broader social order: "No special proof is necessary to show 
that military discipline is the ideal model for the capitalist [and 
socialist] factory, as it was for the ancient plantation." The scientific 
management of both the army and industry requires rational 
calculation and impersonal regulation. In both spheres, "the psycho-
physical apparatus of man is completely adjusted to the demands of 
the world, the tools, machines-in short, to an individual "function." 
Sproule (1997) concurs: 
Spinning off his central conviction that "[m]ilitary discipline gives birth 
to all discipline" (19.158: 1155), Weber particularly stressed the part 
played by the armed forces and war in nation-state formation in 
general and capitalism in particular (1968: 980-982); the same 
influence at work in the organisation of civilian industry and workplace 
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practices, so obvious that "[n]o special proof is necessary to show that 
military discipline is the ideal of the modern capitalist factory, as it was 
for the ancient plantation" ( 1968: 1148-1155) ... 
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On the "ancient plantation" as in the "capitalist factory" "labour" is modeled 
on military discipline, not arrived at in some "natural" way as classical 
economics has it. The great theorizer of contemporary society, Max Weber, 
even attributes the rise of democracy to war. He states: "The basis of 
democratization is everywhere purely military in character ... Military discipline 
meant the triumph of democracy because the community wished and was 
compelled to secure the co-operation of non-aristocratic masses and hence 
put arms, and along with arms political power, into their hands" (Weber, 
General Economic History, 1950, 325-326, from Porter, 1994, xvi). 
In a similar vein, T.C.W. Blanning (1996, 211) in The Origins of the French 
Revolutionary Wars held that: 
... the French Revolutionary wars did constitute the first modern 
war, not because it represented a conflict between two diametrically 
opposed ideologies [royalist religious conservative vs. democratist 
secular liberalism], but because of what it became. By liberating their 
states in the course of 1792-94, by casting off all inhibitions and 
maximising their resources, the French revolutionaries waged total war 
of unprecedented intensity and on an unprecedented scale. Not only 
did it "revolutionise the Revolution" it also forced the other European 
states into emulation, however delayed and partial. After almost a 
quarter of a century of devastation, exploitation and over-exertion, no 
part of Europe was untouched, politically economically, socially 
intellectually or culturally. It was not the French Revolution which 
created the modern w?rld it was the French revolutionary wars. 
Mumford (1934, 90) too assigned a central productive role to the military. 
"By the sixteenth century," writes Mumford, "mining had definitely set the 
pattern for capitalist exploitation" (1934, 74-75): 26 
First, improvements in the technique of warfare, especially the rapid 
growth of the artillery arm, increased the consumption of iron: this led 
to new demands upon the mine. In order to finance the ever more 
costly equipment and maintenance of the new paid soldiery, the rulers 
of Europe had recourse to the financier. As security for the loan, the 
lender took over the royal mines. The development of the mines 
themselves then became a respectable avenue of financial enterprise, 
with returns that compared favorably with the usurious and generally 
unpayable interest. Spurred by the unpaid notes, the rulers were in 
turn driven to new conquests or to the exploitation of remote 
territories: and so the cycle began over again. 
Mumford (76) continues: 
... War, mechanization, mining and finance played into each other's 
hands. Mining was the key industry that furnished the sinews of war 
and increased the metallic contents of the original capital hoard, the 
war-chest: on the other hand, it furthered the industrialization of 
arms, and enriched the financier by both processes. The uncertainty 
of both warfare and mining increased the possibilities for speculative 
gains: this provided a rich broth for the bacteria of finance to thrive in. 
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Thus Mumford locates the origins of capitalism in its relationship to mining 
and warfare. This is quite similar to Braudel's (1967) historical tracing of the 
origins of capitalism in which he highlights the role of the great German 
banking family, the Fuggers, and their relationship to mining. 
While Marx subscribed to the "war obsolescence theory," the same cannot be 
said of his successors. Engels and Lenin did address the way in which the 
historical dialectical process played out through the military function. Engels, 
unlike Marx, wrote extensively on warfare and militarism. For him, 
capitalism and militarism colluded to provide the conditions whereby "the 
armies of the prince~ (the capitalist state) become transformed into armies of 
the people; the machine refuses to work, and militarism collapses by the 
dialectic of its own evolution." (Engels as quoted in Shaw, 1988, 51). 
However, while this "dialectal transformation thesis" may have provided a 
theory that could account for the Russian Revolution, it certainly could not 
account for World War I in the rest of Europe. 
Lenin developed a highly theoretical approach to warfare and used 
Clausewitz's war theory to develop militant Marxism (see Chapter 3). His 
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1916 essay Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism combined Marxist 
philosophy with that of the Prussian military theorist. Clausewitz, of course, 
saw war as an extension of politics, a policy instrument to be employed to 
achieve political goals (Realpolitik). Lenin applied Clausewitiz's thought 
directly to the Marxist idea of proletarian revolution to create his particular 
form of militant Marxism whose goal was global revolution. 
Yet Lenin and Engels subordinated warfare to the "economy," reading 
contemporary warfare as a function of capitalist imperialism, thereby 
maintaining the primacy of economic determinism. While they did not "write 
warfare out of history," they could not accept its theoretical status as a 
variable that existed in part at least independent of the logic of capital. 
However, academic work-of the left or right-that did address war, 
capitalism, the individual, state and nation in ways that challenged the 
ideological primacy of liberal (and Hegelian) concepts of the state, the 
ideology of "liberal humanism," that challenged the idea of war and peace as 
formal and separate conditions of existence was kept out sight, olten as not 
demonized by the Anglophonic academy. This is evidenced, for example, in 
the fact that the dialectical analysis of warfare and militarism in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth was carried out by theorists schooled on the 
continent. 
Engels, who first developed a Marxist theory of war, had been schooled in 
· Germany in the Hegelian tradition as, of course, had Marx. Lenin was 
schooled in Russia. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the first theorists 
to produce a Marxist anti-militarist critique of war, were educated within the 
German Empire (they were killed for their efforts). On the other end of the 
spectrum in Weimar, th~ new German intellectual conservatives were as 
influenced by theories of war and by their experiences in the First World War 
as those who were opposed to war-and this prominently includes Walter 
Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht. The conservatives, however, in large 
accommodated and promoted "total war" theoretically and politically, and, 
indeed, as was the case with Ernst Junger, who used total war as the basis 
for a comprehensive political and moral stance (Wolin, 1991).27 
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However, that the liberal Hegelian paradigm of statist formalism (ideology of 
modernity) still holds in the current condition of long-standing constant low-
grade ultra-statist warfare can only be explained as an ideological denial of 
the actual conditions of contemporary existence. For example, even 
something so fundamental as Hegel's admiration of the militarist Prussian 
state which served as a model for his historical dialectic, that he served the 
Prussian state faithfully at the University of Berlin, seems to have gone 
missing in the contemporary Anglophonic academy wherein his work has 
been renovated recently. 
Knowledge Accessibility 
Continental history and sociology that did address the centrality of warfare in 
human history and in contemporary society was not readily available in the 
Anglophonic academy until the 1960s. Weber's Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
(published 1922, 2nd. volume 1925) was not available in English until 1947 
as The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.R. 
Henderson and Talcott Parsons. 
To complicate the situation, Parsons translation of Weber emphasized 
Weber's "social stasis" thought and remains controversial. Wirtschaft und 
Gesel/schaft, now titled Economy and Society, was republished in 1968 to 
address these concerns. Weber's work on religion is, of course, more 
prominent still than his work on militarism. As well, the two most prominent 
U.S. sociologists of their time, C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) and Talcott 
Parsons (1902-1979) spent their academic lives extending the work of 
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Weber, with Mills concentrating on industrialization and rationalization more 
than militarization and Parsons developing his "structural functionalism" as a 
capitalist operations manual for maintaining and extending "social stasis." 
Modernization theory and area studies provide examples (Simpson, 1998, 
165). 
Norbert Elias's Uber den Prozess der Zivilisation (1939) was first available in 
English in 1978 as The Civilizing Process. Elias (1982, 104), like Weber, 
attributed the rise of the nation-state to its monopoly on violence: 
The society of what we call the modern age is characterised, above all 
in the West, by a certain level of monopolisation. Free use of weapons 
is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever 
kind, and likewise, the taxation of property or income of individuals is 
concentrated in the hands of a central social authority. The financial 
means thus flowing into this central authority maintain its monopoly 
on force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation. 
Neither has in any sense precedence over the other; they are two 
sides of the same monopoly. 
While it was often held that modern states went from a state of 
indiscriminate (disorganized) violence to one of liberal freedom guaranteed 
by the statist maintenance of a military function separate from civil society, it 
may be more correct to think of the state itself as built upon structured-and 
pervasive-violence grounded in a general militarization of the socius. Otto 
Hintze, a German historian whose work was not readily available in English 
until relatively recently, certainly did not subscribe to the "peaceable society" 
thesis. Like so many theorists who lineate and categorize existence (employ 
time as a marker), Hintze (1975, 187) divided history into three epochs: 
We can distinguish three great epochs in this process [the 
Germanification of the Roman Empire], in which definite types of 
military and state organizations appear linked together: the epoch of 
the tribal and clan system at the dawn of history, the epoch of 
feudalism in the Middle Ages, and the epoch of militarism in the 
modern period. 
35 
Characterizing the modern period as an epoch of militarism differs in kind 
from concepts of modernity as Enlightenment and progress. Werner 
Sombart, like Weber, located the roots of capitalism outside the economy, in 
war (De Landa, 1991, 109). The Anna/es historian Fernand Braudel (1967, 
398-412), explains how the state came to garner this monopoly. According 
to Braudel, the great commercial towns (e.g. the towns of the Hanseatic 
League) could not appropriate the "war machine" as fully as the fledgling 
states of the sixteenth century. States drew fighters from relatively large 
geographic regions, could draw on greater material and financial resources to 
industrialize warfare ("national banks" came to form part of this equation), 
and could fight wars of longer span and intensity less expensively than the 
towns who used mercenary forces financed on a more local basis. 
As mentioned, anti-German academic sentiment tied to warfare led to the 
demonization of all things German. Lawton and Gordon (2002, 142-143) 
identify two reasons for the decline of the influence of German Idealism and 
the rise of "new philosophical systems more congenial to empirical science, 
such as pragmatism, logical positivism and linguistic philosophy" after World 
War I. 28 The first, sounding contemporary, was the rejection of the Hegelian 
view "that individuals only realize themselves as members of a state." The 
second was "a hatred of all things German" which combined with the rise of 
Hitler "ensured that Hegelian influence remained an object of intellectual and 
moral contempt until long after the Second World War. This can be seen 
clearly in Karl Popper's The Open Society and its Enemies (1945) and other 
attacks on historicism." 
The aporias grounded in these reasons and no doubt others led to an 
occlusion of critique and history that may have led to a theoretical 
(philosophical) appreciation of the formative impact of warfare on 
contemporary development, to a knowledge "lag" if not a complete 
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avoidance. Such a view is supported by the quick incorporation of European 
science into its AngloAmerican equivalent. For example, the work of 
Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Planck was applied to war-making with 
alacrity, while theory dedicated to understanding war and militarism and 
their relationship to the capitalist state system, the system of five hundred 
years as Braudel termed it, was kept off library shelves and conceptual 
agendas. 
Education as Credulity 
There may be a more heretical reason for academic war aporias. Pick (1993, 
215) writes: 
Even before the First World War, and ensuing bitter reflections on the 
"treason of the intellectuals," the idea of the peculiar susceptibility of 
the educated had been explored in the language of self-critical 
liberalism. Cf. Hobson's Psychology of Jingoism (1901): "Now the 
most astonishing phenomenon of war fever is the credulity displayed 
by the educated classes" (p.21). After 1914-18, of course, that 
perception grew much stronger. To take another example from the 
1930s, note how Virginia Woolf insists that certain kinds of education 
offer no protection, no civilisation against force, possessiveness, war: 
"Need we collect more facts from history and against biography to 
prove our statement that all attempts to influence the young against 
war through the education they receive at universities must be 
abandoned? For do they not prove that education, far from teaching 
the educated generosity and magnanimity, makes them on the 
contrary so anxious to keep their possessions, that "grandeur and 
power" of the poets speak, in their own hands, that they will use not 
force but much subtler methods than force when they are asked to 
share them? And are not force and possessiveness not very closely 
connected with war? (Three Guineas, p.35). 
Pick (201) also points out that Einstein "insists that the susceptibilities of the 
educated individual and the hypnotized masses cannot be easily 
differentiated. Indeed, if anything the intellectual and educated were more 
vulnerable than the uncultured population to collective manipulation."29 
Jacques Ellul, the French theologian and technology critic, developed a thesis 
similar to Einstein's. In Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes 
(1965, 110-111), Ellul observed a similar "peculiar susceptibility" of the 
educated: 
These facts [regarding the social implementation of literacy] leave no 
doubt that the development of primary education is a fundamental 
condition for the organization of propaganda, even though such a 
conclusion may run counter to many prejudices ... the need for a certain 
cultural level to make people susceptible to propaganda is best 
understood if one looks at one of propaganda's most important 
devices-the manipulation of symbols ...... it is only normal that the most 
educated people (intellectuals) are the first to be reached by such 
propaganda. 
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For Ellul urbanization and industrialization are necessary preconditions for 
the development and use of "propaganda." Propaganda is necessarily a 
function of massified (not organic) society. Goebbels himself, Ellul (93) 
writes, "recognized that the peasants could be reached only if their 
structured milieu was shattered; and the difficulties that Lenin experienced in 
integrating the Russians peasantry into the pattern of revolution are well 
known." 
The destruction of "structured milieu" in order to render a society receptive 
to various messages is most certainly a favoured military strategy. 
Psychological operations (psyops) have been developed for just that purpose. 
While Sun-Tze outlined these methods more than two thousand years ago, it 
wasn't until the First World War that they were scientized (academized) and 
turned on domestic populations (see Chapters 3 and 5). This, of course, is 
an active form of knowledge production. On the other hand, "credulity" is a 
passive form, whereby education itself circumscribes social possibility in 
specific ways by forming subjectivity susceptible to mediated messages (thus 
the suspicion of writing in an oral culture, see Chapter 4 ). Such may be the 
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trade-off between literacy and illiteracy, education and ignorance, when 
illiteracy (a concept that dates to late nineteenth century Europe) and 
ignorance are not equated with the lack of intelligence or ability. 
Thesis Outline 
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This author relies on historical "evidence" speaking, while aware that any 
"evidence" has been filtered at the least by time/power and the limitations 
inherent in communication. The work relies on the preponderance and 
variety of examples presented no matter their location in "history," as well as 
on the way they are presented, in the performative instance. The approach 
taken cuts through time, proceeding to produce a narrative based on viewing 
the past synchronomously. 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the topic of education and warfare. 
It has provided a working definition of education that differs markedly from 
usual idealist invocations of the term, the "immaculate conception." And it 
has placed education and war in context, providing a brief intellectual history 
of the theoretical study of warfare, and of the way theoretical study of · 
warfare has been neglected in the AngloAmerican academy. It has offered 
some possible reasons for this neglect, and also demonstrated that there has 
been much more interest in war and the way it relates to the academy, to 
knowledge production-though not necessarily dissemination-since the end 
of the Cold War. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief excursus into the historical conditions that made 
various forms of twentieth century critique possible. It provides the "outline 
of a method," providing a theoretical justification for academic work that is at 
once intuitive and methodical. Indeed, employing intuition, following one's 
nose to the point where historical and rhetorical disconnections and 
discontinuities seem to evidence continuity and coherence, is perhaps the 
work's greatest strength and weakness. Yet such could not but be the 
"method" as there in no "historical record" to access or a body of literature 
dedicated to the examination of education and its relationship to warfare. 
This information, including the "theory" that gives it meaning, was culled 
from the most diverse of sources and then patterned (sequenced). These 
sequences and patterns constitute "findings." 
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In order to accomplish this, the author employed "dialectical thinking" itself 
as method. Such method allows, indeed encourages, various forms of 
unorthodox language usage and even the employment of "creative 
ambiguity." Such method is intended to draw attention to the way ambiguity 
is "built-into" language, to allow novel conceptualization of "everyday" events 
and ways of speaking. The author attempts this by transforming nouns into 
processes-verbs (this itself a symptom of the "Americanization" of English). 
Thus capitalism, or, more correctly, the installation of capitalism in various 
societies or societal sectors, is termed "capitalization" (a play on conventional 
restricted meaning of that term). Likewise for "nationalism," its social 
installation is referred to as "nationalization." And for militarism, 
industrialism, postindustrialism; however, the term "weaponization" is 
employed without reference to "weaponism." This unorthodox language is 
intended to draw the reader's attention to the historical and contingent 
quality of so many phenomena that so often are taken as natural "states of 
being." 
Chapter 3, titled "War Machine," addresses the history, discourse and social 
practice of warfare by employing 1870 as a jumping off point. It takes the 
reader through recent war history and war critique as well as war literature. 
It provides a historical tracing of the contemporary "war machine," and 
provides theory to place0 warfare in a context that emphasizes its impact on 
everyday existence, not only in periods of war, but in periods of ostensible 
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"peace." It proffers "counter" or "anti-war machines" based in the theory of 
Deleuze and Guatarri, suggesting that these "war machines" that are not for 
war provide a site of resistance to the "war machine" dedicated to 
destruction. It provides a number of exemplars of twentieth century 
literature and culture that reflect the material and psychological prevalence 
of war throughout the century. Finally, it points to the significance of 1870 
as a year when great change became evident, where the impact of the 
industrial revolution on both material and immaterial production came to 
world attention because of the war of 1870-71. 
Chapter 4 addresses the development of the Teaching Machine, the making 
of contemporary perception from that same historical vantage. Employing 
1870 as a jumping off point once again, the work addresses the political 
engineering of perception that began as soon as the technological means to 
do so were available. Again the work provides a brief historical excursus, 
taking the reader to the mechanization of perception that began with the 
invention of perspective during the Florentine Renaissance. 
The chapter draws upon polyglot sources once again, piecing together a 
narrative to demonstrate that "education" and the "media" do not exist in 
some binary formation with the first term privileged over and above the 
latter, but that these two modes of subjective formation-the "formal" and 
"informal" are complementary rather than antagonistic. 
The chapter addresses the processes of militarization, nationalization, 
industrialization and capitalization. Each of these processes is conceived as a 
significant contribution to subjectivization or, more philosophically, 
subjectification, the production of subjectivity. More "theory" is developed as 
well, this time employing Deleuze and Guatarri's concept of "assemblage." 
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Chapter 5 extends this analysis to postindustrialization, documenting ways in 
which processes of educationalization have changed along with material 
conditions. The author examines the "weaponization of education," providing 
four exemplars of the process. This leads to the conclusion that the complex 
of educational and research institutions that comprise the contemporary 
academy is itself the greatest war weapon ever invented. 
Highlighting ways in which education from its inception in Ancient Greece has 
demonstrably intimate connections to warfare, that education is warfare in 
ways that have been left inarticulate, the author asks if education as warfare 
is a permanent condition. A brief history of education as war is developed, 
demonstrating ways in which contemporary education is as formatively 
influenced by war as by the state and capitalism. 
The whole of the work is permeated by "dialectical thinking," the continual 
attempt to look "behind the seen/scene" to what is hidden-and to 
understand how the "seen"-including the tools for its apprehension-is a 
contingent (historical) construction. To that end, the Hegelian insight 
whereby quantitative change can become qualititative provides a unifying 
theme, evident not only in the author's conclusions, but in the theory 
brought to the fore and in the historical examples provided. 
Finally, a disruption of the "self-evident" is intended (Verfremdung). The 
work is meant to challenge received conceptions of education, capitalism, 
war, the state, industrialism and of history itself, of war and peace as 
separate spheres and forces. It is intended to replace such a disintegrated-
disciplined-conceptual framework with a view that recognizes the intense 
interrelatedness and continuity, as well as the abrupt discontinuity, of social 
forces and their discursiv.,e constructions (history). 
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Chapter Notes 
1 Katherine Hayles (1999, 12-13), though specifically discussing the 
information/materiality dichotomy, provides a remarkable caution regarding the 
idealist privileging of a discourse/social practice: 
The Platonic backhand works by inferring from the world's noisy multiplicity 
a simplified abstraction. So far so good: this is what theorizing should do. 
The problem comes when the move circles around to constitute the 
abstraction as the originary form from which the world's multiplicity derives. 
Whereas the Platonic backhand has a history dating back to Greeks, the 
Platonic forehand is more recent. To reach fully developed form, it required 
the assistance of powerful computers. This move starts from simplified 
abstractions and, using simulation techniques such as genetic algorithms, 
evolves a multiplicity sufficient complex that it can be seen as a world of its 
own. The two moves thus make their play in opposite directions. The 
backhand goes from noisy multiplicity to reductive simplicity, whereas the 
forehand swings from simplicity to multiplicity. They share a common 
ideology-privileging the abstract as the Real and downplaying the 
importance of material instantiation. 
"Education" is privileged once through the "Platonic backhand." As the social 
practice of law often abstracts Justice as the Real (i.e. law considered as the 
administration of Justice), so the social practice of education is abstracted as 
the Real. Unlike "Justice," which is separated in language from "law," 
"Education" is a term used to signify both its material instantiation (daily 
practice) and its Ideal Form (education). This privileges the abstract 
"Education" twice. 
2 Hoskin {1993, 271-304) argues that education is the "proto" or "Ur" discipline. 
He writes, "education far from being subordinate, is superordinate." This work 
subscribes to this concept, that education is a central arena for academic 
production, and indeed, following Hoskin, that the disciplines themselves came 
out of education. Hoskin (272) claims that the idea of education as an "inferior 
form of disciplinary life" is "perverse and misguided." 
3 Prevailing conceptions of education are grounded in the "ideology of 
humanism," the granting of the human of an a priori status as an autonomous, 
free-standing monad that is "shaped" or "molded" or allowed to "fully develop 
its inherent potential" by application of proper education (e.g. Bi/dung, liberal 
education). Humanism works ideologically to prevent the recognition of the 
profound ways in which humans are plastic, socially produced. This production 
goes much beyond "socialization," a concept that respects autonomous 
subjectivity (the liberal subject) which is merely addended socially. The 
humanist model of the human is tied closely to Enlightenment liberalism (e.g. 
Locke, Rousseau) which provides prevailing conceptions of "freedom." 
4 William Spanos (199J, 2000) is one of the few educational theorists who takes 
a similar view of the educative process. Using Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault, 
Spanos locates contemporary educational discourse in the Roman re-
colonization of the originary "errant" (de-centered) thinking of the pre-Socratic 
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Grecians. On this reading, the displacement of a-lethia with veritas, truth as 
dis-closure (Heidegger finds this kind of truth in theoria) with truth as 
correspondence (between object and representation) was co-extant with the 
privileging of the sense of sight to which the pre-Socratic Greeks were 
ambivalent (Jay, 1993) and, with the imperial eye (ocularcentrism) instituted, 
the constitution of education as (readily observable) scholarship and training in 
good conduct (eruditio et institutio in bonas artes) was implemented. 
Spanos (1993, xii-xx) claims this pedagogical imperialism resonates throughout 
humanist education from the Enlightenment, and resonates again in the New 
World Order (Pax Americana): 
However outrageous it may at first seem to the innocent and well-
intentioned disinterested humanist or liberally educated man or woman, this 
disciplinary strategy-this technology of power-which has as its end the 
coercive re-formation of de-formed entities or, what is the same thing, the 
re-centering of the de-centered center and thus of ec-centric or err-atic 
being in the name of the logocentric norm (the guardian eye of bourgeois 
humanism) and the consumer capitalist power structure - has been the 
real agenda informing the "disinterested," "liberal" discourse of the post-
Enlightenment university. 
5 This follows with the definition taken from The Catholic Encyclopedia: "In the 
broadest sense, education includes all those experiences by which intelligence 
is developed, knowledge acquired, and character formed. In a narrower sense, 
it is the work done by certain agencies and institutions, the home and the 
school, for the express purpose of training immature minds." 
6 Ilan Gur-Ze 'ev (2001) has developed a "posthumanist" pedagogy-or a 
counter-education-that stands in contradistinction to liberal pedagogies with 
their assumptions of dialectical or linear progress. For Gur-Ze'ev, what is 
commonly construed as education per se is normalizing education, a practice 
that is inherently violent because it imposes a series of restrictions upon the 
"knower." 
7 Gur-Ze'ev (1999) in Knowledge and Violence writes: 
Normalized education constitutes and commands the "subject" in four 
levels: 1. Control of the psychic construction of the "subject," her 
psychological possibilities, strives, as well as the limits of controlling and 
changing th~ir borders. 2. Control of the conceptual apparatus, associations 
and their integration with the psychic level and its presence in the 
conceptual level. 3. Control of collective and private self-conscious. 4. 
Control of the function of the "subject" in "her" reality and the minimization 
of the possibilities for change in the representation of reality that 
normalizing education reflects and serves. 
8 For counter-history and counter-education, see Foucault (1977) "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History" in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. "Counterfactual" 
is a term taken from~the Niall Ferguson (2001, 407). Ferguson, justifying a 
"speculative" approach to the writing of history, says, "As so often in historical 
analysis, only a 'counterfactual' approach will get us close to a sufficient 
answer." While making no comparison to the work of Ferguson and other 
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contemporary speculative historians, nonetheless, this author subscribes to the 
idea that "history" is more than fact (random data), that is can be read 
coherently. 
9 Fredric Jameson's commentary on the usefulness of the German playwright, 
dramaturgist and theorist Bertolt Brecht for academic production informs this 
use of Verfremdung (estranging the familiar). See Fredric Jameson, Brecht and 
Method and Maria-Regina Kecht (Ed.). (1992) Pedagogy is Politics: Literary 
Theory and Critical Teaching. 
10 Guatarri (1995, 1-2) writes: 
At least three types of problem prompt us to enlarge the definition of 
subjectivity beyond the classical opposition between individual subject and 
society, and in doing so, revise the models of the unconscious currently in 
circulation: the irruption of subjective factors at the forefront of current 
events, the massive development of machinic productions of subjectivity 
and, finally, the recent prominence of ethological and ecological 
perspectives on human subjectivity. 
This work follows Guattari's model especially as regards the "machinic 
production of subjectivity." 
11 Industrial is simply a term to refer to human industry (the manipulation of the 
environment). However, it is used here in a more discrete sense to refer to the 
application of power-driven machinery to (manu)facturing. The mechanical 
loom, a primary instance of the use of external power in the manufacturing 
process, is dated to 1785 (the Rev. E. Cartwright). However, full-blown 
industrialization often is dated to 1848 in England, and was evident in the 
eastern US and western Europe shortly thereafter. Industrialization 
~ precipitated vast changes to social life, the human as well as to production per 
se (manufacturing). 
12 Keeley (1996, 164) writes: 
The concepts that provide the framework for the pacified past originated in 
the period immediately following World War II. Several features of that 
particular war and its aftermath encouraged a pervasive and profound 
odium for everything connected with warfare. Since the hearth and 
wellspring of modern Western culture remains western Europe, the events 
in and the attitudes of that region are of key concern because they soon 
radiate to the New World and beyond. 
13 Athusser (1969, 101) defines overdetermination: " ... the 'contradiction' is 
inseparable from the total structure of the social body in which it is found, 
inseparable from its formal conditions of existence, and even from the 
instances it governs; it is radically affected by them, determining, but also 
determined in one and the same movement, and determined by the various 
levels and instances of the social formations it animates; it might be called 
overdetermined in its principle." 
14 Personal correspondence with Professor Ramirez, August 29, 2002. 
15 Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (2002, 837) writes: 
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.... if war is now the normal state of affairs for the industrialized nations, 
then potentially all media technologies, no matter who designed them for 
what purpose, add to the suffusion of society with war. In this case, the 
term war transcends its restricted meaning and now refers to a set of basic 
operational procedures that are as indispensable to combat situations and 
military engagements as they are to the routines of everyday life of modern 
society. The execution of these operations involves surveillance, 
information gathering, and interception while their preparation involves drill, 
mobilization, and the creation of self-guided operators. The latter is also 
known as subject-formation ... 
This work extends that argument to education "as a set of basic operational 
procedures that are as indispensable to combat situations and military 
engagements as they are to the routines of everyday life of modern society." 
In this regard and many others, postindustrial society is totally-blended, 
rhetorical demarcation between war and peace, education and training, civil 
and military notwithstanding (see Chapter 5). 
16 The biologism of anthropologists as Conrad Lorenz and Lionel Tiger and the 
"biological determinism" that characterize some forms of feminism stress the 
"natural violence of the male." Keeley (1996, 157-58) provides an 
encapsulation of this issue: 
One persistent claim made regarding the scarcity of peace is that humans 
( especially men) are driven by their "biology" or "nature" to war on one 
another. Obviously, nothing in humans' nature inhibits them from making 
war, but this lack hardly creates an automatic compulsion to fight. Almost 
all higher animals are capable-of violence against their own kind. Humans 
seem no more predisposed to aggressive behavior than any other species 
that commonly fights and occasionally kills its own kind over territory, 
sexual access, or social dominance. 
The "evolutionary psychologist" Richard Dawkins, in his book The Selfish Gene 
(1989), takes "biologism" to another level altogether. He views humans as 
"gene machines," with human behavior pre-programmed genetically-to 
preserve a "selfish" genetic make-up. 
17 Keeley (1996, 20) expresses academic aporia as regards the military origin of 
the most taken-for-granted of cultural artifacts, highways and cars: 
Such completely symbolic interpretations [academic interpretations of the 
built environment] also neglect the extremely significant fact that among 
the primary rationales for building the German autobahns and the American 
inter state freeway system were arguments that they would facilitate the 
movement of modern mechanized armies. If present-day archaeologists 
were faced with interpreting the physical remains of modern industrial 
societies, they might emphasize the derivative symbolism of cars and 
highways while quietly ignoring the dependence of such symbolism on 
practical economic or even military concerns. 
~ 
18 Van Creveld (1991, 210) writes: 
In the not too distant future, major-military-technological research and 
development as we have known it since the industrial revolution will grind 
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to halt. Even today, for every new weapons system actually fielded there 
are perhaps a score that never get beyond the drawing board; the research 
and development process is in large party an empty game whose main 
purpose is to provide employment and serve as a welfare system for 
engineers. 
19 Internet sites by the score now deliver critical comment on a daily basis. 
Prominent among these are Chomsky's Znet, http://www.zmag.org/ZNET.htm, 
From the Wilderness Publications, 
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/index.html, Antiwar.com, 
http://www.antiwar.com/World Policy Institute, 
http:/ /www.worldpolicy.org/wpi/index.html, Third World Traveler, 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/wpi/index.html), and the University of Munster's 
Peace and Conflict Studies, http://www.uni muenster.de/ 
PeaCon/welcomee.html. 
20 Massumi (1993) in The Politics of Everyday Fear examines the 
institutionalization of quotidian fear during the Cold War period. Robert Corber 
(1997) in Homosexuality in Cold War America: Resistance and the Crisis of 
Masculinity examines the relationship between Cold War and the construction of 
homosexuality as a pathological threat to national security. He examines the 
way in which media, most especially the content of movies, were enlisted in 
this effort. The films of Alfred Hitchcock are exemplary. Jeff Schmidt (2000) in 
Disciplined Minds: A Critical Look at Salaried Professionals and the Sou/-
Battering System that Shapes their Lives examines the role of 
professionalization in domesticating academia. 
21 Sidney Lens (1987) in Permanent War was one of the first to document the rise 
of the national security state (garrison state) during the Second World War. 
His work captures the militarization of existence as a function of changes to the 
role of the state that occurred in the U.S. and all other Anglophonic 
jurisdictions. Lens traces contemporary statism (nominal democracy) to 
generative developments during the Second World War. Lens writes, "in 1939 
the (U.S.) federal government had about eight hundred thousand civilian 
employees, about 10% of whom worked for national security agencies. At the 
end of the war the figure approached four million of which more than 75% were 
in national security agencies (Barnet Richard, Roots of War, 1972)." Other 
work, notably The Economy of Death, Barnet (1969), War and Society, 
Polenburg, (1972), a book of record on the quotidian influence of the Second 
World War, The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline, 
Melman (1974), The Coming of Postindustrial Society, Bell (1973) addresses 
the formative influence of war and militarism in the development of new forms 
of capitalism and statism. None of this work directly addressed the role of the 
research university in constructing the national security state, viewed the 
research university itself as a war weapon, or addressed the role of education 
in the process. 
22 C. Wright Mills had af,ready explained the influence of the military industrial 
complex in 1959 in The Power Elite. He called it a power elite because its 
leaders came from all areas of society. He identified the influence of the 
military on education. 
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23 From Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation (1961): 
The conjunction of an immense military establishment and huge arms 
industry is new in the American experience. The total influence - economic, 
political, and even spiritual-is felt in every city, every state house, and 
every office of the federal government .. .In the councils of government, we 
must guard against unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by 
the military-industrial complex. 
24 "Crises of overaccumulation" is a very productive Marxist concept that can 
explain the role of warfare in the contemporary U.S. According to Marxist 
theory, overaccumulation is "built-into" capitalism; is forms a portion of the 
logic of the capitalist system. War can provide a "clearing house" by which 
capitalism rids itself of too much wealth in the form of "capital" (e.g. "money"). 
To quote from Patrick Bond What is a crisis of overproduction?: 
Capital accumulation refers to the generation of wealth in the form of 
"capital." It is capital because it is employed by capitalists not to produce 
with specific social uses in mind, but instead to produce commodities for the 
purpose of exchange, for profit, and hence for the self-expansion of capital. 
Such an emphasis by individual capitalists on continually expanding the 
"exchange-value" of output, with secondary concern for the social and 
physical limits of expansion (size of the market, environmental, political and 
labour problems, etc.), gives rise to enormous contradictions. These are 
built into the very laws of motion of the system. Perhaps the most serious 
of capitalist self- contradictions, most thoroughly embedded within the 
capital accumulation process, is the general tendency towards an increased 
capital-labour ratio in production-more machines in relation to workers-
which is fuelled by the combination of technological change and 
intercapitalist competition, and made possible by the concentration and 
centralisation of capital ... 
When an economy reaches a decisive stage of overaccumulation, then it 
becomes difficult to bring together all these resources in a profitable way to 
meet social needs. How does the system respond? There are many ways 
to move an overaccumulation crisis around through time and space. But the 
only real "solution" to overaccumulation-the only response to the crisis 
capable of reestablishing the conditions for a new round of accumulation-is 
widespread devaluation. Devaluation entails the scrapping of the economic 
deadwood, which takes forms as diverse as depressions, banking crashes, 
inflation, plant shutdowns, and, as Schumpeter called it, the sometimes 
"creative destruction" of physical and human capital (though sometimes the 
uncreative solution of war) [italics added]. The process of devaluation 
happens continuously, as outmoded machines and superfluous workers are 
made redundant, as waste (including state expenditure on armaments) 
becomes an acceptable form of mopping up overaccumulation, and as 
inflation eats away at buying power. This continual, incremental 
devaluation does rtiot, however, mean capitalism has learned to equilibrate, 
thus avoiding more serious, system-threatening crises. 
25 On this reading, postindustrialism co-exists alongside preindustrialism and 
industrialism. For example, one geographic area may be "totally wired" and 
dedicated to the production of information (for example, the accounting data 
produced in India "overnight" for transnational accounting firms based in 
Europe and North America), a preindustrial production platform dedicated to 
manual production may be located nearby, while an industrial gas works may 
be located between. 
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Each of these forms of production, in turn, in aspects increasingly resembles 
the others (blending). Industrial plants adopt digital technologies, while the 
postindustrial accounting firms come to resemble preindustrial "outputting" 
operations. The goods produced manually (preindustrial economy) are 
elevated to the status of "crafts" and produced for export and tourism, while 
industrially produced goods take the place of manually-produced goods in the 
local economy. Such a mixture was not possible until recently (the 1980s). 
However, all "advanced" economies at root are still a function of "third 
generation" industrial technologies (e.g. electrical generation, advanced 
metallurgy, petrochemicals [plastics], hierarchical corporate structures). In 
this rendering, modes of production are contiguous. 
As well, postindustrial refers to an economy of the interior, the production and 
consumption of subjectivity itself (cf. Negri, Back to the Future, A Portable 
Document). This differs from the original meaning (Touraine, 1970, Bell, 1973). 
26 De Landa (1991, 109) offers another interpretation of the overdetermination of 
the economy: 
There is a sense in which economic institutions have a military origin, but 
the inverse is also true. The trade and credit machinery created by 
capitalism was both a result and a cause of the commercialization of 
violence that began the clockwork era of mercenary warfare in the 
thirteenth century. A feedback loop was established between the two 
spheres: a certain level of productivity and a surplus created taxable 
wealth. This wealth fueled the war machine in the form of payments for 
mercenaries. The soldiers in turn became consumers, recirculating the 
money and stimulating the economy. A different loop involved the military 
not as a consumer but as a suppler: a suppler of protection for trade routes. 
Money buys protection, but at the same time, the technology of the 
protector evolves. 
27 Please note that the works of the authors referenced have been read in English 
translation only. 
28 Sloterdijk (1987, 348-49) writes: "In the will to knowledge, interests are 
always astir that do not exhaust themselves in knowledge as such but serve the 
subjects as weapons against the objects. 'Objective knowledge' in this sense 
possesses the character of a weapon." 
29 Virilio (1994, 23) explains this "peculiar susceptibility" may not have been quite 
so straightforward-that it took some to instill "learned ignorance." 
The retreat from the mathematically derived mechanical explanation took 
time. Max Planck~postulated quantum theory in 1900, 'quanta' being 
mathematical facts that cannot be accounted for. After that, as Sir Arthur 
Eddington remarked 'every genuine law of nature stood a good chance of 
seeming irrational to the rational man'. These facts were difficult to accept 
for they not only went against cumulative scientific prejudice, they went 
equally against the dominant philosophies and ideologies. 
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This makes it easier to see why Einstein's theory was banned, why efforts to 
popularize it and communicate it to a wider audience were so sporadic, 
'limiting and reducing the body of knowledge on the subject to a small 
privileged group crushing the philosophical spirit of the people and leading 
to the gravest spiritual impoverishment' ... By reminding us that 'there is no 
scientific truth', in the middle of a century crawling with engineers, Einstein 
remobolised what fifteenth century poets and mystics like Cues called 
learned ignorance; in other words the presupposition of not-knowing and 
especially not-seeing which restores to every research project it 
fundamental context of prime ignorance. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
OFFENSIVE POSITIONING 
Introduction 
This chapter provides the "outline of a method," providing a theoretical 
justification for academic work such as this that is as much intuitive as 
methodical. Indeed, employing intuition, following one's nose to the point 
where historical and rhetorical disconnections and discontinuities seem to 
evidence continuity and coherence, is perhaps the greatest strength and 
weakness of this production. Yet such could not but be the "method" as 
there is no "historical record" to access, or body of literature dedicated to the 
historical examination of education and its relationship to warfare. This 
information, including the "theory" that gives it meaning, was culled from the 
most diverse of sources and then patterned (sequenced). These sequences 
and patterns constitute "findings." 
In order to accomplish this, the author employs "dialectical thinking" itself as 
method. Such method allows, indeed encourages, various forms of 
unorthodox language usage and even the employment of "creative 
ambiguity." Such method is intended to draw attention to the way ambiguity 
is "built-into" language, to allow novel conceptualizations of "everyday" 
events and ways of speaking. The author attempts this by transforming 
nouns into processes-verbs (this itself a symptom of the "Americanization" 
of English). The author, as well, addresses the "battle of assumptions" 
between postmodern and empiricist historians, explaining how this 
production worked from within both productions. The chapter opens by 
~ 
proffering an excursus into the historical conditions that made various forms 
of twentieth century critique possible. 
Mise-en-scene 
If the Classical script that survived "history" is read symptomatically, it is 
evident that academic knowledge producers during both the classical and 
modern epochs were taken up with the formation and control of human 
thought and activity. The product of that concern (knowledge) time and 
again was reformed, rediscovered and reinvented-supplemented and 
superceded-to the point where the concern for control marks most 
knowledge and may even define it. 
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During the Enlightenment and the early Industrial era (circa 1700-1900) this 
concern evidenced prominently in the invention of secularism and the human 
sciences (Foucault, 1971). However, the human addressed (reinvented) by 
these discourses, neo-classical or modern, had been invented much earlier, 
some 2,500 years ago, on the Attic peninsula. 
The process by which this invention proceeded has recently come to be 
termed subjectification-the technologies of self-regulation (cf. Butler, 1997, 
Deleuze, 1995, Foucault, 1980, Heidegger, 1997). Deleuze (113) addresses 
this formative invention that still lives on in traces (discourse): 
... in politics (and elsewhere) the Greeks invented a power relation 
between free men, it's free men who govern free men. Given that, it's 
not enough for force to be exerted on other forces or to suffer the 
effects of other forces, it has to be exerted upon itself too: the man fit 
to govern others is the man who's completely mastered himself. By 
bending back force upon itself, by setting force in a relation to itself, 
the Greeks invent subjectification. We're no longer in the domain of 
codified rules of knowledge (relations between forms), and 
constraining rules of power (the relation of force to other forces), but 
in one of rules that are in some sense optional (self-relation): the best 
thing is to exert power over yourself [italics in original], 
This development, the ipvention of the cultural imaginary termed the human, 
can even be traced to a precise geographic location, a garden in Ancient 
Athens named the Academy. There, in that place, the "West" (post-Socratic 
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thought, logos) sprouted in concert with the internecine wars concerning the 
military, political and economic control of the Peloponnesus and the sea 
lanes, land routes and colonies that constituted three competing Hellenic 
empires (see Chapter 5). Fieser (2002) provides this description: 
The Academy (Academia) was originally a public garden or grove in 
the suburbs of Athens, about six stadia from the city, named from 
Academus or Hecademus, who left it to the citizens for gymnastics 
(Paus. i. 29) .... The Academy suffered severely during the siege of 
Athens by Sylla [Peloponnesian wars], many trees being cut down to 
supply timber for machines of war. Few retreats could be more 
favorable to philosophy and the Muses. Within this enclosure Plato 
possessed, as part of his patrimony, a small garden, in which he 
opened a school for the reception of those inclined to attend his 
instructions. Hence arose the Academic sect, and hence the term 
Academy has descended to our times. 
The sectarian knowledge (logos) developed then was redeveloped when 
Rome colonized Greece (circa 150 BCE)-and Greece discursively colonized 
Rome (circa 150 BCE)-was "lost" to the West and then again "found" (circa 
450-1250 AD), this "Western finding" of ostensibly lost knowledge often 
assigned causal significance as regards the origins of the European 
Renaissance (circa 1250-1450). Thus one form of Hellenic knowledge came 
to be considered Knowledge itself. In changed and changing form, 
Knowledge thus identified served well with Power to the point where the two 
can be conflated (Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980). When Europeans 
some two millennia later proceeded with their projects of global colonization 
(discovery), logos came to be inscribed on the planet presenting as the "age 
of the world picture" (i.e. enframing, Heidegger's historicization of the 
present). 
However, the imperialism (universalism) of this Romanized and scientized 
Hellenic thought, in oth~r words, the parochialism of that thought, and more 
importantly, its post-Renaissance successors (e.g. neo-classical metaphysics, 
empiricist science, political economy), began to be critically apprehended in 
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the new global imperial centre (Northwest Europe, especially in Germany and 
Austro-Hungary) from the early nineteenth century. With that apprehension, 
the exceptional status granted knowledge, consciousness and the trope of 
unmediated vision as pre-existent and value-free, as prior to language, as 
co-extant with positive knowledge, with humanism, progress and linearity 
(Whig history) was destabilized and denatured. 
Mise-en-abyme 
Thought concerned with "seeing through" received knowledge has been 
"deconstructive," from the start, concerned with exposing the "structure of 
the structures" that underscore human language and thought, and with that, 
of "reality." The historian Hayden White (1987, 186) summarizes this 
recognition: 
It used to be thought that certain texts, such as those produced by the great 
nineteenth century theorists of civilization, were themselves less cultural 
artifacts than self-interpreting models for explanation on the human 
sciences. But now not even Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud can escape 
the charge of ideological deformation that they once brought against their 
opponents in the methodological and theoretical disputes of their own times. 
They too must be "deconstructed," their "blindness" specified, and their 
places in the epistemes of their epochs determined before they can enter the 
lists of possible models of historical reconstruction and analysis. 
Marxism (historical materialism) inflected much of this deconstruction, 
including its expression in various fields of study that arose during the 
twentieth century, for example in social theory, critical theory, cultural 
studies, feminist theory, literary theory and poststructuralism. Academic 
0 
work in these new arenas was self-consciously self-referential, interested as 
much in the relationship between the "real" and symbolic and linguistic 
representations of it, as in that which, since the development of empirical 
science, had been (officially) construed as "reality." 
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While analytic philosophy worked to understand language more profoundly, 
to better capture a discernable reality existing outside the language, 
symbols, images required to conceive and perceive it, other forms of 
theorizing concentrated on exposing the nature of language and of 
representation and thereby demonstrate how the "real" in part at least was a 
function of the language, precepts, concepts and percepts that allowed its 
apparent apprehension (Culler, 1982, Schiffrin, 1994). This is not to suggest 
that reality does not exist prior to or outside human consciousness, only that 
its apprehension must be partial, contingent and mediated-and ultimately 
political and ideological in aspects. 1 
Jean Baudrillard's work (1994, 2001) is an exemplar of this deconstructive 
tendency. According to him, the "real" has been "disappeared," lost to 
humans through the levels of mediations that now structure its 
apprehension. For Baudrillard, not only the image, but the image of the 
image, not the referent for the image, have been technologically "lost." The 
"unreal" now is the "real," a politicized and highly partial space that 
ultimately grounds a postreal or posthuman (postindustrial) subjective type. 
In instances, such provocative and speculative theorizing led to a spiraling 
mise-en-abyme (abyss) whereby knowledge doubled back on knowledge, 
especially in the instances where the possibility for non-conditioned exterior 
empirical evidence or logical proofs had been called into question. This spiral 
was brought to the fore most especially in the work of Jacques Derrida 
(1967). Ironically, Derrida logically demonstrated that a text cannot possess 
stable meaning, and thc),t it cannot be adjudicated by external references 
such as the ''life" of the author. 
For Derrida, dialectical regression replaced mimetic meaning, with words 
found to carry traces that hypothetically stretched back from meaning to 
meaning, this leaving the concept of non-relational validity, of empirical 
historical evidence, and of most any other ostensibly concrete referential 
position, previously considered external to the theory or discourse, open to 
refusal. With Derrida, any reference point external to the discourse, when 
brought to bear, was in turn deconstructed (historicized). 
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This relational system of thought (epistemology) wherein there is no appeal 
to final authority, linguistic, scientific or moral, whereby an endless string of 
signifiers with no final signified is all there is, may be a more valid 
philosophical system than systems predicated upon the discovery of a final 
position (analytic philosophy, positivism, theology, Marxism). Nonetheless, 
"postmodernist" theory, to use an inadequate term, engendered considerable 
resistance and was described variously as discursively vertiginous, immoral, 
paralytic, apolitical and solipsistic. 2 
The disdain-or perhaps fear and loathing-that poststructuralism 
engendered was evidenced when poststructuralist forms of theorizing 
attracted vigorous academic address by the conservative academy. The 
historiographer Arthur Marwick (2001) in his defence of "foundationalism" 
refers to this as the "battle of basic assumptions." And as Jameson (2002, 1-
7) recently pointed out, in the last several years this "battle" has been won 
by the conservatives, this evidenced for one by the return of "philosophy." 
As Jameson puts it, one of the "great achievements of postmodernity" has 
been subject to "reversal," though not yet quite relegated to the discursive 
dustbin. 
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Working Method 
Perhaps, however, poststructuralism still can be employed productively to 
ground a historical and social narrative if it is acknowledged up front that the 
historical record, no matter how confabulated, must be taken at face value in 
instances, that what persons said and did has been accurately recorded and 
is reflective of past thought and activity, that "history" still can provide 
meaning when it provides the basis for "grand theorizing" (e.g. Hegel, Marx, 
Spengler, Mumford, Polyani, Braudel). 
For the most part, speculative history (grand theorizing) during the 
"progressive" twentieth century was actually quite conservative and modest. 
Most twentieth century theorists and historians were content to work from 
within the great speculative traditions of the nineteenth century. Even new 
approaches to knowledge production such as the history and sociology that 
focused on the everyday, the social, political and economic for example, 
rather than on "history" comprised of great man narratives-the grand 
doings of the nation-states which ostensibly embodied historical 
progression-worked within paradigms developed earlier. 
Much of the speculative history and grand theory produced during the 
century was Marxist-inflected, for example Braudel, Adorno, Genovese, 
Thompson, Tawney, Beard and Hobsbawn. And, of course, much of this work 
was similar in that it was justified by appeals to empirical veracity and in that 
it attributed causation in history to non-agentic structural factors like "modes 
of production" or "urbanization," "patriarchy," or in Anna/es history, to 
geography and material technological conditions such as the amount of 
ground a donkey could cover in a day's walk, or the effect of the introduction 
of new plant species or r,atterns of crop rotation. As a result, Aristotelian 
"great man" theories, while finding a huge popular audience, fell into 
academic disfavor. Indeed, "names" came to be used metonymically and 
metaphorically to "stand in" for discursive fields and sets of practice.3 
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Recently, however, those grand histories have been attacked from left and 
right-from the particularist empiricist historians who produce contemporary 
micro-history, and by poststructuralist theorists who contend that "history" 
no matter how "factual" and detailed cannot but be a fabulation ripe for 
deconstruction. Such criticisms of empiricist and narrative traditions, and 
there were many, were closely tied to literary criticism, language studies and 
anthropological and sociological studies, all of which colluded to produce 
knowledge wherein it was recognized that the "past" was a confabulation that 
in aspects could not but be ideological. 
This work is placed at this point, an intended integrated articulation that does 
not pretend to history proper, but to a cultural study intended to apprehend 
hidden or perhaps even silenced historical relationships between sets of 
discourses and practices. As Foucault (1978, 27) reminds us, silence is 
active communication, not simply a site for the irrelevant, illogical or 
unknown: "There is no binary division to be made between what one says 
and what one does not say; ... There is not one but many silences, and 
they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate 
discourses." 
Yet, how can conventional method that assumes some "natural space" 
beyond the discursive, that assumes reality (res gestae) can be co-extant 
with its linguistic and semiological representation, be reconciled with method 
that regards the past as always already only approachable historia rerum 
gestarum (subjective comprehension of events)? Can these seeming 
opposites be blended? ~ 
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Fredric Jameson, the preeminent cultural critic working in the U.S., has 
addressed these issues and many more since the 1960s. Jameson employs a 
materialist cultural(ist) critique that incorporates forms of thought sometimes 
considered opposed and contradictory, affirming the validity of Marx's 
understanding that the cultural rests upon the material, while at the same 
time foregrounding a "relativist" dialectical process. His is a full system of 
thought that goes beyond cultural analysis, formal aesthetics and literary 
criticism. It provides a reference for this work, not the least in the 
articulation of method. 
Jameson's work is programmatic in its interpretation of the cultural as a 
function of the economic, and his concepts of "symptom," "theorizing," 
"totality," "irony," "estrangement," "dialectical reversal," and "dialectical 
thinking" are employed to read culture as symptomatic of a particular form of 
material existence (capitalism). While this work uses those concepts, it parts 
with Jameson in that it views war, education and the economy as co-
constitutive, as mutually-determinative in the social production of "reality," 
or, to use Althusser's (1962) concept, "reality" is overdetermined by these 
social practices/systems. 
Instead, this work follows Weber, Sombart, Giddens, Mumford and Elias in 
privileging war as formative in the constitution of "history," education, 
subjectivity and prevailing existential conditions (reality). In this work, the 
relationship between war, education, capitalism (and technology and science) 
are synchronously gathered together within a hybrid narrative. This attempt 
to comprehensively theorize and collapse various historical moments and 
phenomena is, of course, by its nature, open to wide-ranging criticism. Yet it 
is only by this means that the pervasive but hidden interconnections between 
war and other facets of01ife in the West can be apprehended (historicized). 
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Dialectical Thinking 
Such an approach to knowledge production requires a method that 
encourages speculation and novel syntheses, at its most ambitious the 
exhumation of historical gaps and silences, lacunae and paradoxes. Such a 
method stands in opposition to conventional "methodology" based in 
unproblematicized representation and in the easy acceptance that there is 
such a thing as "history." Perhaps anti-method-or counter-method-
provides a more adequate description of the "method" employed in this work. 
Ironically, that method-dialectical thinking-may be no more than a form of 
pattern re-cognition that was formalized as pedagogy by the U.S. military. 
Indeed, in this work, method may be nothing more than a quasi-militarist 
discursive exercise in pattern recognition employing "open source 
intelligence." However, most academic work, in one way or another, is a 
quasi-militarist hunt for "information," that can come into being only by 
being imprinted (constituted), by being formed into patterns (patterned). 
Serres (1983, quoted in McCoy 1997, 492) wrote: "From Plato and a tradition 
of knowledge which lasted throughout the classical age, knowledge is to 
hunt. To know is to put to death ... To know is to kill, to rely on death." 
Such a proviso certainly does little to inspire confidence in the production of 
positive knowledge; however, there is good reason. The twentieth century 
saw the equation between knowledge and death intensify exponentially, 
move much beyond any metaphoric quality to the actuality of the academic 
production of mass death (e.g. the weapons of mass destruction produced in 
the world's best universities). 
Bringing this counter-intuitive equation to the fore is a fraught task. 
Fortunately Jameson's concept of "dialectical thinking" provides a suitable 
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"anti-method" to produce such a "counter-narrative." This method is 
grounded in inversion and reversal-finding the narrative in dialectical 
reversion. Jameson (1971, 309): 
The basic story which the dialectic has to tell is no doubt that of the 
dialectical reversal [in original], that paradoxical turning around of a 
phenomenon into its opposite of which the transformation of quantity into 
quality is only one of the better known manifestations. 
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Such a project by its nature is one of "defamiliarization"-of making the 
ordinary strange (Brecht's Verfremdung). And, as Jameson explains, 
rhetorical devices, especially irony and dialectical inversion, the performative 
aspect of the production, figure prominently in "dialectical thinking" (52): 
Let the subjects of some of them-the relation of titles to works, 
sensitivity to punctuation, the uses of interlarded foreign words and 
phrases, the physical impression books make-illustrate the working 
method itself: they imply dialectical self-consciousness, a sudden 
distancing which permits the most familiar elements of the reading 
experience to be seen again strangely, as though for the first time, 
making visible the unexpected articulation of the work into 
determinable parts and categories. 
Such thinking "pulls itself up by its bootstraps." In this instance, it entails an 
understanding that the templates that discursively form "history," the "ages," 
or, better yet, supply the means for the "conjugation of the world" 
(Winthrop-Young, in Kittler 1999) are social heuristics, explanatory 
abstractions. Marx's "modes of production," Foucault's "regimes of truth," 
Derrida's "metaphysical and post-metaphysical eras," Heidegger's enframing, 
Kuhn's "paradigms," Ong and Macluhan's "ages of media," Williams 
"emergent, dominant and residual cultures," are only conceptual templates-
discursive patterns stamped upon cognition, the reification of which denies 
the possibility of "dialectical thinking." 
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This denaturalizing of received knowledge and thinking is by its nature an 
unsettling process resisted at every step by the knowledge producer. 
Jameson brings this to the fore in another landmark text, The Political 
Unconscious (1981, 283-84): 
What this impossibility of immanence [working within a realm of 
discourse assumed as a natural space beyond question] means in 
practice is that the dialectical reversal must always involve a painful 
"decentering" of the consciousness of the individual subject, whom it 
confronts with a determination (whether of the Freudian or the political 
unconscious) that must necessarily be felt as extrinsic or external to 
conscious experience. It would be a mistake to think that anyone ever 
really learns to live with this ideological "Copernican revolution," any 
more than the most lucid subjects of psychoanalysis ever really 
achieve the habit of lucidity and self-knowledge; the approach to the 
Real is at best fitful, the retreat from it into this or that form of 
intellectual comfort perpetual. 
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This taxing and imperfect method is self-consciously performative and self-
reflexive, predicated upon finding "new ways of seeing." It is ideally suited 
to the goals of this work, to estrange (teach) by providing a 
conceptualization of education as war and the unacknowledged mutually 
determinative relationship between war and education. Traditional concerns 
as regards method as a process of defining and then narrowing a problem, 
either inductively or deductively, to arrive at a prescriptive moment, at 
recommendations, solutions, and thereby at narrative resolution, for this 
work, are themselves considered problems. 
Dialectical thinking problematizes "fact" and "problem," turns them into 
taking-off points for thinking on another level or in a different register. For 
example, if the "problem" is "terrorism," this method would immediately 
deny address in the received context. It would consider how "terrorism" is 
socially (textually) constructed, who gains and loses through this 
construction, what economic interests are promoted, what economic interests 
are silenced, why "freedom" is provided discursive and political privilege with 
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"terror" thrown into a binary with it (in this regard it is similar to "immanent 
critique)." It would invert the term, asking for example how "freedom" may 
be "terror" and how "terror" may be "freedom." Jameson explains (1971: 
307-308): 
Faced the operative procedures of the nonreflective thinking mind 
(whether grappling with the philosophic or artistic, political or scientific 
problems and objects), dialectical thought tries not so much to 
compete and perfect the application of such procedures as to widen its 
own attention to include them in its awareness as well: it aims, in 
other words, not so much at solving the particular dilemmas in 
question, as at converting those problems into their own solutions on a 
higher level, and making the fact and the existence of the problem 
itself the starting point for new research. 
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Of course, this procedure is not novel; it is the way philosophy, history and 
theory have always proceeded. This dialectical ratcheting up of the levels of 
one's thought is predicated upon forming hitherto unacknowledged or 
unpopular historical linkages in order to produce, at its most ambitious, a 
new picture or perspective. Any such process by its nature requires self-
reflectivity; as Jameson explains, unless thought is self-conscious, it cannot 
be dialectical (1971, 340): 
Dialectical thought is in its very structure self-conscious and may be 
described as the attempt to think about a given object on one level, 
and at the same time to observe our own thought processes as we do 
so: or to use a more scientific figure, to reckon the position of the 
observer into the experiment itself ... dialectical thinking thus proves 
to be a moment in which thought rectifies itself, in which the mind, 
suddenly drawing back and including itself in its new and widened 
apprehension, doubly restores and regrounds its earlier notions in a 
new glimpse of reality: first, through a coming to consciousness of the 
way in which our conceptual instruments themselves determine the 
shape and limits of the results arrived at; and thereafter, in that 
second and more concrete movement of reflection which is the 
specifically Marxist form, in a consciousness of ourselves as at once 
the product and the producer of history, and of the profoundly 
historical character of our socio-economic situation as it informs both 
solutions and the problems which gave rise to them equally. 
As Jameson (333) state~: "for a genuinely dialectical criticism, indeed, there 
can be no preestablished category of analysis: to the degree that each work 
is the end result of a kind of inner logic or development of its own content, it 
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evolves its own categories and dictates the specific terms of its own 
interpretation." Could this not supply a very adequate definition of the best 
of educations, of transformative thinking? 
The Ideological Moment 
Dialectical thinking as method can be dismissed out-of-hand as 
programmatic and ideological and therefore illegitimate. Throughout his 
texts, Jameson is very aware of this, and of how his concept of dialectical 
thinking differs from what he terms Anglo-American empirical realism. From 
Marxism and Form (367-368): 
For the dominant ideology of the Western countries is clearly that 
Anglo-American empirical realism for which all dialectical thinking 
represents a threat, and whose mission is essentially to serve as a 
check on social consciousness: allowing legal and ethical answers to be 
given to economic questions, substituting the language of political 
equality for that of economic inequality and considerations about 
freedom for doubts about capitalism itself. The method for such 
thinking in its various forms and guises, consists in separating reality 
into airtight compartments, carefully distinguishing the political from 
the historical, so that the full implications of any given problem can 
never come into view; and in limiting all statements to the discrete 
and the immediately verifiable, in order to rule out any speculative and 
totalizing thought which might lead to a vision of social life as a whole. 
Dialectical thinking as an academically productive technique and rhetorical 
performance is predicated upon speculative and totalizing thought even if the 
resulting "totalization" does not follow Jameson in being singularly Marxist. 
This method relies on synthesis and integration, creative analysis, conceptual 
transgressions, discursive leaps that do not necessarily abide the rules of 
empirical realism. Such thought by definition must proceed outside received 
categories; it is premised on questioning the validity of those categories and 
of the process of categorization generally. 
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Foucault's concept of genealogy is perhaps the most successful way in which 
"history" has been reformed by an author who developed his own categories 
and dictated the specific terms of interpretation. Foucault expends a book, 
The Order of Things (1970) doing that, historicizing categorization itself to 
provide examples of the various ways in which subjective "mental 
machinery" (Sloterdijk, 1987) is overdetermined by various forms of 
categorization that form "cognitive templates." Foucault's (1977) 
explanation of his historical work, which he still termed "archaeology" in 
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1970 (later genealogy), stands in contradistinction to history, in effect 
offering a Nietzschean counter-history, a form of the narrative constitution of 
the past that foregrounds arenas previously left inarticulate when passed 
through the "historical" process. This work, however, is not Foucauldian 
genealogy or archaeology; it does not examine the minutiae of the previously 
silent quotidian, concentrating instead on pulling exemplars out of the past 
that are readily available and that, when hooked together, form a coherent 
picture. 
The rationale for the method, then, is the value of a novel disclosure of a 
systemic and historical nature-approached necessarily through descriptive 
and theoretical speculation as opposed to particularist history or Foucauldian 
genealogy. In this regard, the work follows not only Hayden White (1987) 
who demonstrates how the narrative form itself in part determines what is 
called "history," but theorists who claim the "media is the message," 
especially the (post)materialist analysis of Jean Baudrillard (cf. Critique of 
the Political Economy of the Sign, 1981). Hayden White provides 
text/context for the condition in which such a work of synthesis is positioned 
(1987, 190): 
I call ideology the central problem of intellectual history, because 
intellectual history has to do with meaning, its production, distribution, 
and consumption so to speak, in different historical epochs. But in the 
West at least, the eiuestion of meaning-or more precisely that of the 
meaning of meaning-has evolved against the background of a 
conviction of the irreconcilable opposition between science ( conceived 
of a some kind of objective view of reality) and ideology (conceived as 
a distorted, fragmentary, or other wise deformed view, produced to 
serve the interests of a specific group or class). 
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White characterizes the battle between science and ideology as a "Manichean 
struggle" that could "only end" with subscription to the scientific view of 
reality. Again apparent is the "battle of assumptions" that has flavoured 
various forms of knowledge production for the last century. White (192) 
goes on to explain the way in which the conceptualization of "the problem of 
characterizing the ideological aspects of a given text, discourse or artifact" 
became a central issue in "history": 
... the ideological aspects of a text are specifically those 
"metalinguistic" gestures by which it substitutes another sign system 
for the putatively extralinguistic referent about which it pretends to 
speak or of which it pretends to be a straightforward, objective or 
value-free description. A semiological approach to the study of texts 
permits us ... to regard ideology as a process by which different kinds 
of meaning are produced and are reproduced by the establishment of 
a mental set towards the world in which certain sign systems are 
privileged as necessary, even natural, ways of recognizing a "meaning" 
in things and others are suppressed, ignored or hidden in the very 
process of representing the world to consciousness. This process goes 
on in scientific discourse no less than in fictional and legal-political 
discourse. 
This point is important for this thesis; the establishment of a "mental set," or 
more broadly, of specific forms of subjectivity via "privileged signs" 
constitute education, or for that matter history. To follow White and 
Jameson, such constitution cannot but be an ideological undertaking. 
Importantly for the rest of this work (see Chapter 4 especially), the 
ideological moment is inherent in the process of "meaning-making" through 
books, newspapers or electronic media for example-rather than a product of 
it. Though there certainly is a difference between deliberate misinformation 
(propaganda) and the ideological moment that necessarily accompanies any 
~ 
cultural production, this difference is not as absolute as a binary distinction 
between "truth" and "lies" would have it, but a difference in degree and 
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intent. Indeed, post-realist narratives may hold more truth than their realist 
equivalents (see Chapter 3). 
All that said, history is not a novel, a fabulation comparable to a work of 
fiction. For example, this work does not invent characters or present "false 
evidence," and while it does not subscribe to "metaphysical" historiograhy, it 
still answers to "fair representation" as it is formulated within that register. 
The work is not naively mimetic, does not view history as a given-but as an 
academic production that can change quickly. However, this does not 
preclude the understanding that there is indeed a very real past even though 
it is only in the "telling," in its always already interested narrative 
constitution that it acquires intersubjective meaning (history as we know it is 
a modern invention). This claim is not to be confused with academic license 
as some would have it (cf. Marwick, 2001). That the past is emplotted, 
narratively constituted in the terms dictated by the present, does not suggest 
that one historical narrative is as valid as another. It does suggest, however, 
that any history, no matter how ostensibly empiricist, is always interested 
(ideological). 
To refer to White once again (1987, 87-88): 
In order to read appreciatively the kinds of works produced by the 
majority of modern historians, amateur or professional, one must 
assume the mental stance of the subjectivity that believes in these 
notions not only as values but also as the categories best suited to the 
conceptualization of the "reality" one lives. Such a subjectivity is 
prepared to adopt a specific morality as the criterion for endowing the 
events of history with whatever meaning they can be construed 
"objectively" to possess. When this morality is identified with the 
actual practices of the society to which the reader belongs, these 
notions and the representational practices that project them as the 
basis for understanding "reality" correctly can be labeled "ideological" 
in the broader, analytical sense in which Althusser has presented this 
concept. 
Althusser, of course, famously defined ideology as "the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Lenin and 
Philosophy, 1971, 162). However, those "real" conditions are themselves 
individual and social "acts of interpretation," ways in which persons justify 
privilege and marginality. 
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And here is where the recent "history" of war, economics, knowledge 
production and politics gets very interesting. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the U.S. government after World War II employed many Nazis to 
spy on the U.S.S.R. and actively colluded in resettling Nazis outside Europe 
(as did Canada) (cf. Tom Bower's (1987) The Paperclip Conspiracy: The Hunt 
for the Nazi Scientists, Howard Margolian's (2000) Unauthorized Entry: the 
Truth about Nazi War Criminals in Canada, 1946-1956 and Russ Bellant's 
(1991) Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party). Martin A. Lee's 
(2001, section 1) in The CIA's Worst-Kept Secret: Newly Declassified Files 
Confirm United States Collaboration with Nazis provides these details: 
"Honest and idealist ... enjoys good food and wine ... 
unprejudiced mind ... " That's how a 1952 Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) assessment described Nazi ideologue Emil Augsburg, an 
officer at the infamous Wannsee Institute, the SS think tank involved 
in planning the Final Solution. Augsburg's SS unit performed "special 
duties," a euphemism for exterminating Jews and other "undesirables" 
during the Second World War. Although he was wanted in Poland for 
war crimes, Augsburg managed to ingratiate himself with the U.S. CIA, 
which employed him in the late 1940s as an expert on Soviet affairs. 
Recently released CIA records indicate that Augsburg was among a 
rogue's gallery of Nazi war criminals recruited by U.S. intelligence 
agencies shortly after Germany surrendered to the Allies. Pried loose 
by Congress, which passed the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act three 
years ago, a long-hidden trove of once-classified CIA documents 
confirms one of the worst-kept secrets of the cold war-the CIA's use 
of an extensive Nazi spy network to wage a clandestine campaign 
against the Soviet Union. The CIA reports show that U.S. officials 
knew they were subsidizing numerous Third Reich veterans who had 
committed horrible crimes against humanity, but these atrocities were 
overlooked as the anti-Communist crusade acquired its own 
momentum. For Nazis who would otherwise have been charged with 
war crimes, signing on with American intelligence enabled them to 
avoid a prison term. 
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While the "real winners" of the war were no doubt others, according to these 
revelations and others like them, the U.S. government, certain of its 
agencies, and the U.S. military had reason to hide links to Nazi Germany and 
to the Nazis they, after the war, employed and assisted.4 These "untold 
tales" about various previously hidden aspects of World War II have become 
common recently. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by 
Robert Stinson (199i9) provides another example. Stinson demonstrates that 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that drew the U.S. into World War II 
was provoked by the U.S. and was not unanticipated. Outside of the great 
difficulty of accessing the "historical record" in the first place, and the fact 
that portions of that record have been withdrawn from the U.S. naval archive 
because of Stinson's revelations, his work or the work of others pursuing 
"truths" have yet to change "history." 
In this instance, and in the others, veracity has little to do with history. 
Indeed, too often, historical veracity is written off/out as "conspiratorial." 
Further examples of recent revisionism include Edwin Black's (2001) IBM and 
the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance between Nazi Germany and America's 
Most Powerful Corporation. Black reveals that IBM ran the information 
functions for the administration of German extermination camps. 
Christopher Simpson's (1993) The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law, and 
Genocide in the Twentieth Century reveals that both the current U.S. 
President's grandfathers were financial backers of Adolf Hitler, and provided 
crucial support for the Nazis to consolidate power. And Richard Sasuly's 
groundbreaking work I.G. Farben (1947) provides unassailable evidence of 
the close relationship bE;tween the research university and warfare. Sasuly, 
who was a highly placed U.S. administrator in postwar Germany, documents 
the crimes of the German petro-chemical cartel I.G. Farben, which were 
, 
made possible through the co-operation of U.S. capitalism, in this instance 
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. 
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Anthony Sutton's (1976) Wall Street and the Rise of Hitler documents the 
way in which the most respectable of U.S. banking houses financed the Nazi 
takeover of Germany. Another book on the same theme, Pool's (1997), Who 
Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler's Rise to Power, 1919-1933 
documents the crucial role played by U.S. bankers and industrialists in 
Hitler's rise to power. Britain's culpability is documented in Neil Forbers' 
(2000) Doing Business with the Nazis: Britain's Ecqnomic and Financial 
Relations with Germany 1931-1939. As for the military support the German 
Regime received from the U.S. automobile industry, the following is 
excerpted from a 1974 report of the United States Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary (Henry Ford was no Oskar Schindler, n.d.): 
The activities of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler prior to and during 
World War II ... are instructive. At that time, these three firms 
dominated motor vehicle production in both the United States and 
Germany. Due to its mass production capabilities, automobile 
manufacturing is one of the most crucial industries with respect to 
national defense. As a result, these firms retained the economic and 
political power to affect the shape of governmental relations both 
within and between these nations in a manner which maximized 
corporate global profits. In short, they were private governments 
unaccountable to the citizens of any country yet possessing 
tremendous influence over the course of war and peace in the world. 
The substantial contribution of these firms to the American war effort 
in terms of tanks, aircraft components, and other military equipment is 
widely acknowledged. Less well known are the simultaneous 
contributions of their foreign subsidiaries to the Axis Powers. In sum, 
they maximized profits by supplying both sides with the materiel 
needed to conduct the war. 
This is not to suggest that perfidy is more common to one geographic 
location than another, only that historical veracity is extremely important, 
not least because it provides the basis by which historial connections can be 
ascertained, in this instance between capitalism, imperialism and war, even 
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to the point of demonstrating that they are self-reinforcing. This work relies 
on "out-of-the-way" evidence and the connections it can ground to claim that 
capitalism, war, the state and education have been mutually constitutive 
since the rise of the state and capitalism in the sixteenth century. As Hacker 
(1989, 11) says, "No institution, including military, is monolithic. Interaction 
between military and society produces change in each." 
The way in which twentieth century AngloAmerican "history" has ignored 
long-standing systemic issues such as the formative influence of warfare on 
contemporary society demonstrates that voluntary filtering and outright 
censorship often as not inform what comes to be taken as History. This is 
not necessarily a matter of intended or unintended "false representation" as 
is the the case in histories that purposely ignore information, but of "silence," 
socially imposed through external and self-censorship, through the historial 
models (templates) brought to bear that endow "a specific morality as the 
criterion for endowing the events of history with whatever meaning they can 
be construed 'objectively' to possess" (White, 1987, 88). In all likelihood this 
work is no exception. 
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Chapter Notes 
1 This is not to suggest reality can be reduced to "text." It is to suggest, 
however, that reality is not fully independent of observation (perceptual 
apprehension), that two are mutually constituted (overdetermined by a host of 
factors). Sean Cubitt (1999, 132-133) writes: 
But mediation is not representation: media serve to mediate, not between 
subjects and objects [as the theory of representation would have it], but 
between subjects [intersubjectivity, intertextuality]. This conclusion, 
already adumbrated in the theory of suture whereby the viewer is 
constituted as a presence by the absences (silences, gaps) in the text, film, 
images on TV, music, etc. Looking, listening is a process of "filling in the 
blanks," whereby the human constitutes the message through reading it-
through filling in the gaps; ergo everyone hears/sees/feels differently but 
through the same [i.e. genetically-encoded](servo)mechanisms. Thereby 
the human is an active/act of process/interpretation, never a passive 
viewer/listener/receptacle. On such a reading it cannot be. If it is, it 
cannot see/hear as these processes, by definition, always are acts of 
interpretation and of constitution], provides us with the grounds for a social 
theory of mediation. Screen-theoretical work argues that identity, 
individuality and subjectivity are constructed, in a mediated society, 
through mediation. Individuality is then an end product of the mediation 
process, not is foundation [the is humanism turned upside down] ... What is 
being lost in the acceleration of communication is only a historically specific 
mode of subjectivity, not subjectivity as such. It is only the individual-
along with such perquisites as freedom and privacy-which disappears, 
faced with the new necessity for a blurred boundary between the public 
and, for lack of the private, the intimate sphere of what we can still perhaps 
refer to as the unconscious. This unconsciousness, however, is framed less 
by the individuation process [another inoperative concept in a posthumanist 
world] of the bourgeois family, and more by the interactive, fluid 
subjectivities of online communities [emphasis added]. 
2 Smart (1993, 17) synopsizes Jameson's generative understandings bring the 
depth of the change to the fore: 
The distinctive features attributed by Jameson to postmodernism include 
the following: a new depthlessness and a consequent weakening of 
historicity; the 'waning of affect', a fragmentation of the subject; the 
omnipresence of pastiche and prevalence of a 'nostalgia mode'; and a 
breakdown of the signifying chain following the collapse of the referent and 
associated crisis of representation 
This crisis of representation, the crisis being the point of epistemological break 
down is described by Jameson in his introduction to Lyotard's (1984, viii) The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Stating that the crisis is 
usually perceived as 0an "aesthetic one, although it has relatively immediate 
philosophical and ideological analogues," Jameson writes: 
72 
I am referring to the so-called crisis of representation, in which an 
essentially realistic epistemology, which conceives of representation as the 
reproduction for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it-projects a 
mirror theory of knowledge and art, whose fundamental evaluative 
categories are those of adequacy, accuracy, and Truth itself. 
Lyotard (1993, 27) describes this change economically, the cultural conditions 
for which were forming in the 1920s: 
The decisive feature of what is called the postindustrial [Touraine, Bell], is 
that the infinity of the will invades language itself. The big deal of the past 
twenty years, to speak in the extremely dull phraseology of political 
economy and historical periodization, has"'been the transformation of 
language into productive commodity. This takes two forms. First, phrases 
are considered as messages, to be encoded, decoded, transmitted, and 
arranged (packaged), reproduced, preserved, kept accessible (memories), 
combined and concluded (calculations), opposed (games, conflicts, 
cybernetics). Second, the unit of measurement-which is also the unit of 
price-is established: information. The effects of the penetration of 
capitalism into language are only beginning. Under the guise of an 
extension of markets and a new industrial strategy, the coming century is 
that of the investment of the desire for infinity, according to the criteria of 
optimum performance, in matters of language. 
3 Michel Foucault calls Freud and Marx "initiators of discursive practices" 
(Language, counter-memory, practice, 131) as "they cleared a space for the 
introduction of elements other than their own within the field of discourse they 
initiated." 
4 The titles listed in this work are only a representative sample. Books 
addressing the "untold stories" of World War II and the Cold War have become 
numerous recently. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
WAR MACHINE 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the history, discourse and social practice of warfare 
by employing 1870 as a jumping off point. It takes the reader through 
recent war history and war critique and as well as war literature. It provides 
a historical tracing of the contemporary "war machine," and provides theory 
to place warfare in a context that emphasizes its impact on everyday 
existence, not only in periods of war, but in periods of ostensible "peace." It 
places "counter" or "anti-war machines" based in the theory of Deleuze and 
Guatarri on offer, suggesting that these "war machines" that are not for war 
provide a site of resistance to it. It provides a number of exemplars of 
twentieth century literature and culture that reflect the material and 
psychological prevalence of war throughout the century. Finally, it points to 
significance of 1870 as a year when great change became evident, where the 
impact of the industrial revolution on both material and immaterial 
production came to world attention because of the war of 1870. 
Franco-Prussian War 
In December 1851, some forty years after the first Napoleonic empire ended 
with the Battle of Waterloo (1815), the Emperor Napoleon's nephew Louis (b. 
1808) staged a coup d'etat in Paris, and following in his uncle's imperial 
footsteps, installed another. This "second empire" of post-revolutionary 
France proved only slightly more durable than the first, and it too ended in 
0 
war, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. 
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Goaded into attack by the media strategy of the Prussian Prime Minister 
Bismarck (see Chapter 4), Louis' armies were forced to engage the enemy 
much before they were prepared to do so. 1 The armies of France, which 
were considered much the most powerful in Europe, were defeated in six 
weeks, before they could mobilize fully. All the empires of Europe, especially 
the British Empire, were shocked into the awareness that a new geopolitical 
era was upon them. The social, political, military, industrial and educational 
developments in Prussia following the devastating defeat of its armies by 
Napoleon I (1806-1807) had proven their martial worth. 2 The Prussian 
"national development strategy" carried tremendous influence from that 
point; the importance placed on education did not go unnoticed. 
The import of the war was recognized in even so remote a region of the 
British Empire as the interior of the colony of British Columbia, which was to 
join the Canadian confederation in 1871. From the August 6, 1870 Cariboo 
Sentinel newspaper in the "gold rush" town of Barkerville, Williams Creek, 
Cariboo (War in Europe, August, 1870): 
The whole of Germany, comprising a population of forty millions will 
probably regard the attack upon Prussia as an aggression upon the 
Fatherland, and as demanding common resistance, Austria, at least 
her government, will probably look on with indifference, but the bulk 
of the German people will regard the quarrel as their own. The Thirty 
Years' War, by which France carried her boundary into Germany, 
conquered and retained Alsace and other Germanic territory, will sway 
the German sympathies, if as is reported by telegraph, Prussia aims at 
restoring to Germany those lost provinces. Here we have an 
illustration of the endless fruits of war. Two centuries have passed 
since the termination of the Thirty Years' War between France and 
Germany and today France is to be held accountable for her spoliation 
of the Fatherland. 
Shortly after the debacle of France's war effort, Louis, fashioned now as 
Emperor Napoleon III (@I. 1873), followed in his uncle's Napoleon's footsteps 
once again, though into commodious exile in England compared to the exilic 
conditions enjoyed by his uncle on St. Helena. 3 Historical revenge, to some 
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degree, had been exacted. More importantly, the pattern of military, statist, 
capitalist, secular development formalized by the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648 (the modern nation state system) continued unbroken. 
While the "second empire" of post-revolutionary France has been read since 
as the precursor of twentieth century fascism, its prescience lay not only in 
its installation but also in its defeat.4 The abrupt Teutonic closure of the 
opera bouffe of Napoleonic empire the second time around 
presaged/prestaged not only the mass wars of the twentieth century, but 
also the strained peaces. 5 The military historian McNeil! describes the 
Prussian planning that grounded the global aftershock (1982, 251-252): 
In speed of supply, the French fell far behind the Prussians-a 
weakness that proved irremediable. So Prussian planning defeated 
French elan and, as a result, citizen-soldiers easily overwhelmed 
Europe's best professionals, to the amazement of all the world ... The 
application of reason and intelligence to the waging of war was not in 
the least new in nineteenth-century Europe; but seldom had is been 
carried out so systemically by a circle of men with the authority to put 
their ideas into practice without delay .. .Indeed, extension of radical 
rationality towards the bottom of the chain of command was just as 
important for Prussian successes as was the strategic control from the 
top that Moltke, Bismarck and the king exercised with the help of the 
telegraph and railroads. 
This radical rationality, a new form of organizational control, spoke 
presciently of the preferred means for subjective formation in industrial 
nations during the twentieth century. In a similar way, the industrial 
technologies evidenced in electrical telegraphs, railways, harder metals, 
higher explosives-and in the instructional technologies employed by van 
Moltke to construct a readily trainable soldierly-bespoke "total war," just as 
the Peace of Frankfurt, the treaty which ended the Franco-Prussian War, and 
the formal military alliances that followed quickly thereafter, bespoke the 
"total peace" (latent warfare) of the next century. 
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In hindsight, 1870 proved a benchmark year in the history of the Western 
world. Daniel Pick (1993, 111), in his study titled War Machine: The 
Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age, addresses the discursive 
significance of 1870. He claims it was the year that Enlightenment 
sensibilities were challenged because of the defeat of the French by the 
Prussians. That war, to paraphrase slightly, "broke the spell and fragmented 
the picture" in Britain. This was the case elsewhere as well, in France of 
course, but even in Canada, where the sheer shock of the defeat of the 
French with such dispatch, disabused prior notions of the supreme security of 
the British Empire. 
British hegemony had been challenged, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as 
the empires of France, the United States, Germany, Russia and Italy 
suddenly took on new prominence for the British. The effect of that war 
likely was similar to the dislocation felt in U.S. populations when the U.S. lost 
the Vietnam War (cf. Spanos, 2000), or more recently, when airplanes were 
flown into New York's World Trade Center. In 1915, the British sociologist 
Patrick Geddes highlighted the significance of the war of 1870, a significance 
that has lived on for almost a hundred and fifty years (from the Sociological 
Review as quoted in Pick, 1993, 194): 
It will not be denied that the peace ·of the past generations, especially 
since 1870-71, has been no peace, but one of latent war. So plainly, 
so fully, has this been the case, that there are many to whom the 
extreme state of war preparation has seemed, if not the very norm of 
human existence, at any rate its inevitable burden ... Grant by all 
means, that we in our lifetime have practically only known wars and 
rumours and preparations of wars-that, when not in patent war, we 
have lived in latent war. 
The novel state Giddes termed "latent warfare" became, of course, a 
naturalized condition of .existence for industrialized populations in the 
twentieth century when they were not actually engaged in "patent war." 
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James Beniger (1986), in his remarkable book The Control Revolution, details 
the way in which the "control revolution"-which was coincident with the 
emergence of "latent warfare"-affected every aspect of life in industrial 
jurisdictions from 1870 onward. These two related phenomena-latent 
warfare and systems controls-provided defining moments in the 
development of subjectivity. 
Though Beniger does not address war or education expressly, the control 
revolution was a function of the material technologies that for the most part 
appeared between 1870 and 1910. These technologies, in turn, were 
themselves often a function of warfare. Beniger (1986, 12) explains the 
profound impact the control systems developed from 1870 as the "engine" or 
the machine that runs contemporary existence: 
Identifying the crisis of control [which was necessitated by the size 
and complexity of new industrial processes] and the resulting Control 
Revolution has helped me to answer ... why the period from 1870 to 
1910 ... seems so decisive for society as we know it today .... The 
Information Society, I have concluded, is not so much the result of any 
recent social change as of increases begun more than a century ago in 
the speed of material processing technology. Microprocessor and 
computer technologies, contrary to currently fashionable opinion, are 
not new forces only recently unleashed upon an unprepared society, 
but merely the latest installment i.n the continuing development of the 
Control Revolution. 
When Beniger's novel history is combined with the historical insights of the 
British polymath Keith Hoskin (1988, 1993a, 1993b), the interconnections 
between the organization of the industrial capitalist economy (the control 
revolution) and warfare are brought to the fore. In "Education and the 
genesis of disciplinarity" (in Messer-Davidow, Shumway & Sylvan (Eds.)., 
1993, 285), Hoskin traces that which Beniger termed the "control revolution" 
to the "disciplining of th~ world." He links this "disciplining" (i.e. the 
imposition of the disciplines onto the undisciplined classical academy) to the 
field education and, importantly for this argument, links the contemporary 
control systems detailed by Beniger to the U.S. military, specifically the 
national military academy located in West Point, New York. Hoskin (296) 
asks: 
Why did the modern business enterprise, as the work of Alfred 
Chandler (e.g., Visible Hand) clearly demonstrates, get invented in the 
United States, beginning in the 1830s and 1840s, in such unlikely sites 
as a U.S. armory and a few small railroads? Why not in Europe, as 
part of the Industrial Revolution, at the hands of industrial 
entrepreneurs? It now appears that Chandler's pioneers of modern 
business were all graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point, after 1817, when Sylvanus Thayer as superintendent introduced 
the new educational practices of writing, grading, and examination. 
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At the same time however, Hoskin locates the genesis of these new 
educational practices of writing, grading and examination in late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century Europe. In another work, "The Genesis of 
accountability: The West Point Connection" (1988), Hoskin traces the way in 
which the military training offered at West Point during Sylvanus Thayer's 
tenure grounded the development of U.S. business practices which amounted 
to the military/industrial capitalist restructuring of time, space, subjectivity 
and the socius (see reterritorialization below). Talking of the way West Point 
graduates fanned out across the educational landscape, Hacker (1989, 64, 
quoting Dupuy, 1958, 14) characterizes the influence of West Point 
graduates as "Thayer's direct and indirect 'pedagogical insemination of the 
country' through Thayer's system and West Point graduates." The system 
was that which we take to be the process of education itself-writing, grading 
and examination, practices that were apparently absent in educational 
institutions that are invariably described as undisciplined and lax. 
Hacker (1989, 65) writes, "West Point transferred models to industry as well 
as to education. Although early developments in business management were 
~ 
attributed to the advances and reforms achieved by the railroad industry,_ 
now we learn that these nineteenth century administrative innovations had 
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military roots." However, this militarization/industrialization/capitalization of 
existence, of time, space and the socius was by no means unique to the U.S. 
Though the modern business enterprise is a U.S. invention (the granting of 
personal rights to a private enterprise dates to 1897 when the state of New 
Jersey enacted legislation to that effect), by 1870, full blown Paleotechnic 
(coal-fired) industry was evident in France, Germany, England, Italy, Austro-
Hungary, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, the U.S., Russia, Sweden and 
Canada, even if the way it was "controlled" had not yet evolved into the 
impersonal form it was to take later (the imposition of managerial 
accounting, impersonal ownership and so on). 
At the same time as this new form of discipline was being built into 
mechanical manufacturing, the military and transportation systems, full 
blown systems of compulsed statist nation-ist education engineered along 
the same lines were developed in every industrializing nation. This new form 
of education, together with the new form of discipline being built into 
knowledge itself (the disciplines), saw to the production of a new way of 
being human (mentalite), to the military/industrial colonization of 
preindustrial subjectivity. 
By 1870, high-speed rotary printing presses and electrical telegraphs allowed 
newspapers to produce and disseminate "news" even thrice daily to 
consumerizing literate populations in growing urban industrial centers. By 
1870, railways, statist bureaucracies, continuous flow material production in 
armaments factories, the Bessemer process for iron production, the 
vulcanization of rubber, organic chemistry, steam ships, telecommunications 
cables (the first transatlantic cable dates to 1866) and mass industrialized 
militaries were becoming common in industrial countries in Europe and North 
America. 6 
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By 1870, warfare exhibited the characteristics Wright (1942, 294-313), 
identified as modern in A Study of War (a landmark text synopsizing research 
conducted at the University of Chicago over a period of twenty-five years). 
The study identified the following phenomena as characteristic of modern 
warfare: use of firearms, professionalization, capitalization, mechanization, 
massification, militarization of national populations, nationalization of war 
effort, intensification of operations, and total warfare. Professionalization, 
massification, mechanization, militarization, nationalization, capitalization 
and intensification, at the same time, characterized the 
military/industrialization of existence for the millions located in the new 
urban centers. If the processes of nationalization and educationalization are 
included, a comprehensive picture of industrial control systems emerges (see 
Chapter 4). 
Total War 
Total war was enabled by the control revolution. While intimations of this 
form of warfare were visible in Napoleonic France and in the Franco-Prussian 
War, the coordination, mobilization and deployment of all the resources, civil 
or military, available to modern, imperial states could not be fully realized 
until the control revolution made such vast mobilization possible. While full 
"total war" awaited industrialization, the theoretical and organizational 
framework for this form of warfare had been developed in Napoleonic France. 
Porter (1994, 134) writes: "Napoleon consolidated the three main-~gains of 
the Revolution: rationalization, centralization, and secularization. All were 
characteristic of modernity; all derived from the inexorable calculus of the 
military state [italics added]. 
This "inexorable calculus of the military state" soon found theoretical 
expression in the work of the Prussian general and military philosopher Carl 
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von Clausewitz (On War, 1832).7 A prisoner of the French for some time 
during the Napoleonic Wars, and one the great heroes of the Battle of 
Waterloo, Clausewitz (b.1780) began to write his massive treatise in 1816. 
The work grew out of his understanding of philosophy combined with first-
hand observation of the first "people's war," notably the effect of conscription 
(the levee en masse) enacted in France in 1793. Porter writes: 
Article I of the decree [of levee en masse] of August 23, 1793, says it 
all: 
From this moment until that in which the enemy is driven from the 
territory of the Republic, all Frenchmen are permanently requisitioned 
for service in the armies. Young men will go forth to battle; married 
men will forge weapons and transport munitions, women will make 
tents and clothing, and serve in hospitals; children will turn linen into 
bandages; and old men will be carried to the public squares to arouse 
the courage of the soldiers, while preaching hatred of kings and unity 
of the Republic. 
Accounting for 1,169,000 men under arms by 1794, at that time the largest 
military force yet seen in Europe, this generative use of national conscription 
suggested that intense martial effort could be sustained only if that newly 
formed grouping, the "people" (/es citoyens)-physically and psychically-
were involved massively and intensely in the production of warfare. In his 
treatise, Clausewitz developed a trinitarian model with war comprised of 
three levels-the state, the leaders and the people-and conducted through 
three channels-of reason, strategy and chance. 
The military theorist Kaldor (1999, 21) states that Clausewitiz's concept of 
absolute or "total war" is "best interpreted as a Hegelian abstract or ideal 
concept; it is the inner tendency of war that can be derived from the logic of 
the three different levels. War has its own existence, which is in tension with 
empirical realities." In vyarfare, as Clausewitz read it, an "inner tendency" 
exists independent of the material realities that circumscribe its expression, 
thus creating a "tension" when the independent logic of war rubs against the 
material world. On this model, the state is one of three protagonists in an 
all-consuming drama that, as the modern era developed, increasingly 
emphasized state control and enhancement of the role of the "people" 
through "domestic policy" rather than emphasizing "foreign policy" and 
"armies" (Deleuze and Guatarri, 1987, 147). 
Entropy 
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Clausewitz's work modeled a particular human social activity (war) as a flow 
or a process that proceeds according to its inner tendency (inherent 
developmental logic). Anticipating by a hundred years the systems theory 
developed by the U.S. during the Second World War and the structural-
functionalism of Talcott Parsons, on Clausewitz's model this inner tendency is 
frustrated by "friction," for example inadequate information or organization, 
this abrasive abstraction explaining why wars "slow down." In what may be 
the first comprehensive sociological theory of modernization, Clausewitz in 
effect produced a highly abstract martial and civil operations manual. 8 
Perhaps inadvertently, Clausewitz provided the state with a theoretical model 
to structure and mobilize its monopoly on violence (and taxation) through 
the formation of a "military/industrial complex." 
For Clausewitz (Kaldor, 1999, 22), "war" was a" "resistant medium" in which 
uncertainty, inflexibility and unforeseen circumstances all play their part. 
Real war was the outcome of the tension between political and practical 
constraints and the inner tendency to absolute war." His work presaged 
entropy-which, broadly, is a measure of disorder within a system-a concept 
developed by the German theorist Clausius (1858, 1865). 
The concept, simply high entropy means low organization or systemic 
' 0 
disorder-and that all systems, living or non-living, tend to increased 
entropy, held important implications not only for physics where it could 
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explain a wealth of phenomena that did not fit Newtonian physics, but for 
applied science (engineering) as a means to measure the efficiency of steam 
engines-and social theory. Once that concept was in play, it was only a 
matter of steps from entropy, to systemic randomness and chaos. 
It may be coincidental that Clausewitz's sociological modeling of war was in 
aspects analogous to the modeling of the physical universe as expressed in 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics (entropy); nonetheless, the affinity is 
striking, and in hindsight this affinity presaged the close connections between 
academic research and development in the physical and social sciences that 
developed during the twentieth century, and the martial ends to which that 
work was put. Throughout the century, the Western academy developed the 
means to organize and control violence, overt and covert, on an ever larger 
scale-to control or manage systemic entropic tendencies-through the 
massive application of education, for example. 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics allowed measures to be developed by 
which molecular disorder could work more productively in a steam engine 
(closed system). Control of this closed system in order to produce energy 
more efficiently was paralleled by Parsonian structural functionalism (e.g. 
homeostasis) and early systems theory-and later by modernization and 
development theory, which when combined with military force, provided the 
U.S. with a strategy of "counterinsurgency" to contain social movements 
hostile to capitalism. 9 
While these theorists may not have recognized their debt to Clausewitz, his 
concept of war as an interplay of forces held together by dynamic tension 
between three players (the people, the state and leaders) lent itself 
admirably for use in conditions of informal warfare. Success was determined 
by a combination of reason, strategy and chance (war was fought in a "fog" 
and subject to "friction"). An inherently unstable (and nonlinear) flow, his 
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concept of war not only suggests early "closed systems theory," but a non-
linear, fractal universe, even chaos theory, and information as unstable data 
that "wears out" (von Neumann). 
Lenin (1916) was the first to recognize the more general application of 
Clausewitz's conception of war. He wedded it to Marxism to form Marxist-
Leninism, the official ideology of the Soviet state. This is the familiar 
Marxism of ideological offensives led by a "vanguard," fomenting disruption 
(high entropy) and ultimately to the displacement of an existing social order 
(low entropy). Bost (1998) writes: 
Lenin joined Marxist philosophy with the ideas of the German military 
theorist Carl van Clausewitz. Clausewitz treats war as a policy 
instrument to achieve political goals. Lenin adopted Clausewitz's 
"paradoxical trinity" for characterizing the major components in a 
state's use of war. The trinity consists of (1) national popular 
sentiment, (2) the "fog of war" (Clausewitz's terminology for chance 
and probability), (3) the attempt of government to use war rationally 
to achieve ends. In Clausewitz, Lenin found a theory that would 
combine the role of leadership with the vast and problematic nature of 
political struggle. 
Destabilization of an existing order was a strategic goal, while at the same 
time a new system was prepared at least theoretically to take advantage of 
the high state of entropy deliberately induced. Simply, chaos was structured 
out of order, as was wont, while order came out of chaos, this reflexive 
dynamic explaining much more, for example, than the progressive laws of 
Hegel or Marx. Such strategic usage of disorder also marked U.S. 
geopolitical strategies following the Second World War. Entropy has been 
complemented by other physics, chaos theory in particular, since the Second 
World War (cf. Smithson, M. 1989, Prigogine I. and Stengers I. 1984). Like 
entropy, chaos theory was deployed in the social sciences; however the 
paradigmatic employment of entropy in physics or social theory has yet to be 
found redundant. 
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Even the poststructuralist social theorists Deleuze and Guatarri have put the 
concept to use in their analysis of "social life forms" or ecologies. Chaos out 
of order, order out of chaos-from high entropy to low entropy-a "law" or 
model on a very different order from dialectical progression. The idea of the 
dissipation of energy, in this instance, energy produced over and above that 
socially needed, produced only because of the logic of capitalism, provides a 
key concept in Deleuze and Guatarri's theory of the social processes of 
coding/decoding, reterritorialization/deterritorialization. Deterritorialization 
and decoding dissipate organized social energy, lead to high entropy, while 
reterritorialization and coding put energy back to work in the terms provided 
by a system predicated upon this movement. 
A striking example of the process deterritorialization and reterritorialization, 
or of the move from a state of high social entropy to low entropy, is provided 
by the Enclosure Acts in England and Scotland that denied peasants access 
to what was then a grazing "commons" and thus to their traditional 
economy. In Deleuze and Guatarri's formulation, as the peasants were 
deterritorialized, were unbound from the land, they were at the same time 
reterritorialized as abstract labour-and ultimately formed into citizens, 
provided with abstract "rights" and thereby recoded. 10 
Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 456) describe this process: 
The natal or the land, as we have seen elsewhere, implies a certain 
deterritorialization of the territories (community land, imperial 
provinces, seigneurial domains, etc.), and the people, a decoding of 
the population. The nation is constituted on the basis of these flows 
and is inseparable from the modern state that gives consistency to the 
corresponding land and people. It is the flow of naked [waged] labour 
that makes the people, just as it is the flow of capital that makes the 
land and its industrial base. In short, the nation is the very operation 
of a collective subjectivation, to which the modern State corresponds 
as a process of subjection. 
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Today again, the process is evident. Collective subjectivation is being 
transferred to a more polyglot assemblage wherein military/industrial 
subjectivity human is being recoded. Contemporary change and reform 
theories and processes (e.g. leadership studies, educational change) can be 
read symptomatically as formalized discourses that, like the Enclosure Laws, 
manage the deterritorialization/reterritorialization, coding/decoding that 
mark the production of subjectivity at the global level. Equivalent laws are 
those of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
The Origination of the Military Industrial Complex 
Clausewitz's tripartite model captured almost perfectly the outcome of the 
tensions between practical and political constraints and the inner tendency to 
absolute war acted out in the Great War (1914-18)-the deterritorialization 
and reterritorialization that accompanied the introduction of a new form of 
social economy-total warfare. 11 The conditions that developed during that 
real war transformed what began as limited war into total war. Until that 
time, the possibility of waging that type of war had been delimited by various 
regulatory technologies such as the Papal decrees regarding civilized warfare 
Uus in be/lo), but most importantly by the limitations imposed by localized 
and non-industrial technologies and systems of control. De Landa (1991, 
108) writes: "World War I marks a turning point in the history of logistics. 
The first global conflict was not a confrontation between tactical innovations 
(tanks, deep infiltration tactics) or between strategic ideas (the Schlieffen 
Plan), but a clash between the industrial might of entire nations." 
As it progressed, this real war began to approximate the ideal form 
Clausewitz termed absolute war. By 1917, real total war, not its theoretical 
0 
abstract, had turned the domestic economies of the three European powers 
still running the war upside down. 12 Whole nations were transformed into 
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"home fronts," discrete theatres of militarized operation that as Clausewitz 
had foreseen, required militarized management if they were to be engaged 
fully in war. The initiators of the war seemingly had little control of the type 
(mode) of war they engaged; however, by war's end, the societies that had 
engaged it were changed to the point where it was possible only to simulate 
the previous state of affairs (cf. Tuchman, 1962, Smart, 1993, McNeil, 1982). 
Virilio (1989, 16) writes: 
After several months of trench warfare-that is, of position warfare, 
since the armies could no longer move-they [politicians, generals, 
planners, manufacturers] realized that their current war 
production ... could no longer meet the demands of military 
consumption ... And this was on both sides, for Germany as well as the 
Allies. This was the "technical surprise," as it was called, of World War 
I. So all of a sudden there was tragic revision of wartime economy [in 
original]. They could no longer say that on the one side [of the 
economy] there was the arsenal which produced a few shells, and on 
the other civilian consumption and the budget. No, they noticed that 
they needed a special economy, a wartime economy. This wartime 
economy was a formidable discovery, which in reality announced and 
inaugurated the military-industrial complex. 
This "complex," however, already was visible in the U.S. by the end of the 
Civil War (1861-1865). This war by 1864 had become the first mass 
industrial war of attrition that enlisted all the resources of the antagonists (it 
bears mentioning that European commentators rarely recognize the 
revolutionary nature of U.S. Civil War). Unlike the U.S., however, where a 
war economy was built while the states were engaged in warfare, the 
foundations for "total war" already were visible in Prussia and France before 
the wars Bismarck initiated during the 1860s. 
The "blended" industrial infrastructure built in the German states after the 
Napoleonic Wars placed military concerns alongside the more strictly 
commercial. The strate!liC military placement of new waterways (canals) and 
railways evidenced the process of the military/industrialization of the 
landscape (as did the Northerly placement of the Rideau Canal in present day 
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Canada, which allowed travel from Montreal to the Great Lakes without use 
of the St. Lawrence River which was in range of U.S. cannon at certain 
points). As well, the "new" (post-Napoleonic) economy in Prussia even then 
concerned the organized and deliberate production of strategic knowledge, 
evidenced for one in the academic production of organic chemistry, the 
backbone of German capitalism and warfare (see Chapter 5). 
The British military historian McNeil! (1983) comments on the 
military/industrial concerns that were taken into account during the 
industrialization of both Prussia and Russia. In these countries 
industrialization proceeded quite differently than in Great Britain where 
military concerns had not been "built into" the national industrial complex 
originally. As well, McNeil! (262) relates how the "military/industrial 
complex" was inaugurated in Great Britain, in a way that, like the War of 
1870, eerily presaged/prestaged twentieth century warfare: 
Just as the industrialization of war can be dated to the 1840s, when 
railroads and semiautomated mass production together with Prussian 
breech-loaders and French efforts to exploit steam to the detriment of 
British naval supremacy began to transform preexisting military 
establishments, so, too, one can date the intensification of interaction 
between the industrial and military sectors in European society to a 
naval scare promulgated in Great Britain in 1884. A Clever journalist, 
W.T. Stead, and an ambitious naval officer, Captain John Arbuthnot 
Fisher, were the protagonists of the affair, though other men also 
played a part in manipulating British public opinion from behind the 
scenes. 
Like the "missile gaps" of the Cold War, and the "security gaps" that 
accompany the contemporary "war on terror," so the naval "gun gap" and 
the "ship gap" between the U.K. and Germany especially, but also its other 
naval competitors, the U.S., France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Austria and Turkey, 
saw the British economy,,start to develop in a way that was generalized in the 
U.S. economy during the Second World War. The way in which new 
communications technologies lent themselves to the strategic deployment of 
1-., 
fear to prepare a populace for warfare was as evident as it had been in the 
instance of the "Ems telegram" (see Chapter 4). 
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Naval officer Fisher "leaked" a story to the newspaper reporter Stead 
regarding the unpreparedness of the British navy to answer the technological 
challenge from abroad. Armed with that information, Stead published a 
series of "inflammatory articles" (268). With public opinion marshaled (fear 
created), the government of the day (Gladstone's Liberals) answered the 
concern by turning away from the publicly owned military production 
facilities, which until then had produced most military materiel. It contracted 
with private suppliers for research, development and production work to 
address the "gun gap," and other technological gaps as well, and thus allow 
the British navy to maintain, at least ostensibly, the supremacy it had 
enjoyed since the Battle of Trafalgar (1805). 
Of course, privatized production of publicly financed military materiel 
continues to this day, and, as will be argued, is in large responsible for the 
developmental trajectory of military/capitalist societies from that point 
onward. Large scale processes for strategic knowledge production (i.e. 
academic research and development) was "built-into" the industrial 
infrastructure (McNeil!, 357, 369) so that separating out military from civilian 
research and development by the end of the twentieth century had become 
meaningless-as had separating out peace from war. 
Permanent Warfare 
In hindsight, it seems a few steps only to move from World War I to World 
War IV; once the genie was out of the bottle, once the continuous flow 
processes (systems) for material and theoretical production had been 
developed, their geopolitical use seemed to follow. 13 Describing the impact 
of technology on war and peace in the twentieth century, the military 
historian Mary Kaldor (1982, 276) writes: 
The mode of warfare underwent an incredible transformation (which 
was begun at the end of World War I) from a system which combined 
the products of nineteenth century industry-heavy engineering and 
shipbuilding-with the military relations of an even earlier era, to a 
system which built upon and speeded up the techniques of mass 
production, the technology of the internal combustion engine, and the 
growing application of science to industry, that were emerging in the 
immediate pre-war period. Thus the outcome of World War II was the 
release of accumulation from the limits imposed by an earlier era, so 
that any increase in demand merely served to absorb the excess 
capacity which developed in the 1920s and 1930s. World War II also 
involved a process of military innovation that subsequently helped 
boost technology in the civilian sphere. 
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World War II (1939-1945), which according to Kaldor, released 
"accumulation from the limits imposed by an earlier era" began twenty years 
after World War I ended. 14 As the war progressed, Russia, now the lead 
state in a federation of socialist republics (USSR), found itself engaged after 
German invasion, as did the American federation after U.S. navy ships 
stationed in the Hawaiian islands were bombed by the Japanese empire. 
However, unlike the World War I (the Great War), which ended with a 
conditional peace of sorts (Treaty of Versailles, 1919), World War II followed 
the Clausewitzian script to its conclusion, ending with unconditional or 
absolute surrender, the raison d'etre Clausewitz originally provided for total 
war. 15 Kaldor (1999, 25) writes: 
Clausewitz could not possibly have envisaged the awesome combination of 
mass production, mass politics and mass communications when harnessed to 
mass destruction. Nevertheless, war in the twentieth century has come as 
close as can be conceived to Clausewitz's notion of absolute war, culminating 
0 
in the discovery of nuclear weapons which, in theory, could wreak total 
destruction without "friction." 
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Kaldor (26) continues: "as war involved more and more people, the 
justification for war in terms of state interest became increasingly hollow, if it 
ever had any convincing validity." This hollowness found expression in the 
military, though not necessarily economic failure of late twentieth century 
land-based relatively lengthy warfare (e.g. Afghanistan, Vietnam). Since 
Vietnam, military policy in the U.S. has favored short, intense war "at a 
distance." Virtual war, first in Iraq and then Serbia, provided a "hi-tech" way 
to wage "post-heroic" war. This mode of war perhaps was a necessity if 
militarism, the culture and economics of war, was to be maintained in light of 
changed material and cultural conditions. 16 The loss of cultural meaning 
attached to individual bravery that the industrialization of death entailed, and 
the fact that non-combatants formed the overwhelming majority of casualties 
in the era of post-heroic war-as well as the sheer scale of the world wars-
no doubt contributed to "war aversion" (cf. Luttwak, 1995, Towards post-
heroic warfare). 17 
This virtualization of massified violence extended Baudrillard's concept of 
"hyperreality" into actual shooting war. 18 For example, the ability of 
automated missiles to carry ultra-high explosive warheads to distant targets 
accurately-and the ability of the blended military/civilian communications 
infrastructure (e.g. CNN) to deliver "real time" images of exploding 
"payloads" to the home front-provides an exemplar, or paradigmatic 
example of virtual war. 
War as information, a concept that runs perilously close to Sun Tzu's (1963) 
concepts of warfare developed 2500 years earlier, is evidenced variously, for 
example in that access to war is no longer provided primarily via human 
beings-the news reporter in the field or the long-distance runner reporting 
the Grecian victory at Marathon. War, reduced to the electronic perception 
of it, is constructed on computers and then supplied the viewership as digital 
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imagery transmitted directly from the field of overt activity to televisions and 
computers. Now, more than ever, war is information, as is the inverse, 
information is war. New age warriors, whether Slobodan Milosevic, 
Subcommandante Marcos, Ariel Sharon, Vladimir Putin, George Bush or 
Osama Bin Laden fight on and over information, which is not only the theatre 
of operation-but is itself a form of warfare. 19 
Subcommandanate Marcos, leader of the Zapatistas based in the state of 
Chiapas in Mexico, was the world's first real time virtual warrior, the first 
warrior to combine social theory, politics, the Internet and real (shooting) 
violence. His use of novel information technologies to spread his message, 
is, however, entirely unexceptional. The use of new communications 
technologies for warfare has an ancient provenance. The Ayatollah Khomeini 
used cassette tapes smuggled from France during the Iranian revolution in 
the 1970s to promulgate his orders. Written battle orders, then a novel idea, 
were central to Napoleon's military success, as they were to Grant's during 
the U.S. Civil War. Newspapers, of course, were called into the front lines 
soon after they were invented (see chapter 4). Sexual pornography has 
been deployed more than once to demoralize populations; dropping 
pamphlets from airplanes is still popular. Wireless radio communications 
allowed German tanks a huge advantage at the beginning of the Second 
World War. And, this is to say nothing of "electronic eavesdropping" and 
"code-breaking." 
Therefore, Marcos' most prescient contribution to warfare may have been his 
social theory. Marcos calls the Cold War the Third World War "both in the 
sense that it was a third global war and because it was fought in the Third 
World ... really a hot war, made up of 149 localized wars [limited war] that 
claimed 23 million livesm(Coronil, 2000, 359). 20 To Marcos (360), what is 
theorized here as virtual war actually is World War IV, "a conflict waged 
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between metropolitan financial centers and the world's majorities taking 
place with constant intensity on a global scale."21 Indeed, World Wars III 
and IV can be blended. The current "Bush Doctrine" (2001) simply 
substitutes "terrorism" for the "communism" of the Truman Doctrine (1947), 
both discursive diversionary instruments deployed to impose a 
religio/ideological frame upon World War IV, the "struggle waged with 
constant intensity on a global scale between the world's majority and global 
financial centers." 
On such a reading, bankers, managers of multinationals, religionists, 
specialists in financial instruments, trade experts, policy-makers, and even 
the educationists and TV executives operate the "new world order." These 
functionaries comprise a new global bourgeoisie, "new age" warriors 
reterritorializing the globe without using mass material armies, but invading 
various terrestrial geographies and cyberspaces by employing new forms of 
time/space/speed to accomplish that which in electromechanical times was 
done more slowly and less comprehensively. 
Imperial virtual warfare today polices an integrated global state comprised, 
not so much of independent states following their own inclinations (within 
international law), but of internationalized "holding areas" for raw (relatively 
fungible) labour and natural (relatively unprocessed) resources (e.g. wheat, 
wood, oil, coffee, nickel, copper, zinc, uranium, natural gas, potash, rice, 
diamonds, bauxite,) that are "branded" (e.g. Colombian coffee, Canadian 
lumber) and thereby identified with certain countries or regional trading 
areas. 
Coronil (360) writes, "According to Marcos, neoliberal globalization must be 
understood for 'what it ls,' that is, as 'a new war of conquest of 
territories' ... World War IV has fractured the world into multiple pieces ... what 
he calls the rompecabezas [puzzle] of neoliberal globalization." Religious 
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overtones mark aspects of this war. However, these overtones are 
themselves aspects of the war. New rightist Islam and new rightist 
Christianity are not so much revivals of "fundamentalisms" seemingly built-
into these doctrines. Rather, these "fundamentalisms," while drawing on 
established doctrine, are new hybrid discourses, unique responses to 
"globalization" (assemblages) built in response to particular gee-political, 
economic and military developments. 22 
On its home fronts, in the perceptual jurisdictions of the imperial "west," this 
postindustrial war (World War IV) serves many functions, not the least of 
which is the regeneration of a politics of fear, or of ressentiment to use the 
concept developed by Nietzsche (cf. Brown, 1995). Now millions are invited 
via cable and satellite, as generals and politicians used to invite a select few, 
to a virtual picnic to watch the "ultimate spectacle of battle" (combat to the 
death). War is access and control of "prime time," the formation of common 
(mass)perception, as it has been since that force arose with the invention of 
industrial media. 
World War IV is fought on at least four fronts simultaneously. This is 
possible only because the problems of production of necessities (and 
necessity) for life have long since been solved by industrialization, and, in an 
ironic inversion, the maintenance of overproduction to sustain select wants is 
now the basis for postindustrial capitalism (cf. Pestone, 1993). 
This form of warfare is conducted in at least five ways simultaneously: 
strategic material neglect (e.g. mass poverty, starvation, disease), strategic 
ignorance (e.g. the global institution of edutainment, restricted access to 
literacy, numeracy), through strategic trade and finance (e.g. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), ~arid Bank, WTO, NAFTA), through the strategic 
formation of common perception by means of the electronic mediation 
(constitution) of reality, and through actual strategic violence (e.g. the wars 
of imperialism and resistance that accompany Pax Americana). These 
strategies comprise entropy as a "weapon of mass destruction" (deployed 
daily on a global basis). 
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This "totally blended" form of mass warfare on a mass scale, as compared to 
specific militarist societies (e.g. Sparta), is grounded in an economy based in 
the erasure of these distinctions. De Landa (1991, 111) writes: 
... by the time of World War II, distinctions between a purely civilian 
and a purely military area of the economy were impossible to draw ... 
But perhaps what signaled the merging of the two sectors was the 
mathematical procedures used by the military to organize the 
mobilization of a nation's resources, the discipline of OR [operations 
research], becoming an integral part of large civilian undertakings 
under the name of "management science." 
While the end of the Cold War saw military budgets cut in all western 
nations, these cuts actually accelerated the globalization of militarism. The 
export of military goods and services from the home states of industrial 
militarism, the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom 
especially, was officially encouraged so that military contractors could 
compensate for their loss of internal markets. Along with this increased 
emphasis on exports and increasing competition for export markets, many of 
the goods produced are even more "dual purpose" than was the case during 
the Cold War. 23 The most impressive blended good (assemblage), the one 
that operationalizes postindustrial capitalism, is the command, control, 
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
system (C4ISR) that grounds global entities as McDonalds and Wal-Mart. 24 
The roots of scientific management (Taylorism), and its continuing global 
influence and development in various forms (Lenin was captured by scientific 
management and thought it capitalism's great gift to socialism) are located in 
militarism, specifically in the post civil war US armories where Taylor was 
first allowed/encouraged to try out his theories (see Chapter 5). 
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De Landa (1991: 109) writes: "Indeed, a century ago, historian Werner 
Sombart was already arguing in his book Krieg und Kaplitalismus that 
industrial society itself was a direct product of centuries of military conflict." 
And further (138): 
The military process of transforming soldiers into machines, as well as 
the related campaigns to organize the management of human bodies 
(in military hospitals, for instance), generated much knowledge about 
the body's internal mechanisms. The "great book of Man-the-
machine" [Foucault] was both the blueprint of the human body created 
by doctors and philosophers, and the operating manual for obedient 
individuals produced by the great Protestant military commanders-
among them Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus and Frederick the 
Great. 
-and Oliver Cromwell (Weber, 1968, 1150-1157). 
Though full-scale statist war may be passe at present, the formalities of this 
mode of war, Clausewitz's concepts for example, still are taught in policy 
programs and military schools the world over (and considered difficult). 
They are used in Singapore and Scandinavia to organize the five pi//ars-
psychological, social, economic, civil and military-of total defense. They are 
used-metaphorically and operationally-in sports, total soccer and hockey-
in commerce, total economic war, or as Virilio calls it, globalized economic 
warfare-in theatre, especially in its mass, commodified form (advertising, 
popular music)-in politics, in total electoral campaigns waged in the air 
(electronic advertising) and on the ground (getting out the vote or 
strategically blocking it)-and in the academy, not least in the development 
of contemporary war and war theory (strategy, tactics). Derrida (1984, 20-
31), in another of the periodic cold war crises, wrote: 
For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war [a 
fable because there has not been absolute nuclear war, and if there 
0 
was, there would be no one to read or write about it] are perhaps 
distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other 
words the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless 
capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of 
speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through 
all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not 
only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius 
today, everything that is named by the old words-culture, civilization, 
Bi/dung, schole, paideia. 
This military industrial "structuring" of not only the army, diplomacy and 
politics-but of "the whole of the human socius"-of education at its most 
accomplished limits-of Bi/dung, schole, paideia-this strategic organization 
of thought and thought processes and the larger social environment that 
contains them is militarism unconcealed (revealed). 
97 
Derrida's sensibility may be uncharacteristically romantic in this instance. As 
this work demonstrates, "culture, civilization, Bi/dung, schole, paideia" along 
with material and immaterial technologies-postindustrial speed for 
example-are a function of warfare (Chapter 4). 
Regarding modern education specifically, the transformation Bi/dung, schole, 
paideia into codified nation-alized knowledge began in earnest with 
Napoleon, though it was emulated quickly in the U.S. and Prussia. Porter 
(1994, 136) writes: "The man [Napoleon] who founded the University of 
France five months after Austerlitz [overwhelming French defeat of Austria] 
and three months after the crushing of Naples well understood that in the 
modern age an educated society is as much a pillar of military success as a 
prosperous society." This perception has only increased since Napoleon 
reformed-in the ideology of late capitalism "modernized"-France's 
educational system (see Chapter 5). 
Napoleon established the Ecole Polytechnique in 1794, which soon after was 
devoted to training military engineers, and the /ycees to replace the civic-
though not martial schools of the Directory. Hacker (1989, 61) says," ... 
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the engineering schools were military schools, which became the great 
polytechnics of Western Europe." Napoleon (the discursive field) put into 
place a system of national military/industrial education before the Prussians, 
who did so after their defeat by Napoleon at Jena (1807). 
This imbricated military/industrial trajectory continued unabated wherever 
industrialization saw implementation, and each global war added a new set of 
institutions to those in place already (e.g. League of Nations, International 
Monetary Fund, Breton Woods, United Nations, World Bank). At the national 
level, however, many new institutions were directed to theoretical production 
as much as to material production, to schooling, mass motivation, 
censorship, propaganda, research, education, military-psychological 
operations (psyops), mass training technologies and the development and 
use of mass media. 
By 1917, economic and social production in the United Kingdom effectively 
had been rolled into one, the first totally integrated system for the theoretical 
and material production of warfare. The U.S. and Canada followed this 
development model. Interestingly, Hitler admired the propaganda 
techniques first developed in England and the U.S. during World War I 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999, 211). Porter (1994, 192) captures this "total 
machinic assemblage" when he writes: "The mass state, the regulatory state, 
the welfare state ... is an offspring of the total warfare of the industrial age." 
Ubiquity and pervasiveness-and seeming inevitability-conceal the existence 
and impact of contemporary militarism (i.e. running an economy "as if" total 
war was imminent), its very visibility hiding its success/excess. As Virilio 
(1998, 26) writes: "All of us are already civilian soldiers without knowing it. 
And some of us know it. 0 The great stroke of luck for the military class's 
terrorism is that no one recognizes it. People don't recognize the militarized 
part of their identity, of their consciousness." 
War Machine Inverted 
According to Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 119): 
Total war itself is surpassed, towards a form of peace more terrifying 
still. The war machine has taken charge of the aim, worldwide order, 
and the [nation] states are no longer anything more than objects or 
means adapted to that machine. This is the point at which 
Clausewitz's formula is effectively reversed; to be entitled to say that 
politics is the continuation of war by other means, it is not enough to 
invert the order of the words as if they could be spoken in either 
direction; it is necessary to follow the real movement at the conclusion 
of which the States, having appropriated a war machine, and having it 
adapted to their aims, reissue a war machine that takes charge of the 
aim, appropriates the States and assumes increasingly wider political 
functions. 
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On this reading, the state-operated war machine as conceived by Clausewitz 
has mutated, has self-organized once again, into an independent social 
practice whereby war is no longer "politics by other means" but politics "war 
by other means." However, Deleuze and Guatarri's machinist imagery was 
meant literally as well as metaphorically. 25 
The war machine, the one that appropriated the state function, is an 
abstraction of very real social processes which can be studied in the same 
way as other phenomena and social practices, for example, governance, 
education or medicine. 26 Like other social practices (assemblages), the war 
machine can be read (constructed) in a "solicitous" manner (Derrida) 
whereby no essential problematic can be obtained but whereby various 
exposures-manifestations-of a particular social practice (war) are 
apprehended, in this instance, in "realist" and "post realist" fashion. 
On such a reading, realist productions are those that constitute and provide 
endogenous critique of tJ:,e theory and practice of war-critique that does not 
question or challenge fundamental epistemological, ontological, ideological 
presuppositions and perceptions-as does "immanent critique" as developed 
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by Adorno and Horkheimer, or dialectical thinking as theorized by Jameson. 
Realist productions include the work of the policy makers, scientists, 
researchers, teachers, "realist" novelists, politicians, administrators and 
technicians, strategists and theorists like Clausewitz, those who develop and 
impart the means and manage the practice of war, those who Virilio calls the 
global, military class. Realist productions include the military policy analysis 
provided by organizations critical of warfare such as the Institute for Policy 
Studies in the U.S. and Project Ploughshares in Canada, the work of the 
great twentieth century critics of modernity, for example Weber and Polyani, 
and the work of Marxists from Engels to Lenin to E. P. Thompson, each of 
whom addressed war and imperialism and their relation to capitalism. 27 
In addition to this "realist" work, a new theoretical tradition has developed 
since World War II-French and feminist technology critique-that might be 
termed "postrealist," or to flagrantly violate discursive boundaries, magic 
realism. The developing tradition, directly and indirectly, addresses war and 
the militarization of existence. Like magic realism proper (a term originally 
developed in the 1920s to describe a school of painting that "heightened 
reality"), it is not that this theoretical work isn't intended to or doesn't 
apprehend "reality." Indeed, "postrealist" theory does so in ways denied 
"realist" approaches. However, like magic realism, it does so in ways that 
may be foreign to the "realist" traditions of rationalism, empiricism, 
scientism, narrative structure premised on linear time and geographic space 
(Heidegger's age of the world picture) and the theories of "realist" 
representation including the correspondence theory of language. 
Postrealist theory as it is constructed here fundamentally differs from realist 
theory. Not only does it involve a presentation that denies the possibility of 
language acting as neutral medial device between reality and observer 
(reader), it also replaces realist discourse with a discourse that operates 
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according to a different model-in-theory as well as in-practice. Thus, it is not 
a matter of re-placing a re-form in the old economy of (realist) images, 
symbols and practices, but a matter of developing new concepts and 
perceptions (Heidegger's bringing into presence). By this means, new 
analytical tools are placed on offer, new ways provided, in this instance, to 
comprehend the nature and extent of contemporary warfare. 
Postrea/ist Fabrications 
For those unused to the world of cyborgs (and simians), the posthuman self, 
virtuality, pure war, dromology, nomadology, simulacra and war machines, 
entering this theoretical work might be like following Gabriel Garcia Marquez 
into the cycles of coup and counter-coup that have for so long plagued so 
much of Latin America (One Hundred Years of Solitude, 1970, Love in the 
Time of Cholera, 1988), watching Joseph Heller's wheelerdealer Milo 
Mindbender sensibly sell a bombing raid by a squadron in the US Air Force on 
its own airfield (Catch-22, 1961), or following Slothrop through wartime 
Europe in Gravity's Rainbow (1973). 
Derrida (1984, 20-21) divides writing somewhat similarly to this 
realist/postrealist division, between the theoretico-informative and poetico-
performative, applying the contemporary nuclear epoch to conjugate the 
division: 
... it would rather be of a sudden "synchronous" appearance, of a 
cohabitation of the two formations: on the one hand we have the 
principle of reason (interpreted since the seventeenth century 
according to the order of representation, the domination of the 
subject/object structure, the metaphysics of will, modern techno-
science, and so on) ... and on the other hand we have the project of 
literature in the strict sense ... Literature [because its "inscription is the 
very possibility of its effacement"] has always belonged to the nuclear 
epoch, even if it does not talk "seriously" [i.e. realistically] about it. 
And in truth I believe that the nuclear epoch is dealt with more 
seriously in texts by Mallarme, of Kafka, or Joyce, for example, than in 
present-day novels that would offer direct and realistic description of a 
"real" nuclear catastrophe. 
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On such a reading, the poetico-performative offers an appreciation of the 
contemporary situation that may be denied its "realist" counterparts. 
Contemporary French social theory stands in an interesting position in this 
regard, as it places on offer both forms of apprehension simultaneously. The 
performative moment is evident throughout; provocations, the tongue-in-
cheek approach, are no doubt meant to estrange the realist reader and no 
doubt have succeeded in doing so beyond the wildest hopes of these 
philosophers. 
The purposeful transgressions, the array of new words, or of old words used 
to capture new concepts-are employed to demonstrate how different 
contemporary technological societies of compulsive consumption are from 
previous societies. Arthur Kraker (1992, 2), another poetico-performative 
theorist captures this dual-purpose theory, what he terms "French 
bi modernism." 
Indeed, what might be called the key impulse of French "bimodernism" 
has been to explore the mutation of technology within a series of 
critical discourses: technology as pure speed (Virilio), technology as 
simulation (Baudrillard), the rhetoric of technology (Barthes), 
technology as desiring-machines (Deleuze and Guatarri), technology 
as aesthetics (Lyotard) and technologies of subjectivity (Foucault) .... 
What emerges from the French mind, then, is an account of 
technological society that can be immediately and massively influential 
because it is a mirror of technology in the postmodern scene. This 
means that the reception of French thought in the outmoded form of 
post-structuralism has always been a trompe l'oeil deflecting attention 
away from the key contribution of French thinkers as theorists of 
technology par excellence; that is, as brilliant interpreters of the 
virtual phase of technological society. Thus, for example, while 
American thought is trapped in a pragmatic description of technology 
as liberation, the French discourse on technology begins with a violent 
exteriorization of the self, actually producing an eerie account of 
cynical technology. 
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This study of the mutation of technology has led each of those theorists, and 
Derrida as well, into the study of war and militarism. When combined with 
U.S. feminist posthumanist theory and interpretation (cf. Brown, 1995, 
Butler, 1997, Haraway, 1991, Hayles, 1999), the two scholarly traditions 
work together, not necessarily with intent but more likely out of common 
interest, to explore/expose the contemporary social practice of war (and 
militarism). Machined apocalyptic imagery is prevalent in these constitutions 
of cynical (militarized) technology. Foucault's panopticon (the watching 
machine) is based in part on the effect of the barracks (military life) in 
constructing the modern (self-regulating) subject. The effect of Virilio's 
dromology (the study of movement) employs pure speed, whereby speed 
itself overdetermines spatial and human relations, while his concept of pure 
war captures the "exhausted logic" (Kroker, 1992) of war as total offence, 
and of the supercession of actual real total war by continual war preparation. 
Deleuze and Guattari's nomadology (the study of social geomotion) reinvents 
total war as a war machine that arises from two generative social pulses-the 
sedentary (e.g. cities, settlements) and the nomadic (the raiding of cities, 
settlements). Baudrillard addresses the political and symbolic economies (of 
death), and more than any other media theorist exposes the 
interconnections, indeed the mutually-constitutive relationship of media and 
war, Friedrich Kittler (1999) excepted. 28 Derrida in Spectres of Marx: The 
State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International ( 1994) 
addresses death, capitalism and a Marx whose spectral presence is still 
intimately involved in the production of knowledge and of "history," neo-
liberal economic theory and history notwithstanding. 
It is as if these theorists are lifting a veil from the "not-to-be-spoken" (from 
what Foucault terms th~ "outside discourse"), from the impermanence and 
violence of existence covered (papered) over by positivist (and positive) 
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knowledge (e.g. ideologies of progress, promise, technology, the conceit of 
"reality" thoroughly apprehended). These theorists "bring into presence" the 
previously inarticulate, the previously incomprehensible. In doing so, they 
have developed thought that complements other formative discourses, 
perhaps especially the themes of moral regulation, self-formation (identity) 
and the social constitution of reality addressed in feminist, postcolonial and 
cultural theory. 29 
Haraway engages war critique, employing her hydra-headed cyborg to 
examine the possibilities of residing within a subjectivity that exists outside 
patriarchal militarism (or militant patriarchy). Hayles provides the history of 
hypertechno autopoiesis (self-making) and, in doing so, indirectly provides a 
genealogy of postindustrial autopoiesis. Though less directly than Haraway, 
Hayles too addresses potentially expansive possibilities that could attach to 
"self-making" located outside the thrall of organized symbolic (and actual) 
violence (i.e. postindustrial economies informed by militarism). 
Butler provides a genealogy of subjectivation-of the always already political 
process of self-formation-while Brown offers a philosophical excursus into 
postliberal authoritarianism as an effect of twentieth century capitalism (and 
the patriarchy embedded therein). Brown, by redeploying Marx and 
Neitzsche, especially the concept of ressentiment, Nietzsche's mechanism for 
the production of human meanness (in both senses), takes apart classical 
liberalism. She too provides a positive moment, a postliberal notion of 
freedom. Virilio and Derrida, too, address a "place/space beyond" by 
employing the concept of "justice." 
Some of the imagery these philosophers and scientists employ, at first sight 
anyway, may seem fantastic (excessive). Yet seeming linguistic excess may 
be required if the influence of militarism (and war) is to be apprehended, 
especially in those jurisdictions that sponsor but rarely experience war 
directly. As war and war/science become (cyber)fiction, so it may be 
necessary to draw upon an expansive poetico-performative arsenal to tell 
new war stories. 30 • 
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Paul Virilio (2000, 23) writes: "My aim was to understand the notion of "Total 
War." As I have said many times before, I was among the first people to 
experience the German Occupation of France during the Second World 
War. "31 Armitage (2000) explains: 
A child of Hitler's Blitzkrieg, Virilio has theorized the cultural logic of 
contemporary militarism ... Revealing the dromological and political 
conditions of the twenty-first century, Virilio interprets modernity in 
terms of military conception of history and the endo-colonization of the 
human body by militarized technoscience. 
Virilio's construct "dromology"-the study of the logic and impact of speed-is 
interpreted by Kroker (1992:21): 
That's the empire of immediacy: speed and communication where the 
self mutates into a classless cyborg, half-flesh, half-metal, where living 
means quick circulation through the technical capillaries of the 
mediascape, where culture is reduced to the society of the spectacle, 
and where power is generalized in the form of the predatory logic of 
the war machine. 
And of Virilio (28): 
Virilio is the French Clausewitz: a theorist who, working in the spectral 
terrain of the late twentieth century, analyzes "the tendencies and 
flows" of the war machine to discover its underlying tactics, ("the 
intelligence of the hunt"), strategy ("the logic of politics") and logistics 
(where "war is less than about actual episodes of war, than about 
lengthy preparations for war"; or, as Virilfo quotes the Pentagon: . 
"logistics is about the transferal of a nation's potential to its military 
machine." 
Foucault speaks of a war machine as well, and puts a dialectical reversal on 
0 
offer. Though his model is based in his concept of a disciplinary society that 
has been theoretically displaced, or, at the least, augmented by Deleuze's 
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concept of societies of control, nonetheless his work is instructive, not the 
least because it again offers a reconceptualization and generalization of 
warfare as a prevailing existential modality. In Discipline and Punish (1979, 
168), Foucault provides a historical sketch of the way in which warfare 
invaded the socius to work formatively to inscribe what Foucault terms 
disciplinary society: 
It may be that war as a strategy is a continuation of politics. But it 
must not be forgotten that "politics" has been conceived of as a 
continuation, if not exactly and directly of, at least of the military 
model as a fundamental means of preventing civil disorder. Politics, as 
a technique of internal peace and order, sought to implement the 
mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the docile, 
useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres 
and exercises. In the great eighteenth century states, the army 
guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, an ever-
threatening sword, but also because it was a technique and a body of 
knowledge that could project their social schema over the social body. 
If there is a politics-war series that passes through strategy, there is 
an army-politics series that passes through tactics. It is strategy that 
makes it possible to understand warfare as a way of conducting 
politics between states; it is tactics that make it possible to understand 
the army as a principle for maintaining the absence of warfare in civil 
society. 
In Power/Knowledge (1977, 90), Foucault goes much beyond the specific 
historical situations that accounted for the imposition of rational discipline 
upon the socius. His conceptualization becomes more abstract and begins to 
approach the concept of the "war machine" as developed by his 
contemporaries, Deleuze and Guattari: 
... if power is properly speaking the way in which relations of forces are 
deployed and given concrete expression, rather than analyzing it in 
terms of cession, contract or alienation, or functionally in terms of its 
maintenance of relations of production, should we not analyse it 
primarily in terms of struggle, conflict and war? One would then 
confront the original hypothesis, according to which power is 
essentially repressiQn [liberal interpretation], with a second hypothesis 
to the effect that power is war, a war continued by other means. 
This reversal of Clausewitz's assertion that war is politics continued by 
other means has a triple significance: in the first place, it implies that 
the relations of power that function in a society such as ours 
essentially rest upon a definite relation of forces that is established at 
a determinate, historically specifiable moment, in war and by war. 
Furthermore, it is true that political power puts an end to war, that it 
installs, or tries to install, the reign of peace in civil society, this by no 
means implies that it suspends the effects of war or neutralizes the 
disequilibrium revealed in the final battle. The role of political power, 
on this hypothesis, is perpetually to reinscribe this relation through a 
form of unspoken warfare; to reinscribe it in social institutions, in 
economic inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each 
and everyone of us. 
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This statement captures the "effects of war" and "disequilbrium" revealed in 
the final battle (the entropic moment) that continue into the "reign of peace," 
indeed mark it. In this regard, Foucault echoes Virilio's "total peace" as well 
as Deleuze and Guatarri's "peace more terrifying still than war." As well, 
Foucault's concept of the political as reinscription echoes Deleuze and 
Guatarri's "reterritorialization." French "bimodernists," and this includes the 
Baudrillard, present a similar theoretical image, that of a war saturated 
socius. 
Foucault (92) however, did express reservations about forcing the polity into 
a "schema of struggle-repression" and thereby about his generalization of 
war. Yet this was a hesitant caveat. Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 7), on the 
other hand, displayed no such hesitations. They again performed a 
dialectical inversion of Clausewitz's war machine, but to different analytical 
effect. In their construction termed nomadology-the study of militarism 
outside of state power-they explain: 
The State has no war machine of its own; it can only appropriate one 
in the form of a military institution, one that will always cause it 
problems. This explains the mistrust states have towards their 
military institutions& to the extent that the state inherits an extrinsic 
war machine. Carl von Clausewitz has a general sense of this when he 
treats the flow of absolute war as an Idea which States partially 
appropriate according to their political needs, and in relation to which 
they are more or less good "conductors." 
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The abstract Idea of war existing separate from the State places the state in 
an exterior position as concerns warfare, similar to its position as concerns 
capital. Deleuze and Guatarri (118) write: 
The factors that make State war total war are closely connected to 
" capitalism: it has to do with the investment of constant capital in 
equipment, industry and the war economy, and the investment of 
variable capital in the population in its physical and mental aspects. 
Finally (17), explaining the implications of the exteriority of this expanded 
war machine, of this tendency to war that can now be read economically and 
militarily as a "diffuse" and "polymorphous" war machine beyond state 
control: 
But the war machine's form of exteriority is such that it itself exists 
only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial innovation as 
well as in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as 
in a religious creation, in all the flows and currents that only 
secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State. It is not 
in terms of independence, but of coexistence and competition in a 
perceptual field of interaction, that we must conceive of exteriority and 
interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of 
identity, bands and kingdoms and megamachines and empires. 
Is not the contemporary "war on terror" powerfully captured by Deleuze and 
Guatarri's "war machine," the one that exists "only in its own 
metamorphoses?" As they point out, the war machine exists in industrial 
innovation, technological invention, commercial circuits and religious 
creation. 
The Crusader zeal and millenarianism that marks rightist U.S. Christianity, 
the industrial innovation that marks new U.S. military technologies, the 
commercial circuits of the financing of this capitalist warfare state (e.g. the 
increasing U.S. national debt), the warfare corporation (e.g. the Carlyle 
~ 
Group), and the way these developments collude seamlessly to produce the 
"war machine" evidence such metamorphoses. 
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In the realist narrative, this diffuse and polymorphous power, the total 
influence (C4ISR) attributed to the military-industrial complex, realizes the 
concept of (diffuse) power articulated by Foucault. It appears, materializing 
like the predatory war machine formulated by Deleuze and Guatarri. 
Seymour Melman (1997, 2) provides specifics of this machinic 
metamorphosis, the way the war machine continued to appropriate the state 
after Eisenhower publicly labeled the "complex: 
The creation of the state-management [complex] marked the 
transformation of President Dwight Eisenhower's "military-industrial 
complex," a loose collaboration, mainly through market relations, of 
senior military officers, industrial managers, and legislators. Robert 
McNamara, under the direction of President John Kennedy, organized a 
formal central management office to administer the military-industrial 
empire. 
Melman continues: "This is a new imperialism ... The methods of the new 
imperialism included the direct wielding of military, political and economic 
power to checkmate leftist nationalism and to take direct political control of 
the entire nation ... " Living within this war economy, if only "virtual," under 
the constant "real" threat of war, is "second" nature for those who grew up 
with or after Virilio. 32 The economy of generalized violence institutionalized 
in western industrial jurisdictions during World War I is the rewoven cloth of 
postindustrialism, its warp and woof, not a pattern printed on it. 33 
However, this economy of total violence, symbolic and material (of pure war 
and pure speed), is so naturalized as to be all but invisible (apperceptionally 
inassimilable), its "total influence" outside the sphere of common 
comprehension, perhaps most especially to residents of jurisdictions 
constituted by the war machine but affected by material warfare least 
directly. 34 Melman (13) writes: 
... despite the acknowledged weight of conventional ideology, 
thoughtful people have wondered how something so huge [the military 
industrial "complex"] could remain so hidden, especially from the 
consciousness of the Left, with their history of critiquing ideas that 
support the establishment. At this writing [1997] the managers of 
America's military and civilian economy have joined in a grand 
consensus to omit from public discussion-notably during major 
elections-all references to the civilian infrastructure decay and the 
relation of all this to the prospect of the new $1,450 billion [one trillion 
four hundred fifty billion] commitment to new weaponry. 
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In the post cold war period, the military-industrial complex did not fade 
away. It simply changed outfits. Military spending in the US, the home the 
war machine adopted, continued to be maintained following the cold war, but 
recently, like a cancer that lay dormant, has begun to spread and to grow 
again luxuriantly. 35 Indeed, even before the current "war on terror," more 
than 50% of the discretionary U.S. federal government budget was dedicated 
to "defence" (Vidal, 2001, 448). 
Current war spending in the U.S. is of course more profligate than when Vidal 
provided this documentation. 36 The war machine being built to fight "terror" 
(World War IV) is proving more intrusive than the one in operation until the 
Cold War ended. 
War Machine Conversion 
For Deleuze and Guatarri, the war machine is not about actual warfare, but 
about deterritorialization/reterritorialization, the various machinisms that 
take the social form of resistance or of repression in terms of smooth and 
striated social spaces and of social flows and blockages. While the war 
machine at this particular time is emblematic of a military/capitalist process 
of subjective delimitation (reterritorialization of the self-of subjectivity) 
within ever changing parameters, for Deleuze and Guattarri, the war machine 
also offers a way out of, as they put it, this "axiomatic process."37 
~ 
According to Deleuze and Guatarri, while all power societies deterritorialize of 
necessity, capitalism differs from despotism in that it decodes representation 
111 
altogether. This is the genius of capitalism; one of its most "fundamental 
rhythms" is "its reduction of all phenomena to the present," the way in which 
capitalism constantly recodes already encoded phenomena and knowledge in 
terms of the "market" (Jameson, 2002, 194). This process was identified at 
least in part by Marx in his concept of commodity fetish. That term, 
however, does not do the process full justice. 
For example, under the regime of capital, the focus of desire moves from the 
regus or god-as was the case in pre-capitalist societies, to abstracted 
wealth-money. 38 Deleuze and Guatarri say that instead of over-coding, as 
was done when Christianity coded-over (overwrote) pagan celebrations of 
the vernal equinox (Easter), capitalism axiomatizes. As Eugene Holland 
(1991, 58), one of the major interpreters of Deleuze and Guatarri in the U.S. 
puts it: 
Capitalism differs from despotic power society in that it is an economic 
power society: it deterritorializes not by over-coding via 
representation, but by de-coding representation altogether: by 
substituting a calculus of abstract quantities for the codes and over-
codes that defined concrete qualities under savagery and despotism. 
Instead of over-coding, capitalism axiomatizes: it conjoins first of all 
the deterritorialized and de-coded flow of pure liquid wealth henceforth 
invested as capital in means of production with another· 
deterritorialized and de-coded flow: pure labor-power henceforth 
disciplined or "skilled" to match its pre-given object of investment on 
the assembly-line or some other manufacturing process. The 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall will then force the addition of 
additional axioms: production processes are continually transformed 
by the input of technical information flowing from the hard sciences. 
Crises of mass over-production will in turn force the addition of still 
other axioms: advertising programs the taste informing purchasing-
power to match the commodity production of labor-powe·r, so that 
consumption is re-territorialized onto the pre-existing objects of 
production and thereby realizes profit on invested capital. In this 
context, reterritorialization is the "dead hand of the past," as Marx 
said, "that weighs upon the living .... " 
Deleuze (1995, 172) describes the "war machine" as he and Guatarri 
invented it. Speaking of the major "lines of flight" in contemporary society, 
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and with Deleuze and Guatarri "lines of flight" are emblematic of resistance, 
of what for Marx were the manifestations of the "contradictions of 
capitalism," Deleuze describes the war machine as a "third major direction": 
Then, finally, a third direction, which amounts to finding a characterization of 
"war machines" that have nothing to do with war but with a particular way of 
occupying, taking up space-time, or inventing new space-times: 
revolutionary movements (people don't take enough account, for instance, of 
how the PLO has had to invent a space-time in the Arab world), but artistic 
movements too, are war-machines in this sense. 
This formulation-and in this sense feminism, in terms of the new space it 
has opened, is a war machine-is a politicized version of Heidegger's "coming 
into presence," or that which Deleuze and Guatarri term "becoming."39 Thus 
various "avant-gardes" that actually live up to their appellation come into 
existence. Such "avant gardes," for example late nineteenth century Paris, 
Vienna at the beginning of the twentieth century, or New York in the 1950s 
are "war machines" par excellence. As Deleuze's translator explains (1995, 
185): 
The "war machines" of A Thousand Plateaus are not "machine for war," 
but free arrangements oriented along a "line of flight" out of the 
repressive social machinery that configures or codifies all processes 
and production within the extrinsic ends of a transcendent state 
oriented along the single "static" line of a unitary history. In 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia the free interplay of all the machines, 
arrangements, flows, processes, becomings, events into which a given 
thing (component, variable) enters is intrinsically desiring, productive, 
and disruptive: Creative, artistic, and revolutionary. 
Again an inversion; suddenly the war machine is a site for freedom, the 
splace (place/space) where the bounds of existence are pushed at, the point 
of "becoming"-the agol'listic point of creation whereat new forms of 
existence are imaginable and may even be tried on. 
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Along with the war machine, assemblages and axiomatization, "de" and "re" 
territorialization are needed to make sense of Deleuze and Guatarri's 
reformulation of the socius. "De" and "re" territorialization are expressions of 
the capitalist axiomatic based on the production of various forms of excess. 
For example, the "axiomatic" evidences in a subjective economy that 
produces subjectivity delimited by a specific coding, for example 
contemporary "consumerism," which produces anti-production as a by-
product. That "subjective wastage," such as "criminal" behavior, is a 
function of the system, that, like a perpetual motion machine for the 
production of value, must then be reterritorialized back into the economy. 
This constant movement is the means for new wealth production, in this 
instance the expansion and privatization of statist incarceration. Again, this 
is the genius of the system, to deterritorialize and reterritorialize precisely 
that which is reterritorialized in the first place. It is the system's logic 
(axiomatic). 
In terms of material production, this reterritorialization is evident in the 
recent global imposition of marketable "pollution credits" that are being 
"earned," "sold" and "bought." In the subjective economy, this 
reterritorialization is evident in education whereby the ruin of the statist 
system is given back to the socius as an investment opportunity, as is the 
operation of the state itself. However, this seemingly perpetual dynamic 
whereby capitalism moves from crisis to crisis, creating crises and their 
always partial resolution, is most often taken at face value. 
Thus there is the confusion of symptoms with problems, for example the 
confusion regarding the current beggaring of public education in Canada, the 
beggaring itself as the issue or problem without regard to the systemic logic 
that underwrites it. Thus, it is not a matter of contradiction, but of flows, of 
flood and ebb tides, of low and high entropy-of becomings, war machines 
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and the formation of new assemblages. The contemporary capitalist 
economy since its inception in North West Europe has functioned as a 
deterritorializing/reterritorializing machine, moving constantly from place to 
space, most always employing warfare. This description of contemporary 
existential conditions places war and education in an unfamiliar context. 
Deterritorialization and reterritorialization then are descriptive of the 
capitalist process-and explain the role of education during the period of 
capitalism as a reterritorializer par excellence. 
However, Deleuze and Guatarri are not alone in striving to find new ways to 
conceptualize capitalism and warfare. For example, Haraway (1991, 72) 
locates her cyborgs-which contain liberationist possibilities-in this new 
space determined by a war machine "for war" that eerily describes the war 
machine being (re)built in the U.S.: "From one perspective, a cyborg world is 
about the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet, about the final 
abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the name of 
defense, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist 
orgy of war." 
In turn Kroker's "spectral terrain" provides the grounds upon which a "grid of 
(perceptual) control" is imposed (through the Internet and TV, for example), 
much like the barbed wire running around and through Europe during both 
World Wars that controlled that spectral (and material) terrain and thereby 
"occupied" not only the geography (territory) but its inhabitants. 
In effect, Foucault, Haraway, Deleuze, Guatarri, Virilio and Baudrillard, took 
warfare-and its relationship to capitalism-out of its closeted/cosseted 
theoretJc surrounds. They forced war onto the academic stage in a manner 
that in some respects re;;embles the cold stare of Benjamin or Adorno, 
certainly a reminder of Adamo's felicitous phrase that the Second World War 
was "capitalism making war on its own future." Their schemas, with the 
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exception of Virilio, are not, however, trapped within the binary of subjective 
autonomy/heteronomy whereby the free subject is "for itself" and "in itself"; 
rather the subject constituted in these narratives is an effect of power. 
Thus power, while it is both repressive and oppressive in that it cannot but 
delimit human possibility, a zero sum game at best, is at the same time 
positively formative-a form of reterritorialization to employ Deleuze and 
Guatarri, endocolonization to use Virilio, or a process of subjectification to 
use Foucault and Butler. Perhaps, it may not be too much to suggest that 
the "people" controlled (formed) by the confluence of contemporary 
capitalism and war are themselves a form of constant "low-grade" warfare. 
Virilio (2000a, 55), who very muck focuses on World War I as the point 
where the "future" first became evident, provides this comment: 
(The press anticipated) ... a first world war which, by its very 
universalism, would become the first total war of humanity against 
man thanks to the deployment of a military-industrial arsenal of mass 
destruction, which was soon to encompass a scientific complex ranging 
from physics to biology and psychology. 
It was merely a question of time, then, for the transfer of the West's 
expansionist drives from the exhausted geography of the terrestrial to 
the human body-that last, still-unexplored corner of the planet, 
relatively protected by the last cultural, social and moral prohibitions. 
Literature has proven prescient in apprehending the existence of this total 
war machine, articulating its function as a total control system long before it 
was fashionable. Nicholas Spencer (1999, 31) points out the groundbreaking 
way in which Pynchon's postrealist "novel" anticipated French war theory. 
Importantly, his reading of Gravity's Rainbow against French theory points to 
the postwar development of the civil "security state" that now marks all 
postindustrial jurisdictions, the "realization of practices of social control that 
are irreducible to war [irt its conventional formal aspect]": 
In its treatment of war Gravity's Rainbow shares many features with 
poststructuralist theory, especially that of Paul Virilio and Jean 
Baudrillard. Pynchon articulates the poststructuralist notion proffered 
by Michel Foucault, Felix Deleuze, Felix Guattari and others that 
modern societies are disciplined by military structures rather than 
being ruled by law. Much of Gravity's Rainbow depicts the end of the 
Second World War as a significant moment in a process whereby 
military relations and realities are being extended into the post-war 
era. This view coincides with the arguments of Virilio, who coins the 
term "pure war" to denote how the military extension portrayed by 
Pynchon is inaugurated and maintained by the idea of deterrence. 
However, at times Gravity's Rainbow portrays the Second World War 
as a preparatory moment in the realization of practices of social 
control that are irreducible to war. 
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Another theoretical "double-bind" is apparent-the irresolvable contradictions 
between the "will to technology" as Kroker (1992) put it-and the "will to 
life." Yet both indifferent registers allow the apprehension of the pervasive 
control system that is contemporary war as it manifests in the hyperreality of 
postindustrial jurisdictions and in the real time mass suffering in many places 
outside those exclusive premises. This is the point-though they are 
contradictory in part, both concepts must be employed simultaneously for 
the apprehension of the global(ized) socius. 
The realist narrative, Virilio's "pure war," must remain in play, for example, 
in the statistics of war expenditures, the history of warfare, its theory, the 
continuing encroachment of the national security state, the "totally-blended" 
economy of postindustrialism. Yet, at the same time, the socially 
constructed nature of these elements of warfare must be brought to the fore, 
especially how they are grounded in electronic mediation, the way in which 
the "real" is constituted in the era of postindustrial war. Each, in its way, is 
part of the same "axiomatic," the means by which deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization now proceed globally. 
The incursion of the phantasmagoric into actually existing reality, the one 
that exists prior to and outside of consciousness, must be respected if the 
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incursion of the "actual war machine," the social economy of war, in its 
economic, political, technological, moral, social, semiotic, symbolic, imagistic 
and axiological avatars, is to be accounted for materially.40 With that caveat, 
poststructuralist theory and its literary equivalents, nonetheless point to an 
understanding of the ways in which war penetrates every aspect of life in 
postindustrial jurisdictions. Daniel Bell (1961), the progenitor of the term 
"postindustrial society," described it as a "mobilized society" with a 
"preparedness economy" (as quoted in Noble, 1991, 18). 
This form of theory allows the theoretical and political-economic 
apprehension of World War IV, the contemporary war trivialized as terrorism, 
the war that more than ever before, is being fought on both realist and 
postrealist fronts simultaneously. The extent of this war remains largely 
invisible, usually manifest only in events designed to capture electronic 
mediation; but it is nevertheless broadly engaged in all aspects of quotidian 
existence in every postindustrial jurisdiction, and, of course, in other 
locations that happen to be sites of material warfare, of actual killing. 41 
The war theory outlined above may seem a long way from the social practice 
and discourse (the assemblage) termed education. The next two chapters 
will demonstrate that this is not at all the case, that education can. be 
decoded on a historical and encompassing level by employing the concepts 
outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter Notes 
1 The "Ems telegram" reported the happenings of a meeting between the King of 
Prussia and the French ambassador to the Prussian chancellor Bismarck. 
Bismarck made available an edited version of the document that omitted the 
courtesies exchanged by the two participants. This edited version, which was 
published in France and the German states, further exacerbated the ill feeling 
between France and Prussia and led to calls for war in Paris and Berlin. France 
declared war on Germany on July19, 1870. With the French as apparent 
aggressors, Bismarck was successful in enlisting the southern German states in 
the ensuing war. The unification of all the German states (except Austria) into 
modern Germany ensued shortly thereafter. After 1870, Germany was 
Europe's leading military, commercial, cultural, technological, educational and 
scientific power. Hegel's history appeared to be unfolding. 
2 Weber (1968, 1463-1466) discusses the "epochal importance" of Bismarck and 
the wars of German unification. He too attributes great historical importance to 
the events highlighted here. 
3 Unlike fifty years earlier when England had been allied with Prussia against 
Napoleonic France, the country this time was lining up with France against a 
resurgent Prus~ia (and a uniting Germany). Therefore, the deposed Emperor 
Napoleon III (after being captured and released by the Prussians) and the 
deposed Empress Eugenie were provided luxurious sanctuary in England, 
though the former Emperor died shortly after going into exile. 
4 A resurgent Prussian triumphalism, itself a comic opera of sorts with the 
crowning of a pan-German Kaiser (Caesar) at Versailles, the return of French 
republicanism in the form of the "third republic", the rise and defeat of the Paris 
Commune, the contractual reinvestment of hostilities between historic 
continental rivals (the Peace of Frankfurt that saw France cede Alsace-Lorraine 
to Germany and pay war reparations), and perhaps most of all, the 
concentrated, intense, industrialized violence of the Franco-Prussian War 
itself-saw the closing as well as the opening of the (melo)drama of the second 
empire as a preview of what was lying in wait in the next century. 
5 This is not to suggest that the Franco-Prussian War is comparable to World War 
I in terms of magnitude. More shells were expended in a single day on the 
Western Front in World War I than in the entire Franco-Prussian War. 
However, the speed of German troop movements and the concentration of their 
violence evidenced the changed nature of war. A full-blown industrialized war 
economy, not realized until 1916 or 1917, provided the basis for total war. 
6 Van Creveld, (1991: 102) in The transformation of war, writes: 
As almost every function of civil society came to be duplicated in the army, 
the old haphazard administrative machinery for mobilizing the forces and 
supervising their operations no longer sufficed. A new supervisory 
institution was needed and this new institution duly appeared in the shape 
of a general staff. 
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Generals staffs consisted of bodies of specifically selected, specially trained, 
experts. Their preferred place of work was not the field but the office. 
Instead of fighting, they planned and administered ... 
This planning and administration formed the basis for contemporary 
systems based management theory. It is another manifestation of the 
"control revolution," a technology of control that was from inception 
militaristic. 
7 Bassford (http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/Complex/Proposax.htm) 
writes: 
Carl von Clausewitz's magnum opus On War (Berlin, 1832) is 
unquestionably the most important single work ever written on the history 
of warfare. The principal importance of Clausewitz's approach to theory is 
his realism. By this I do not mean realism in its usual sense of mere 
cynicism about politics and naked power, although this is not lacking in On 
War. Rather, Clausewitz's approach is profoundly realistic in that it 
describes the complex and uncertain manner in which real-world events 
unfold, taking into account both the frailties and the complexity of the 
physical and psychological world. 
8 In Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction (paper presented to the 23rd 
Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe at Georgia State 
University, 26 February 1993), Bassford writes: 
Aside from their differing relationships to Napoleon, the fundamental 
differences between Clausewitz and Jomini [a competing war theorist] are 
rooted in their differing concepts of the historical process and of the nature 
and role of military theory. Clausewitz saw history in relative terms, 
rejecting absolute categories, standards, and values. The past had to be 
accepted on its own terms. The historian must attempt to enter into the 
mindsets and attitudes of any given period, the "spirit of the age." History 
was a dynamic process of change, driven by forces beyond the control and 
often beyond the comprehension of any individual or group. This 
historicism is particularly obvious in two key themes of On War that are 
missing in the 1812 Principles of War. These are the famous notion that 
"War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means" (i.e., 
organized violence) and the recognition that war can vary in its forms 
depending on the changing nature of policy and of the society within which 
it is waged. 
9 See Simpson (1998) for a history of the theoretical development of U.S. foreign 
policy based in modernization, development and counterinsurgency theory. 
Irene Gendzier (Simpson, 1998, 78-79) in Play it Again Sam: The Practice and 
Apology of Development, an essay included in Simpson's book, describes a 
system "in balance," as one where existing relations of power are not 
threatened, which was preferable to an unstable system where, by definition, 
homeostatic relationships were challenged because of entropy such as 
"insurgency" that was theoretically manageable because the system was 
"closed." Gendzier documents how academicians worked closely with the 
military to develop foreign policy in the 1960s. 
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10 Wendy Brown (1995, 106) writes: 
In Marx's account, the ruse of power peculiar to liberal constitutionalism 
centers upon granting freedom, equality and representation to abstract 
rather than concrete subjects. The substitution of abstract political subjects 
for actual ones not only forfeits the project of emancipation but 
resubjugates us precisely by emancipating substitutes for it-by 
emancipating our abstracted representatives in the state and naming this 
process "freedom." The subject is thus ideally emancipated [in original] 
through its anointing as an abstract person, a formally free and equal 
human being [as free as anyone else to sleep under the bridge], and is 
practically resubordinated through this idealist disavowal of the material 
constituents of personhood, which contain and constrain our freedom. 
Thus, because we are in this way subjugated by the very discourse of our 
freedom, liberal freedom is structurally, not merely definitionally, 
ambiguous. The notion of "representative" and the process by which 
according to Hobbe's Leviathan, we "author" the state exemplify this 
condition and Rousseau makes a similar point in his critique of 
representative government in the "Discourse on Inequality" and the Social 
Contract. Marx himself develops this point through an analogy between the 
state and Christianity: 
Religion is simply the recognition of man in a roundabout fashion; that is, 
through an intermediary. The state is the intermediary between man and 
human liberty. Just as Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes 
all his own divinity and all his religious bonds, so the state is the 
intermediary to which man confides all his non-divinity and all his human 
freedom ("Jewish Question," p. 32). 
11 World War I was the primary generative event of the twentieth century. The 
destabilization that followed its outbreak led to the success of Bolshevism in 
Russia, of Nazism in Germany, World War II (the second phase of the global 
warfare that plagued the century), the Cold War (phase three), and the 
constant "limited" warfare that accompanied it. The effect of war in the 
twentieth century cannot be overstated. Perhaps only the Protestant 
Revolution (reformation) and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), that provided 
founding events for the modern period, might be comparable in terms of recent 
Western history (the system of five hundred years). 
12 In 1917, Czarist Russia sued the German Empire for peace and the US entered 
the war. The Germanic, Ottoman, Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires 
disintegrated during World War I, and France and Great Britain emerged from 
the war as ostensible victors but much diminished. By the end of the war in 
1918, the US was playing a lead role, in which, outbreaks of (symbolic) 
isolationism aside, it continues. 
13 The development of theories of "determinism" and "indeterminism" have 
marked social theory since Hegel and Marx. For the most part, they are of the 
chicken and egg sort, 'for example, does language determine consciousness or 
the other way round, do media determine social relations as McLuhan and 
Kittler posit, or simply reflect relations of power as is the case according to 
Stuart Hall. 
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14 Marshal Foch, the French military commander, stated at the signing of the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919: "Ce n'est pas un traite de paix, c'est un armistice 
de vingt ans." This is not a peace treaty, it an armistice for twenty years. 
15 Since the end of World War II, real total war seems to have lost much of its 
appeal, perhaps especially because the ostensible benefits attached to its 
employment have been superceded by an indiscrete socialization of its costs 
(i.e. nuclear war that over time would impact equally on all regardless of their 
wealth or station in life). 
16 Keeley (1996, 164) addresses this cultural reconsideration of warfare: 
This general change in the Western appreciation of war can be seen in two 
areas of popular and academic culture. The war stories, novels, and poems 
of the nineteenth century celebrated the adventure, heroism, and glory of 
war. Those produced between the world wars treated war and soldiers' 
experience of it as an epic tragedy that, if lacking in any pretense to glory, 
nevertheless provided the stage for stoic heroism and comradely self-
sacrifice. The literature of the past fifty years, by contrast, has tended to 
treat war as a brutal bedlam in which humans merely struggle, usually 
unsuccessfully, to preserve their lives and sanity. Postwar American war 
novels, for example, portray men as the dazed neurotic victims of psychotic 
officers, the petty tyrannies and stupefying boredom of military life, and the 
mindless cruelty of war itself. War had changed in literature from an 
uplifting melodrama, to a elegiac tragedy, to a surrealist black comedy. 
17 Nietzsche (and Marx) noted the end of heroism because of its incompatibility 
with bourgeois values and industrialism at about the same time as the Franco-
Prussian War demonstrated its increasing martial obsolescence. This is not to 
suggest that individual acts of courage no longer marked warfare-only that 
industrial war and the slaughtering of combatants by the millions made such 
acts increasingly meaningless. Van Creveld points out that no "utilitarian 
calculation can justify risking death ... heroic justification is needed to ... kill and 
risk being killed." (Kaldor, 1999, 25-26). This justification is difficult to 
maintain when contemporary technologies are employed to indiscriminately kill 
people by the millions. 
18 Virtual reality is a highly unstable concept, undergoing radical shifts in 
meaning. Michael Heim devotes a book to its explication (1993, 321). He 
writes: 
Duns Scotus [medieval logician] used the term virtual to bridge the gap 
between formally unified reality (as defined by our conceptual expectations) 
[according to Scotus, the real thing already contains its manifold empirical 
qualities in a single unity] and our messily diverse experiences. Similarly, 
we use the term virtual to breach the gap between a given environment and 
a further level of artificial accretions. Virtual space-as opposed to natural 
bodily space-contains the informational equivalent of things. Virtual space 
makes us feel as if we were dealing directly with physical or natural 
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realities. As if .... 
Baudrillard's term hyperreality captures the disappearance of the "real" 
altogether, the replacement of reality by the "as if." He writes (1983: 25) "it is 
no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of 
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus the saving of the 
reality principle." 
19 Kittler (1999/1985: xii) writes: 
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And since 1973, when Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow was published, 
it has become clear that real wars are not fought for people or fatherlands, 
but take place between different media, information technologies, data 
flows. Patterns and moires of a situation that has forgotten us .... 
With Gravity's Rainbow, once again the postrealist narrative provided critical 
apprehension long before the realist one (information warfare, both in the 
sense of propaganda and in the sense of information itself as the means and 
end of war are commonly held views now). 
20 Robert Higgs provides some indication of the scale of warfare: 
The end of World War II blended into the beginning of the Cold War. In 
1948 the government reimposed the military draft, and over the next 25 
years conscription was extended time and again. After 1950 the military-
industrial-congressional complex achieved renewed vigor, sapping 7.7 
percent of GNP on average during the next four decades-cumulatively 
some $11 trillion dollars of 1999 purchasing power. 
from http://www.independent.org/tii/news/990700Higgs.html. 
21 If this be considered fanciful, please consider contemporary U.S. foreign policy. 
This is the official U.S. strategy for fighting World War IV. See The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America, Section III, Strengthen 
Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us 
and Our Friends, September 17.2002 
http ://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss3.htm1: 
The United States will continue to work with our allies to disrupt the 
financing of terrorism. We will identify and block the sources of funding for 
terrorism, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny 
terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate 
charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of 
terrorists' assets through alternative financial networks. 
However, this campaign need not be sequential to be effective, the 
cumulative effect across all regions will help achieve the results we seek. 
We will disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by: 
direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and 
international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist 
organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism 
which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their 
precursors; 
defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at 
home and abroad. by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches 
our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the 
support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively 
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against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people 
and our country; and denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary 
to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign 
responsibilities. We will also wage a war of ideas to win the battle against 
international terrorism. This includes: 
using the full influence of the United States, and working closely with allies 
and friends, to make clear that all acts of terrorism are illegitimate so that 
terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: 
behavior that no respectable government can condone or support and all 
must oppose; 
supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim 
world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism 
do not find fertile ground in any nation; 
diminishing the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism by enlisting the 
international community to focus its efforts and resources on areas most at 
risk; and 
using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and 
ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies 
ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism 
22 The concept of assemblage is taken from Deleuze and Guatarri (1987). An 
assemblage can be comprised of various seemingly unrelated processes and 
artifacts that are assembled with a particular context. An assemblage brings 
about effects which are multifaceted, polyglot and polymorphous, at once 
productive, consumptive, creative, destructive, aesthetic, pragmatic, etc. The 
concept of the assemblage allows Deleuze and Guatarri to neutralize "effects" 
that other theorists would consider negative, positive or ideological (e.g. 
Althusser). It is of great value to this work in that it allows the material and 
discursive, theoretical and pragmatic to be integrated into a "machine" of sorts. 
This concept can allow expression of social dynamics that are actively written 
out of discourse when it is constructed within the confines of conventional 
binaries, most especially those of logocentrism. 
23 Ken Epps in New Welfare to Arms (1995) writes: 
Many products developed with DIPP monies [the Defence Industry 
Productivity Program, a multi-billion dollar Canadian government program 
to subsidize military production that dates to the Defence Production 
Sharing Arrangements (1959) recently replaced by Technology Partnerships 
Canada which has a broader mandate] are "dual-purpose" goods for both 
civilian and military markets. These are goods, such as aero-engines, in 
which the difference between a military and a civilian product may be no 
more than the difference between some components (with, typically, 
components of the military version having to conform to tougher 
specifications), or where the same product may be supplied to both 
commercial and military customers. Recently, the government has 
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indicated a preference for dual-purpose products in DIPP eligibility, even 
pointing to "the priority given to projects exhibiting dual use technologies" 
as evidence of the use of DIPP funds for military-to-civilian conversion. 
24 Even when particular goods such as the transistor and the silicon chip had a 
civil provenance (William Shockley and Jack Kirby, respectively), their 
development was sponsored by the military. De Landa (1991, 150-151) 
provides a history of the imbrication civil and military technologies. 
25 Kraker writes (1992, 107) writes: 
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Deleuze and Guattari are the world's first systematic theorists of 
technological fascism. Foucault was correct only in part when he said of 
Deleuze and Guattari that they had written an ethics of resistance. For this 
is not just an ethics of resistance, but something more indefinable and 
valuable: a howling scream cut across the "white wall" of signification and 
through the "black hole" of dead subjectivity. In their theory machine, the 
fateful encounter of Kant and Nietzsche in the nineteenth century explodes 
across the social field in an indefinite series of reterritorializations. 
26 To view war as a discourse in its own right and to critique war as a social 
practice is not to trivialize suffering. The intent is the reverse-to understand 
how profoundly war pervades every aspect of contemporary existence, reaching 
into human bodies, human thinking and social institutions in ways that are 
largely ignored. Copjec (1996, xii) captures the (un)ethical warp of "all out 
war" and the double bind that faces those who try to come to terms with it 
when she writes: 
what I want, he wants too ... is the common motif of all-out and perpetual 
war that initiates modern struggles for 'pure prestige', in which individual 
subjects and nations seek the absolute elimination of their rivals. Yet what 
has been obscured by contemporary thought is the fact that this 
relativization of our desire is no less an incitement to war when we decide 
not ... to define our wants as the same ... but as irreducibly different. The 
celebration of the plurality of cultures and hence the relativity of our desires 
is, in Kant's terms, no less an indication of wickedness and corruption of the 
human heart than is the coveting of all our "brother" holds dear. This is, 'to 
each his own desire' is no less dangerous a sentiment than 'what I want, he 
wants too' 
Copjec finds no way to address this double-bind (of liberal pluralism), and at 
the end of the article, addressing the way in which the Kantian concept of 
radical evil has become modern evil, and sounding much like a Frankfurt School 
critic, she writes: "The greatest post-Enlightenment danger has turned out to 
be not our capacity to make reason an instrument of our will, but reason's 
capacity to make instruments of us." 
27 Melman (1997) writes: "The U.S. currently deploys warheads with the power of 
some 2.3 billion tons of TNT. 188.2 million tons of TNT, enough to destroy both 
Russia and China, is merely 8% of the active U.S. nuclear arsenal's power. The 
rest 92%, represents an outrageous excess of killing power and spending 
overki II." 
Juxtapose such a "factual" interpretation with Jean Baudrillard's "postrealist" 
The Gulf War did not 'happen. Its publication was greeted with praise and 
outrage. French postmodernists have employed Brechtian strategies in their 
works. Barthes was first a Brechtian scholar, and Brecht is central as well to 
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Derrida. However, les agents provocateur of the virtual age may be becoming 
mainstream, perhaps especially in the application of Derrida's supplementarity 
(the hierarchy of binaries), Barthes concepts of the text and reading, Foucault's 
conceptualization of power/discourse/truth, Lacan's destabilization of 
signification and Deleuze and Guattari's desiring machines. 
28 Kittler's work pulls out the way in which industrial/postindustrial 
communications technologies are products of warfare. His periods are the 
Gutenberg, Edison and Turing worlds. Each encompasses one of the three 
recent mediatory social states. The Gutenberg universe is grounded in the 
typewriter, which, interestingly was developed in the U.S. by the Remington 
Firearms Co. of New York, then the mass broadcast radio that came directly out 
the use of wireless communications during World War I, and, of course, 
computers based in the Second World War work of Turing. Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter (Kittler, 1999) is a complex work of philosophy and theory, and 
though education is not his central concern, he does address it, especially as 
concerns the limitations inherent in the concept of Bildung. 
29 Megill (1997, 109) claims that Foucault and Derrida "are a continuation of and 
confrontations with a Nietzschean and Heideggerian perspective. Both theorists 
have confirmed the generative influence of Heidegger. 
30 The all-consuming machine (Frankenstein) as developed by Mary Shelley 
(Wollstonecraft) continues to return to haunt literature, theory, popular culture 
and policy. This cultural disquiet suggests that popular resistance to "science 
and technology," perhaps expressed first in the figure of Prometheus, has not 
abated in spite of centuries of scientific and technological "advance." The 
machined human has re-emerged in cybernetic literature and film (see The 
Terminator, Robocop and Bladerunner; these films incorporate a saving 
(humanist) remnant when the machines develop "human feelings," and in the 
case of Bladerunner, a conscience not exhibited by the humans who formed the 
cyborgs existence). 
31 Douglas Kellner compares Virilio to Baudrillard, writing "for Baudrillard reality 
disappears in hyperreality, for Virilio new technologies provide a substitute 
reality, a virtual reality which becomes more powerful and seductive than 
ordinary reality" Virilio can be described as materialist humanist (and a 
practicing Christian) whose project it is, Kellner writes: "to describe the losses, 
the disappearances, of the substitution, describing how technology displaces 
human faculties and experience, subjecting individuals to ever more powerful 
modes of technological domination and control." from 
http://www.uta.edu./huma/illuminations/kell29.htm 
32 This is not to suggest that jurisdictions participate more or less equally in 
maintaining militarism and war readiness. The degree to which the 
contemporary war machine is an American construction is documented by the 
Center for Defense Information, World Military Spending. from 
http://www.cdi.org/issues/wme. 
The United States ancl its allies-NATO, South Korea and Japan-possess a vast 
qualitative military advantage over any other nation or group nations in the 
world. And while such superiority doesn't come cheap, when compared to the 
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rest of the world the amount the United States alone spends on its military is 
simply staggering. 
At $305 billion, the U.S. military budget request for FY'0l is more than five 
times larger than that of Russia, the second largest spender. It is more than 
twenty-two times as large as the combined spending of the seven countries 
traditionally identified by the Pentagon as our most likely adversaries (Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria). 
It is more than the combined spending of the next twelve nations. 
The United States and its close allies spend more than the rest of the world 
combined, accounting for 63% of all military spending. Together they spend 
over thirty times more than the seven rogue states [emphasis added]. 
33 Ernst Mandel (1975) was the first economist to subject the permanent war 
economy to political economic analysis. His analysis remains remarkably 
prescient. As he explains (274-275), sounding like Weber, there is nothing 
"peculiarly new about the production of weapons and military expenditure," 
weapons production was "one of the most important midwives of early 
capitalism." However, on Mandel's thesis, the role of war related production 
has changed qualitatively since World War II. Mandel (274) considers it a 
"hallmark of late capitalism." 
Mandel (308) considers it "nonsensical" not to include the production of 
weapons as commodity production, and that investments in this [military] 
sector must be considered as "accumulation of capital." In other words, 
warfare is fully economically integrated under late capitalism, not some 
extraordinary expenditure, no matter how many declarations of putative 
"emergencies." For Mandel (309), the permanent arms economy provides the 
ultimate expression of the "parasitic nature of monopoly capitalism," for "how 
else can one regard a system which for 25 years (now 50) has constantly 
squandered such a substantial part of its available economic resources of the 
production of the means of destruction?" 
34 The Polish war correspondent Ryszard Kapuscinski (1990, 200) writes about the 
incommensurable experience of real war: "A person who lived through a great 
war is different from someone who never lived through any war. They are two 
different species of human beings. They will never find a common language, 
because you cannot really describe the war, you never cannot share it." The 
Canadian writer, Pierre Berton (Vimy, 1986).made similar point, saying that 
Canadian soldiers returned from the Great War could not speak of their 
experiences; they were unspeakable. 
35 From WORLD TRIBUNE.COM November 15, 2002: 
House and Senate conferees have reached agreement on the $393 billion 
defense budget for fiscal 2003 that places new emphasis on missile defense 
and marks the largest overall increase since the early years of the Reagan 
administration. 
House Armed Services Committee chairman Bob Stump, a Republican from 
Arizona, said the $7.8 billion authorized for missile defense-$814.3 million 
of which is allocated for the Defense Department for counterterrorism-
marks the fifth straight year of real increases in defense spending. 
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Stump said the fiscal 2003 defense budget is the largest increase in nearly 
20 years. "Rogue nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are actively 
seeking or testing ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. homeland, 
and U.S. allies and U.S. forward deployed troops already face a growing 
threat from shorter range ballistic missiles," the conference report of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 said. 
36 Vidal (2001, 438) provides these details: "from 1949 to 1999 the U.S. spent 
$7 .1 trillion on "national defense." As a result, the national debt is $5.6 trillion, 
of which $3.6 trillion is owed to the public, and $2 trillion to the Social Security-
Medicare Trust Funds, all due to military spending and servicing the debt thus 
incurred." 
37 Deleuze and Guatarri in their use of the term "axiomatic" fall in with Marx's 
analysis of capitalism. For them, the axiomatic-a set of equations based on 
fixed relationships among variables-is the decoding and deterritorializing 
process of capital. Yet the genius of the system is that it does not succumb to 
the "contradictions" inherent in the capitalism because of the falling rate of 
profit. Instead, the system is premised in "new answers," new manifestations 
pf this fundamental contradiction. Thus, there is no inexorable march into the 
future, there is no necessary "revolution"; rather there is constant systemic 
adjustment, the process of breaking down and self and systemic reinvention 
(though it appears the vectors in the equation may be getting tighter). 
38 Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 399) elaborate on the relationship between desire 
and its effectuations which differ in time/space depending upon the particular 
assemblage in place at a particular time: 
But if it is true that all assemblages are assemblages of desire, the question 
is whether the assemblages of war and work, considered in themselves, do 
not fundamentally mobilize passions of different orders. Passions are 
effectuations of desire that differ according to the assemblage: it is not the 
same justice or the same cruelty, the same pity, etc. The work regime is 
inseparable from an organization and a development of Form, 
corresponding to which is the formation of the subject. This is the passional 
regime of feeling as "the form of the worker." 
39 "Becoming," like "axiomatic," is a difficult and fraught term when employed by 
Deleuze and Guattari. As with so many terms its meaning changes from text to 
text and as the texts develop. "Becoming" is identified initially as a process 
that is generative of a new way of being (Deleuze and Guatarri, 1987). The 
"war machine" is expressive of this process. These new ways of being are not, 
however, arrived at through a progressive process (such as the dialectical 
process). They form by molecular reorganization, by the arrival of new 
combinatory possibility, recombinant processes. 
40 It is important to point out that the "electronification of existence" is grounded 
in a very material technology, the generation of electrical power. No electrical 
power, no hyperreality once the "effect" has worn off. The concepts deployed 
by the French poststructuralist must be understood as performative devices 
(heuristics) in their own right, that they are deployed with considerable irony 
that seems to escape many "literalist" English readings. 
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41 The current U.S. Vice-President R. Cheney coined the term "new normalcy" to 
describe the state of constant low-grade warfare. " 'The way I think of it, it's a 
new normalcy,' said U.S. vice president Richard Cheney in late October. With 
the war itself such 'that it may never end, [at] least, not in our lifetime,' 
Cheney warned that the post-September 11 conditions 'will become permanent 
features in our way of life'." See "The New Normalcy" by Simon Serfaty (2002) 
The Washington Quarterly 25(2), 209. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
TEACHING MACHINE (ASSEMBLAGE) 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses the development of the Teaching Machine, the 
making of contemporary perception, again from the vantage point of 1870. 
More specifically it addresses the political engineering of perception that 
began as soon as the technological means to do so were available. Again the 
work provides a brief historical excursus, taking the reader to the 
mechanization of perception that began with the invention of perspective 
during the Florentine Renaissance. The chapter addresses the processes of 
militarization, nationalization, industrialization and capitalization. 
The concept of assemblage taken from Deleuze and Guatarri (1987) is 
employed as a "conceptualizer," a discursive construct that captures fully 
integrated and recursive qualities of social formations and processes. An 
assemblage can be comprised of various seemingly unrelated processes and 
artifacts that assemble within a particular context. An assemblage brings 
about effects which are multifaceted, polyglot and polymorphous, at once 
productive, consumptive, creative, destructive, aesthetic, pragmatic, 
"passional" and "desiring," the latter two terms exemplifying the literally 
hundreds unorthodox terms and expressions developed by Deleuze and 
Guatarri. 
Tele-graphic Warfare 
When Bismarck in 1870 °so effectively goaded the second empire of post-
revolutionary France into declaring war on Prussia, he was employing at least 
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three new technologies simultaneously. As Bismarck recounted, the "Ems 
telegram" was calculated to enrage the French "not only on account of its 
contents," a "national" insult, "but also on account of the manner of its 
distribution" directly to the populace of France and the German states 
through newspapers at the same time as it was diplomatically communicated 
to the French government. As Bismarck related in his memoirs, it was 
delivered in this deliberately provocative way so that the telegram, "before 
midnight" would "have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull" on the 
same day it was sent 
"Fight we must"-said Bismarck-"if we do not want to act the part of the 
vanquished without a battle. Success, however, depends essentially upon 
the impression which the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it 
is important that we should be the ones attacked."1 
The desired effect the telegram produced so quickly was contingent upon 
mass literacy, the rotary (high-speed) printing press, the electrical 
telegraph-and the mentalities of populations exposed to nation-ism from the 
time the ancien regime was overthrown in France (1789), and in the German 
states, at least from the time of the Napoleonic invasion (1806). 2 The 
telegram's transmission-and the great military victory that followed so 
quickly-signaled the electro-mechanical (industrial) extension of warfare 
into the new industrially formed and industrially accessible theatre (field) of 
human perception.3 
The war that followed evidenced, albeit in primitive form, the energy 
generated when the social formation termed the "people" (/es citoyens), the 
leaders and the form of social organization termed the nation-state colluded 
with capital to produce war. This new social formation, the newly 
industrialized and nationalized socius, grounded the ability of armies to 
conduct wars of ever greater lethality ever more indiscriminately. 
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The telegram's release signals a change in existential conditions, marking a 
point at which the electromechanical construction and mediation of existence 
for the "people" in industrial societies comes to be common (normative). 
Bismarck, in effect, was engineering (machining) perception, and with that 
machining affect. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 400) put it: "Affects are 
projectiles just like weapons; feelings are interoceptive like tools ... 
Weapons are affects and affects weapons." 
"By striking out words, but without adding or altering anything" Bismarck 
(Memoirs, n.d.) changed the meaning of the telegram sent him by the soon-
to-be pan-German Kaiser Wilhelm, his revised version was reproduced en 
masse and distributed. As Bismarck said, "Success, however, depends 
essentially upon the impression which the origination of the war makes upon 
us and others." This industrial dissemination of a manufactured casus be/Ii 
(just cause) spoke of the medial manufacturing of consent (perception) that 
was a hallmark of the twentieth century. 
Writing in 1930, Junger (Wolin, 1991), perhaps better than anyone, 
understood Bismarck's strategic temporal location between two ways of 
being-and the way in which he assisted the transition from one to another. 
Junger's concepts of "partial mobilization" and "total mobilization" explain the 
transition. His binary captures the transformative process Weber accounted 
for with the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, and with 
Durkheim's organic and mechanical society. For ]Linger (Wolin, 1991, 125), 
"partial mobilization corresponds to the essence of monarchy." 
Almost instinctually (126), a monarch cannot conceive of committing the full 
resources of the state to warfare, for to do so would undermine the 
existential conditions th~t support dynastic rule itself (something akin to· 
Gemeinschaft). At the same time, the monarch, in Bismarck's time in the 
German states, had to accommodate the "abstract forms of spirit, money, 
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'folk'-in short, the forces of growing national democracy-as part of the 
preparation for war." For Junger, a society could reach "total mobilization" 
only after the vestiges of organic society had been replaced by a purely 
secular state with a singular capability and allegiance. 
The crux of the transition between preindustrial and industrial perceptual 
regimes is evident in Junger's (126) understanding: "The manner in which it 
[recognition of the new social forces] was incorporated [into political life] 
represents the real essence of nineteenth-century statecraft. These 
particular circumstances explain Bismarck's maxim that politics is the 'art of 
the possible'." 
For Weber (1978, 1392), Bismarck "left behind him a nation without any 
political sophistication [italics in original], far below the level which in this 
regard it had reached twenty years before [i.e. in 1870]." For Weber, 
Bismarck's authoritarianism infantilized the German population, left it ripe for 
exploitation by unscrupulous leaders who could impose their will on a "nation 
without any political will of its own [italics in original]." Yet Weber's idealist 
construct of a national will explains little; for with electromechanical mass 
mediation, the "national will" could be constructed on-demand.4 
Like Bismarck, Lincoln, Gladstone and John A. MacDonald engaged 
electromechanical mass media to construct a "national will" in their 
jurisdictions. Electromechanical subjective mediation allowed for the 
transition between politico-medial epochs. By this means the energie 
potentielle of the "people" recognized by Clausewitz was actualized through 
various industrial processes. (In Canada, this actualization of the energie 
potentielle of the "people" was evident during the World War I, and then 
again from 1939 when tile Canadian Parliament created the War Supply 
Board and appointed C.D. Howe to run it). 5 
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David Hume (1741) in an essay titled Of the First Principles of Government 
already had pointed out the intimate relationship between "opinion" and 
statist govern a nee: 
Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs 
with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are 
governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with which men 
resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. 
When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, 
that, as force is always on the side of the governed, the governors 
have nothing to support them but opinion. It is therefore, on opinion 
only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most 
despotic and most military governments, as well as to the most free 
and most popular. 
Hume, however, could not have witnessed the efficient way in which 
industrial technologies colluded to provide an electromechanical means for 
the formation not only the public opinion but of "the public interest."6 
However, from its beginnings in prehistory, "public opinion" always had been 
imposed, at least in part. Thus the constant academic interest in rhetoric, 
come to us today in very different form as "communications" and 
"marketing." 
However, nationalism was as much an artifice as was public opinion; indeed 
it may be its ultimate expression. Porter (1994, 131) writes: 
The much vaunted nationalism of this enlarged French army (the army 
based in universal conscription, the levee en masse) was hardly a 
spontaneous phenomenon. From the beginning the state fostered and 
manipulated the nationalism that sustained it ... the mass 
mobilization of 1793-94 portended the manipulation of nationalism 
that would become commonplace in the twentieth century. 
While Bismarck cannot be accused of being the inceptor of militarist 
nationalism, he may have been among the first political leaders to 
0 
understand that "the governors have nothing to support them but opinion." 
As well, his understanding that language was comprised of form that in part 
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determined content augured well for its military-industrial (and commercial) 
deployment. Though guile (lies, deception) had been employed for centuries 
(if not millennia) to whip up war fever, the means Bismarck used to 
incite/excite the French citoyen and its counterpart in soon-to-be Germany 
proved as prescient as the war (and the peace) his electromechanical 
mediations precipitated. 
The mechanical reproductions of his electrical dissemination (the newspaper 
articles based on the telegram) placed the industrial (i.e. standard, 
mechanized, uniformly regulated) production of perception beside the 
industrial (i.e. standard, mechanized, uniformly regulated) production of 
space, time and movement. 7 Napoleon III, spurred to action by a whipped-
up nation, declared war against Prussia on the same day Bismarck sent the 
telegram. Effectively, the war was over in six weeks. 
The U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), as noted previously, had demonstrated the 
range of characteristics that comprise industrialized warfare. Indeed, the 
federal President Lincoln used the mechanical press to industrialize public 
opinion before Bismarck; as well, commonly accessible books such as the 
worn example of Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852) by Harriet Beecher Stowe, had 
demonstrated how mass affect could be created through literary mediation, 
in this instance anti-slavery sentiment. 
Some time later, Randolph Hearst's newspapers in the U.S. were credited 
with instigating the first "newspaper war," the Spanish American War of 
1898. That war provides an exemplar of the way in which "public opinion" 
can be a war resource as vital as guns or battleships, and of the way in which 
that "opinion" can be formed by officially sanctioned lies and disinformation, 
in that instance the fabrb(:ation regarding the sinking of a U.S. warship in 
Havana harbor (recently declassified materials have shown the Gulf of Tonkin 
resolution, the "legal basis" for the U.S. war in Vietnam, to be a similar 
fabrication.) 
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Bismarck's use of an incipient "military-industrial-educational-entertainment 
complex"-railways, telegraphs, armies, newspapers, literacy, education, the 
constitutional state, steam-powered factories-is one of the first instances of 
the simultaneous deliberate deployment of industrialized movement (sp~ed), 
time (mechanically synchronomous) and space (mapped, industrially-placed) 
as an integrated war weapon. The railway moved materiel and armies, the 
telegram and high-speed printing presses moved information, the urbanizing 
literate populations of the German states and France moved en masse-
producing for themselves homogeneous affect at the same time in disparate 
geographic locations. 
The global effect the war produced may first have been theorized by John 
Henry Cardinal Newman (1854/1959, 108) in his understanding that 
mechanically distributed knowledge may have little if anything to do with 
"enlightenment": 
What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do 
with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be 
passively, almost unconsciously enlightened, by the mere 
multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school 
boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the 
town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one 
way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. 
No doubt, there was no necessary relationship between the "mere" 
reproduction and dissemination of books and "enlightenment," there was a 
relationship between the (electro)mechanical reproduction and dissemination 
of books and "affect." Bismarck proved this (as Lincoln had earlier). These 
leaders weaponized the J.Jnconscious, to employ Freudian figural 
representation. They employed new media to form a new, a 
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capitalist/militarist form of reserve subjective energy, Heidegger's "standing 
reserve" (Bestand). 
The dissemination of mass hostility (the selling of a perception) was based on 
the industrial formation of the other as radically different (Other). 8 This 
strategic military-industrial deployment of differentiation-of developing 
purposeful heterogeneity-speaks to the opportunistic opening of a "popular 
front" soon after the technical means to do so were invented. 9 As such, the 
"Ems telegram" marks the launching of mass electromechanical perceptual 
offences (and defenses), whereby the imperialism of "radical alterity" is 
technologically/psychologically re-inscribed/re-vested. Like the 
industrialization of war (and commerce) more generally, industrialized wars 
of perception (for the minds [and hearts] of the "people") were developed 
more fully forty years after Bismarck won the Franco-Prussian war so 
decisively. 
The propaganda offences of the Great War (1914-1918), especially the 
almost instant reduction of whole nations to demon monoliths-in concert 
with exhortations to work, to sacrifice and buy bonds-evidenced the 
industrialization and intense capitalization of war and of perception (i.e. total 
teaching-at that time the terms advertising and propaganda were 
synonymous). 10 Virilio (1994, 13): 
The year 1914 not only saw the physical deportation of millions of men 
to the battlefields. With the apocalypse created by the deregulation of 
perception came a different kind of diaspora, the moment of panic 
when the mass of Americans and Europeans could no longer believe 
their eyes, when their faith in perception became slave to the faith in 
the technical sightline: in other words the visual field was reduced to 
the line of a sighting device. 
137 
Electro-mechanization of Subjectivity 
Manufacturing, in this instance, their own subjectivity (autopoiesis), subjects 
in industrial capitalist states constantly deterritorialize and reterritorialize. 
Under capitalism, unlike previous regimes, the process whereby the least 
deterritorialized element reterritorializes the most the most deterritorialized 
element is on-going throughout a subject's lifetime. Indeed, a case can be 
made that the process operates in ever shrinking cycles, in constantly 
tightening vectors (consumerism). 
This is not to suggest that there are not "essential" aspects of the human 
that reside outside this machinic subjective process, albeit they too may be 
socially formed initially. As Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 175) put it: "As a 
general rule, relative deterritorialization (transcodings) reterritorialize on a 
deterritorialization that is in certain respects absolute [sedimented, 
overcoded]." Thus, a subjective "kernel" or irreducible remainder always 
remains "overcoded"-colonized once-and placed outside the de and re-
territorializing process (cf. Sloterdijk, 1987). 
Regardless, the reduction of the visual field to a technical sightline opened 
visual perception to constant (instrumental, commercial, political, military) 
deterritorialization/reterritorialization. Poster (2001, 55), in his explanation 
of how Virilio's concept of war and communications technologies differs from 
the negative critique provided by Adorno, inadvertently perhaps articulates 
how this "reduction" differs from either liberal or Marxist interpretations of 
change that retain a humanist element. Speaking about the war film (The 
Great Man, 1957), Poster writes: 
Like Adorno, the film depicts war and communications technologies as 
"dehumanizing," im!tead of understanding the process, as Paul Virilio 
does in War and Cinema, as a process of reconfiguration, not one of 
"pure loss." "For men at war, the function of the weapon is the 
function of the eye" [italics in original]. It is therefore quite 
understandable that, after 1914, the air arm's violent cinematic 
disruption of the space continuum, together with the lightening 
advances of military technology, should have literally exploded the old 
homogeneity of vision and replaced it with the heterogeneity of 
perceptual fields. 
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In effect, human visual perception had been technologically (militarily) 
reconfigured-not expanded as in conventional progressive narratives or 
subject to "pure loss" as per conservative concepts such as "alienation" or 
"anomie" (i.e. pure loss that can be found again). 11 Though the process was 
initiated on the battlefields, like so many war inventions in the twentieth 
century, the process was extended to industrial populations regardless of 
their particular geographic location or occupation. 12 Martin Jay's (1993) 
extensive history of perception, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth Century French Thought, details and explicates this imposition of 
visual heterogeneity. He (211) expresses thought very similar to Virilio's: 
The interrogation of sight hesitantly emerging in certain prewar works 
of philosophy and art was given an intense, often violent inflection by 
the war, which also helped disseminate an appreciation of its 
implications. The ancien scopic regime, which we've called Cartesian 
perspectivalism, lost what was left of its hegemony, and the very 
premises of ocularcentrism themselves were soon being called into 
question in many different contexts. 
While the perceptual maelstrom (deregulation, deterritorialization) Virilio 
identified may have been quickly and violently set off, the epistemological 
modification (loss of faith) that Virilio equates with violent perceptual 
deregulation was not so abrupt or militarily induced as Virilio suggested. It 
was part of a larger historical process of a process that can be theorized 
productively as the decoding and axiomatization (a new operating 
architecture) of the overcoded feudal world. 
~ According to Virilio (1994, 16) himself, this change to perception (sensible 
apprehension of the world) "was simply the progressive disintegration of a 
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faith in perception founded in the Middle Ages, after animism, on the basis of 
the unicity of divine creation, the absolute intimacy between the universe 
and the God-man of Augustinian Christianity [overcoding]." Jay (1993, 29) 
details this progressive disintegration of faith in Western perception. He 
places the "problem of perception" in a deeper historical context than Virilio. 
To follow Jay (192), Henri Bergson (1896), more than Feuerbach, Marx and 
Nietzsche, all of whom "had developed a materialist notion of the practical 
rather than the contemplative subject," philosophically put perception back in 
a body and re-activated it. Jay writes: "Bergson helped redirect philosophical 
inquiry back toward the body as intertwined with consciousness before the 
separation of mind from matter." 
Jay explains that the epistemological reconfiguration of perception gained 
momentum throughout the twentieth century, to the point where vision as 
perception was destabilized completely. Since the 1960s, idealist models 
whereby the mind is a reservoir for a contemplative self separate from its 
active embodiment (for example, the res cogitans and res extensa of 
Descartes) and the subject/object distinction integral to it have been 
challenged in virtually every field of conceptual endeavor, in art, science, 
philosophy and literature. 
In the scientific mode, autopoiesis as developed by Varela (Hayles, 1999, 
155-156) develops the concept of "enaction" to explain how perception is 
constituted through human engagement in the world: 
Perception must not be understood through the viewpoint of a "pre-
given, perceiver-independent world ... enaction sees the organism's 
active engagement with its surroundings as more open-ended and 
transformative ... sees cognitive structures emerging from "recurrent 
sensory motor patterns" .. emphasiz[ing] the links of the nervous 
system with the seiisory surfaces and motor abilities that connect the 
organism to the environment. 
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In effect, contemporary philosophy and science turned the Cartesian 
humanist universe upside down, or, more correctly, inside out. To continue 
with this brief excursus, Lowe (1982, 12) tied perception to mediation, the 
means by which the world is construed or constructed by and for the ap-
perceiver: 
The horizontal field [that which is seen "out front" and taken for the 
world itself] is constituted by the perceiver, the act of perceiving, and 
the content of the perceived. In each period, the culture of 
communications media frames the act of perceiving; the subject is 
delimited [formed] by a different hierarchical organization of sensing; 
and the content of the perceived is ordered by a different set of 
epistemic rules. Therefore, the perceptual field constituted by them is 
a historical formation, which differs from one period to the next. 
Thereby perception itself is denatured, provided a materiality, a history and 
contingency that was denied it until recently ( consciousness itself has been 
subjected to the same denaturing process). Jay (1993, 275) goes on to 
explain that the Cartesian form of looking that assumed the subject/object 
division crumbled when these philosophers situated the viewer "within a 
visual field, not outside it." 
During the twentieth century, the viewer and the viewed, perhaps for the 
first time since the development of perspective 400 years earlier, was 
reintegrated. The "nobility of sight" (ocularcentrism) was philosophically 
deprivileged and various options proffered throughout the twentieth century. 
However, the sight/site of language and its relation to the sight/site of vision, 
was most forcefully addressed by Derrida (Of Grammatology, 1967). He 
provided the means by which perception can be related to language, thereby 
allowing the contingency of perception to be placed alongside the 
contingency of the "word. "13 
Derrida's work recognizes and provides the means to deal with both the 
"breakdown of the signifying chain following the collapse of the referent" 
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(Jameson, 1979) and the interested-the ideological character of the 
contemporary regime of vision/metaphysics (/ogocentrism). The na"ive 
linkage between the word, vision and reality whereby the "word" really 
apprehends "vision" was defused during the century and with that the human 
rendered radically contingent. 14 
Breaking this epistemological relay between the word, vision and reality (the 
assemblage) meant denying that sentient experience could comprehensively 
apprehend "reality" (e.g. Benjamin Franklin's notion of common sense). To 
challenge the relay meant to challenge the longstanding hegemony of the 
Cartesian person, and with that, scientism. Jay (1993, 503): "How, it must 
be asked, does writing relate to visual experience? Aren't marks of the page 
just as evident to the eye as pictures, photographs, or the visible manifold of 
"real objects"? He explains that Derrida's response is a "double reading": 
Although the figurative, ideographic dimension of writing should not be 
forgotten, Derrida, argued, neither should it be made its essence. "I 
have often insisted on the fact," he told interviewers in 1971, "that 
"writing" or the "text" are not reducible either [in original] to the 
sensible or visible presence of the graphic or the "literal." Their hidden 
workings should themselves be understood in terms of an invisible 
materiality. 
"Invisible materiality" skirts close to "cultural materialism." It captures the 
influence of "immaterial technologies" like those for subjective regulation. As 
such the term hovers in the background of this work, the author constantly 
addressing the "invisible materiality" of schooling, organizational technologies 
and the military. This materialist interpretation frames this deconstruction. 
The regime of ocularcentrism-whereby the metaphysics of vision 
(ideologically) disallows the contingency of perception, or, in spite of 
phenomenology, the rerusal of the recognition that ocularcentrism is a 
metaphysical product-Jay explains, can be dated to a precise invention, one 
that is considered so significant that it stands as a marker for modernity. 
142 
With the imposition of perspective, Jay writes: "the unicity of divine creation, 
the absolute intimacy between the universe and the God-man of Augustinian 
Christianity" came to be lost, when in the work of the Florentine architect 
and theorist Leon Battista Alberti: 
the visual field now replaced the visual world. The ocular potential to 
privilege synchronic stasis, which we've seen Jonas claim was the key 
to Greek metaphysics, here achieved explicit visual expression. Now 
the participatory moment in theoria (theory), the specular intertwining 
of likenesses in viewer and viewed withdrew entirely from the seen 
(the scene), separated from it by Alberti's shatterproof window. 15 
The philosophical (and pragmatic) implications drawn from Alberti's invention 
and accompanying theory were enormous. 16 The great historian of art, 
Arnold Hauser (1952, 64): 
He [Alberti] is the first to express the idea that mathematics is the 
common ground of art and the sciences, as both the theory of 
proportion and the theory of perspective are mathematical disciplines. 
He is also the first to express to give clear expression to that union of 
the experimental technician and the observing artist. 
The means for this separation, the regulative technology termed 
perspectivalism, dominated theory/sight/philosophy from the Florentine 
Renaissance until the twentieth century. This regime of specular unity 
assumed an accessible and wholly comprehensible reality that could be 
captured fully (mirrored) through sight, sound and /anguage. 17 It proved the 
most powerful tool for knowledge development yet invented. 
Ostensible transcendent perception and an accompanying belief in one on 
one correspondence between perception and its mediation (exhaustive 
capture) provided the modus operandi for Western global expansion and 
colonization, for those practices that have come to be called modern (circa 
1550-1950). It provided the means by which space, time and movement 
were reconceptualized and mechanically measured (were mathematized and 
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rationalized). It was this imperial vision (way of looking/seeing/thinking) 
that was deregulated and reregulated, deterritorialized/reterritorialized, early 
in the twentieth century. 
David Harvey (1990, 244), one of the first theorists to identify the 
"postmodern" with changes to movement, space, time and perception, 
attributes as much importance as Jay does to Alberti's "shatterproof 
window." He states that the rules of perspective developed by Brunelleschi 
and Alberti "which dominated until the beginning of the twentieth century, 
was a fundamental achievement of the Renaissance; it shaped our ways of 
seeing for four centuries." 
Ong and McLuhan, of course, keyed on the "site/sight of vision" to trace 
changes to mass perception. Their work in part concerned changes to what 
may be metaphorically considered the human "operating platform" or 
"wetware" (the sensorium), the processing (means of interpretation) of 
stimuli at the monadic (subjective) level. Ong (1982, 221) writes: "With the 
shift in the sensorium by print, the large scale campaigning for the 'clear and 
distinct' soon began, led by Ramus and focused by Descartes-a campaign 
for a visually conceived cognitive enterprise."18 That this campaign was most 
successful is evidenced in contemporary systems of perceptual/conceptual 
control and formation, for example tele-vision and ac-counting. 19 These 
perceptual technologies provide the operating systems, the hidden cognitive 
architecture for contemporary organizations, including the organization still 
referred to as the "individual." 
Industrialization 
By providing the combu~tible Bismarck used to ignite the war of 1870, the 
"people" as an expression of nation (and industrialization, capitalization and 
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militarization) were performing a role others had written. By launching the 
"Ems telegram," Bismarck, a most conservative politician, provided the state 
with another means besides schooling, work or religion to control/form the 
people, to engineer, however imperfectly, more or less uniform perception 
and with that mass disposition (this formative work was carried out by the 
populace; this auto-endocolonization, this auto-reterritorialization came to be 
called leisure during the twentieth century). 
During the First World War, this theatre of perceptual operation was 
amalgamated/welded to the theatre of warfare. In effect, a statist 
industrialized "perceptual front" that complemented the more general 
industrialization of war was obtained through schooling, education, religion 
and media-the teaching machine of the industrial period. And with 
perception emerging from World War I reduced to a technologically mediated 
"sightline," the common perceptual field became subject to deliberate 
regulation. After that war, the technological means by which massed, 
nationalized populations could be governed (regulated) effectively were 
readily available to leaders (the ruling class) in every industrial jurisdiction. 20 
Virilio (1994, 23): 
To admit that for the human eye the essential is invisible and that, 
since everything is an illusion, it follows that scientific theory, like art, 
is merely a way of manipulating our illusions, went against the 
political-philosophical discourses then [1920s] evolving in tandem with 
the imperative of convincing the greatest number, with its 
accompanying desire for infallibility, and a strong tendency to 
ideological charlatanism. Publicly to point out how mental images are 
formed, including the way their pyschophysiological features carry 
their fragility and limitations, was to violate a state secret of the same 
order as a military secret, since it masked a mode of mass 
manipulation that was practically infallible 
A comprehensive history of this "mode of mass manipulation" is provided in 
Propaganda and Persuasion (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999). U.S. President 
Wilson's Committee on Public Information, the "Creel Commission," provides 
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a paradigm example of this new mode of subjective formation. After the 
war, the U.S. Congress attempted to suppress Creel's reportage of his 
committee's work-of which he was proud-and indeed about the lies and 
deception industrially disseminated as a part of the war effort (see Chapter 
5). 
However, while specific "content" (the propaganda) may have been 
suppressed and denied, the techniques developed during the war continued 
to flourish. The electromechanical phonic and optical activity that followed 
the First World War-radio, magazines, newspapers, billboards-the informal 
perceptual control vehicles-and on the other side of the theoretical 
economy-the expansion of the formal vehicle, common schooling-formed 
ground zero for the contemporary aesthetic economy of perceptual and 
conceptual regulation. 
The German social theorist and poet Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1974) was 
one of the first academicians outside of the Frankfurt School to critically 
examine the burgeoning "consciousness industry," the primary growth 
industry of the twentieth century. As Enzensberger (62) foretold: 
With the development of the electronic media, the industry that 
shapes consciousness has become the pace-setter for the social and 
economic development of societies in the late industrial age. It 
infiltrates all other sectors of production, takes over more and more 
directional and control functions, and determines the standard of the 
prevailing technology. 
Since his critique, the industry developers-the marketers, educationists, 
computer programmers, hardware designers, actors, film producers, TV 
producers, radio programmers, music producers, population control experts, 
publishers, psychologists, sociologists, public relations practitioners-have 
~ 
turned the "consciousness industry" into much the largest industry in the 
world. However, schooling and education is not set in opposition to the 
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"consciousness industry." They are integrated into it, a component part of 
the subjective production apparatus. Further, the products of the 
consciousness industry produces, affect (disposition) and knowledge, are 
themselves too often weapons. However, before developing that theme 
further, it is necessary to search out the roots of contemporary education (as 
defined in Chapter 1), to trace the militarization of education. 
Militarization 
The teaching machine-the consciousness industry-like all social inventions, 
carries with it a provenance (history). Though the industry-the 
industrialization of subjective formation-is very much a function of specific 
industrial (and postindustrial) technologies, it roots much predate 
industrialism. It can be traced back at least to the invention of mechanical 
printing, a technology whose development coincided with the development of 
Protestantism, the modern state, the modern military and statist education. 
That militarization was "built-into" the teaching machine from its inception is 
evidenced by highlighting and contextualizing select aspects of the work of 
various modern educational "fathers." While evident most certainly in 
Bismarck's Kulturkampf (the culture war) that accompanied the 
establishment of the German empire after the war of 1870, militarization was 
not unique to Germany. Statist education, English, French or German, was 
militarized from its beginnings. However, statist education-which forms only 
one aspect of the teaching machine, albeit an important one-had already 
been assigned the right to form militarized subjectivity in sixteenth century 
Protestant Germany. At this point in time and space, the social practice of 
education began to come in its own as a great technology for the formation 
~ 
of human subjectivity en masse and in accord with uniform predetermined 
formulae (modern pedagogy as developed by example by the systematizers 
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Comenius and Pestalozzi). This generative social development was 
reinforced, indeed mutually determined by another generative development 
in the same place and time, namely the invention of the Book (the 
mechanical reproduction of text imprinted on paper). Indeed, state schooling 
may well be a function of the book; at the least it is based in "bookish" 
knowledge. 
The book, the greatest advance yet in educational technology, provided the 
technological means for the great Western project of deliberate subjective 
formation as we still know it (cf. Eisenstein, 1980, Ong, 1982). Consider the 
generative case of Martin Luther (1483-1546), the progenitor of Christian 
Protestantism. Luther embodies the mass, statist educational revolution. He 
employed the mechanical reproduction of text to disseminate his vulgar 
German bible. This bible, the Gutenberg Bible, stands as a great discursive 
marker in its own right, as does Luther; but Luther's influence was much 
more than religious. 21 Luther looked to the State-to secular power-to 
ground his form of religion. This statist inclination, as much as his theology, 
separated him from Catholic authority (Weber, 1978, 1175). 
Luther, after he publicly denied the hegemony of the Catholic Church, was 
placed under the authority/protection of the independent German states that 
his form of Protesting Christianity informed and supported. Secure in this 
setting, he continued with his generative political and religious work. In 
1524 he wrote a justly famous letter called To the Councilmen of all Cities in 
Germany that they Establish and Maintain Christian Schools (LW 45:341-
378). It reads in part: 
I maintain that the civil authorities are under obligation to compel the 
people to send their children to school. ... If the government can 
compel such citizens as are fit for military service to bear the spear 
and rifle, to mount ramparts, and perform other material duties in 
time of war, how much more has it a right to compel the people to 
send their children to school, because in this case we are warring with 
the devil, whose object it is secretly to exhaust our cities and 
principalities of their strong men. 
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Here already, children are offered up to the State rather than the Church as 
chattel, though still for religious reasons-to deal with the materialism that, 
according to Luther, was running rampant among the otherwise Godly 
German peasantry (here again the Platonic pedagogical moment). 22 
However, whether it was the devil (Mammon) or another form of difference 
(alterity) that motivated Luther's appeal for statist education, in one way or 
another education in the West has been at war since then. 23 Luther, the 
religionist, proved to be the great European secularizer, a great warrior, 
conservative politician and secular leader in his own right. 
Weber (1978, 1175) writes: 
The Catholic church has tenaciously resisted caesaropapist tendencies; 
in spite of some temporarily necessary concessions, it eventually 
succeeded ... Luther was completely indifferent toward the 
organization of the church, as long as the Word could spread in its 
purity. This indifference, deriving from the individualist nature of his 
piety and also from the eschatological streak in his person faith, in 
effect surrendered his church to the caesaropapism of the secular 
power. This was facilitated by the political and economic conditions in 
the territories in which Lutheranism originated. 
On this account as well, Luther's protesting form of Christianity provided a 
vehicle by which changes-to war, the state, the economy and education-
came to fruition (the "model armies" of the era were all Protestant statist 
organizations that deployed a new form of education, rote drill and 
mechanical training en masse of those drawn and sometimes led by those 
from outside the warrior class (aristocracy). Luther reduced the church to an 
instrument of state and in the process did so with education (the Protestant 
theocracies that did arise after Luther had very limited and temporary 
~ 
success in maintaining any independence from secular, statist governance). 
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With Luther, the politically conservative religionist, education-not just 
schooling but education-that vast project of deliberate subjective 
formation-became a "tool of state" in early Protestant capitalist Germany. 24 
Education as an instrument of state was a constituent of hegemonic 
subjectivity, of capitalism, and, much later, of nation-and of war (this 
instrumentalized use of education was advocated as well by Francis Bacon a 
few decades after Luther, though as much to war with a devil called "nature" 
[empiricism] as to form the "English hegemon"). 
The assemblage ( educational system) in place globally today rests of these 
generative developments. While mass compulsed schooling and higher 
education have been examined critically many times, the best example 
perhaps the numerous studies of Pierre Bourdieux ( cf. 1990), both these long 
standing social practices-and they are more alike than different-still remain 
unexamined as overdetermined by the processes of nation-ism and 
nationalism, statism, industrialism, capitalism, war and militarism, with this 
work of course intended as a corrective. Ramirez and Boli (1987, 2) write: 
During the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, national states 
constructed mass schooling systems that eventually came to 
encompass their entire population of children. State authorization, 
sponsorship, funding, and control of mass education first developed in 
Western Europe (Collins 1977) and later became a central feature of 
national development throughout the world (Ramirez and Bali, 1982). 
Yet, most comparative studies of education entirely overlook the 
historical origins of state systems of schooling, thereby ignoring the 
sociological institutionalization of the social innovation. 
Perhaps it is time to look back at some of the fathers of statist education that 
followed Luther and examine their work for connections to warfare. Locke 
(1632-1704), one of the generative theorists in the construction of modern 
education and the modern state, in his Second Treatise on Civil Government 
0 
(1690) provided this apologetic for war: 
The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and therefore 
declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a sedate 
settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war with 
him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has 
exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any 
one that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it 
being reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which 
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, 
man being to be preserved as much as possibl~, when all cannot be 
preserved, the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may 
destroy a man who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity 
to his being, for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; 
because such men are not under the ties of the common law of 
reason, have no other rule, but that of force and violence, and so may 
be treated as beasts of prey, those dangerous and noxious creatures, 
that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power. 
It seems that Locke, a generative liberal educational and political theorist, 
was at the same time, like the Greek educational fathers who were also 
educational and political theorists, at the same time a war theorist. 
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Bacon (1561-1626), a more neglected progenitor of modern education than 
Locke, may have thought even better of war than his philosophic successor 
(quoted in Wright, 1965, 1399): "Wars are the highest trials of right when 
princes and states shall put themselves upon the justice of God for deciding 
their controversies." In this instance, might making right seems perilously 
close to God. 
A hundred and fifty years after Locke, Spencer (1820-1903), the most widely 
read Anglophone academic of his time, addressed war extensively in his 
mammoth Principles of Sociology, written between 1876 and 1896. He 
developed a thesis of enduring if not recognized impact, dividing society in 
two types, the military and industrial (see Chapter 1). Reflecting the positive 
tenor of his times, he argued that industrialization, science and the evolution 
of the human species rei;,ders warlike states obsolete, a retrograde 
organizational form (see Chapter 1). Of course, this matched better with 
Rousseau's innately peaceable human as compared to Hobbes's 
characterization of the species as naturally warring. 
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Though Spencer renounced his warless future in volume III of Principles of 
Sociology, referring to a tragic return to war which would constitute 
extinction not progress, his progressivist ideology that equated 
industrialization with progress and progress with peace was generalized in 
the Anglocentric academy, notwithstanding the mass of contradictory 
evidence provided by World War 1. Spencer's work provided the prevailing 
paradigmatic framework for Anglo sociology until recently, and laid the 
discursive groundwork for the scientization, and with that the 
psychologization (and militarization) of mass compulsed schooling during the 
twentieth century (cf. Egan, 2002). 
Spencer's contemporary Ruskin (1819-1900), the most influential art critic 
and social commentator of the Victorian Age, was a champion of universal art 
education, and for imperial aesthetic reasons, a champion of war as well. 
From a lecture titled "War" (1865) presented at the Royal Military Academy, 
Woolwich (quoted in Pick, 1993, 68-69): 
all the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war; no great art 
ever yet rose on earth, but among a nation of soldiers. There is no art 
among a shepherd people if it remains at peace. There is no art 
among an agricultural people, if it remains at peace. Commerce is 
barely consistent with fine art ... There is no great art possible to a 
nation but that which is based on battle. 
While Ruskin and Spencer are all but forgotten, they were central to the 
development of industrial (contemporary) education, as was Matthew Arnold, 
one of the first theorists of contemporary liberal education. He advocated 
using English-language literature in the way that Fichte had advocated the 
~ 
use of German-language literature in the disunited German states about fifty 
years earlier. 25 Arnold envisioned a "national literature" employed 
strategically to form "nation-ism" and "national-ism" in England, in this 
regard echoing the more generative nation-builder Bacon. 26 
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In the U.S. as well, John Dewey, the country's leading liberal philosopher and 
philosopher of education, strongly supported the elitist minority in the U.S. 
against prevailing public opinion in advocating U.S. involvement in the First 
World War. At the same, however, Dewey renounced aspects of German 
philosophy that he had relied upon initially and by war's end was warning of 
propaganda as a threat to democracy. Until his death in 1952, Dewey 
remained actively involved in issues warfare, writing about it and working to 
prevent its recurrence. Again the point is that war occupied a prominent 
position in the thinking of the leading contemporary father of education. 
From Democracy and Education (1916): 
It is not enough to teach the horrors of war and to avoid everything 
which would stimulate international jealousy and animosity. The 
emphasis must be put upon whatever binds people together in 
cooperative human pursuits and results, apart from geographical 
limitations. The secondary and provisional character of national 
sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association 
and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled 
as a working disposition of mind. If these applications seem to be 
remote from a consideration of the philosophy of education, the 
impression shows that the meaning of the idea of education previously 
developed has not been adequately grasped. This conclusion is bound 
up with the very idea of education as a freeing of individual capacity in 
a progressive growth directed to social aims. Otherwise a democratic 
criterion of education can only be inconsistently applied. 
However, mass democracy-the basis for any "democratic criterion"-that 
form of social organization theorized by various of these fathers of modern 
education, by Rousseau, Locke and Dewey for example, is itself a product of 
warfare. In War and the Rise of the State, perhaps the definitive recent 
Anglophonic theoretical exposition of war, Porter (1994, xvi) states: 
0 
But the mobilization imperative of war does not always culminate in 
total state power; in certain circumstances it can actually foster 
democratization. This occurs when the state's demand for war-fighting 
resources gives bargaining leverage to the holders of these resources. 
Max Weber, despite his hyperbole, captures the crux of this process: 
"The basis of democratization is everywhere purely military in 
character ... Military discipline meant the triumph of democracy 
because the community wished and was compelled to secure the co-
operation of the non-aristocrat masses and hence put arms, and along 
with arms political power, into their hands." 
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Just as military discipline meant the triumph of democracy, so too it meant 
the triumph of education (note, each father of education was also a theorist 
of liberal democracy). The processes of militarization, capitalization, (liberal) 
democratization, massification and industrialization were synchronous with 
the educationalization of existence. 
Nationalization 
During the nineteenth century, "objective knowledge" and the institutions 
dedicated to it came to assume a new form (assemblage). The research 
university developed as a key component in the assemblage termed the 
"teaching machine." This new institution produced a "fully legitimated 
subject of knowledge and society," (Bi/dung) that was itself a weapons 
system (i.e. the producer of objective knowledge that was itself a form of 
warfare). The Kindergarten, invented in the 1830s by the German educator 
Froebel, saw to the final components in the assemblage termed the "teaching 
machine." With that, and the introduction of "lifelong learning" in the 1880s, 
the formation of subjectivity from cradle to grave had been regularized, 
brought into statist alignment, dedicated to the production of the "mental 
machinery" that was itself the essential component in the military industrial 
complex. 
~ 
Hegel's theory of statism, along with the University of Berlin, became the 
model for higher learning and academic knowledge production throughout 
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Europe and the United States, and throughout the world during the twentieth 
century. The goal Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt, the founders of the 
Univeristy of Berlin (1810), was nothing less than the "spiritual and moral 
training of the nation." Bi/dung, the term von Humboldt's used to describe 
the dispositional set ostensibly imparted by this "training." This elevated 
concept for the formation of an ideal (bourgeois) type was based in teaching 
a subject to search out "truth" and relating it to "equality," the end product 
being a subject who complement the concept of State as developed by Hegel 
(cf. Readings, 1996; Lyotard, 1984). Massumi writes (Deleuze and Guatarri, 
1987, xii): 
The end product would be "a fully legitimated subject of knowledge 
and society"-each mind an analogously organized mini-State morally 
unified in the supermind of the State, Prussian mind meld. More 
insidious than the well-known practical co-operation between 
university and government (the burgeoning military funding of 
research) is its philosophical role in the propagation of the form of 
representational thinking itself, that "properly spiritual absolute State" 
endlessly reproduced and disseminated at every level of the social 
fabric. 
The "propagation of the form of representational thinking itself" is perhaps 
the greatest conservative strategy ever invented. Representational thinking 
grounds the universalization of the Western conceptual schema (truth, 
validity, etc.); it grounds stable subjectivity (liberal humanism), privileges 
"realist signification" (na"ive representation) and ultimately grounds 
contemporary relations of power. It is the most important product the 
teaching machine (assemblage) produces. All academic 
programs/discourses/fields cannot be apprehended without apprehending the 
(interested) system of representation in which they are written. 27 
The introduction to Kittler's Film, Gramophone, Typewriter (1999, xxi) 
~ 
provides this description of the official subjectivity production machine: 
texts as Lessing's family dramas or Goethe's Bildungsromane have to 
be read as instances of a cultural inscription program: German 
literature around 1800, so often hailed as the apex of Germanic 
cultural output culminating in the twin peaks of Goethe and Schiller, 
becomes a means of programming people, part of the overall recoding 
enterprise [reterritorialization] that ushered in an age that saw not 
only the spread of the nuclear family but also the growth of literacy, 
the notion of authorship as the expression of ineffable individuality and 
Innerlichkeit [contemplation leading to "sublimity," located in religion 
before Kant], and the preindustrial mobilization of the modern state on 
all ideological, administrative and military levels [italics added]. 
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The machine assemblage that came together in the German states provided 
the prototype for the world system. The teaching machine, including the 
operating system and hardware-the system of representation it employs 
and thereby justifies-is in itself a recoding and reterritorializing exercise 
dedicated to the formation of specific forms of subjectivity. Deleuze and 
Guatarri (1987, 457): 
it was the modern State and capitalism that that brought the triumph 
of machines, in particular motorized machines (whereas the archaic 
state had simple machines at best); but what we are referring to now 
are technical machines [in original], which are defined extrinsically. 
One is not enslaved by the technical machine but rather subjected to 
it. 
Foucault too pointed to this form of subjection/subjectification that became 
apparent during the modern period of social/technical development in 
Northwest Europe (circa 1700-1900). The forms of space, time, subjectivity, 
production, warfare invented then still form the official and unofficial 
components of the contemporary teaching machine. 
In the instance of nineteenth century Germany, "culture" is understood in its 
secular, bourgeois form; its state-sanctioned imperial imposition by Bismarck 
was called Kulturkampf (culture struggle, 1873-1878).28 It formed a primary 
~ 
engine for German imperialism, as popular culture does today for U.S. 
imperialism, though with much less effectiveness. This formal statist 
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perceptual offensive was conducted through the implementation of 
compulsory state-funded education with a legislated curriculum, a 
"nationalitarian" (bourgeois Germanic) literature and history arrayed against 
the remnants of the feudal order as evinced by the Catholic Church (the 
overcoded, not axiomatized, world where God still functioned as 
transcendental signifier). This Germanic initiative-this particular machinic 
assemblage-formed the model for state education and nation building in 
most every jurisdiction around the world during the twentieth century. 
Without the monopoly the state enjoyed on taxation, the ability to tax the 
landed, martial class (Junkers) to pay for compulsory education for example; 
without the state monopoly on violence, for example the means to enforce 
the removal of Catholic functionaries (school inspectors) from the school 
system and replace them with state-salaried bureaucrats, Kulturkampf could 
not have happened. 29 The teaching machine-this machinic assemblage-
provided the means for this operation, for the reterritorialization of a 
population within a new set of operating parameters. 
However, it should not be presumed that the machine operated upon a "natal 
landscape" (tabula rasa) in wait of development (subjectification, subjection). 
Informal systems of schooling already had provided high rates of literacy and 
higher education throughout Northwest Europe and North America. In the 
nineteenth century, these systems were overwritten, and not for educative 
reasons (cf. Lawton and Gordon, 2002; West, 1965, 1975). Statist education 
was not written on a tabula rasa, but on well developed systems of education 
that worked within preindustrial parameters. The statist system of education 
was imposed, in Prussia sometimes at the point of a bayonet, in New York 
City in the midst of riots, on already developed educational systems that had 
been effective in constructing literate populations, albeit not literate 
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populations that at one and the same time, were nation-alized, industrialized, 
capitalized and militarized. 30 
Education Acts common to all industrial nations evidence this statist 
systemization. Rousseau's concept of education as outlined in one his later 
works, Considerations on the Government of Poland (1772). The "late" 
Rousseauian concept of forced statist schooling came to fruition in every 
national jurisdiction that industrialized during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Industrialized states everywhere followed Rousseau's militarist 
model during the twentieth century, though sometimes "softening" it with 
"student centered learning" to make the social practice more effective in 
democratic societies. Hacker (1989, 66): "Education need not coercively 
control young men's minds behavior and emotions; it need only help them to 
it thel'!lselves, a much more efficient approach." 
States, by definition, were carriers of the abstracted "will of the people." 
They assumed the "natural" right to form a citizenry according to nation-
statist parameters and "legitimately" imposed compulsed state schooling (cf. 
Lawton and Gordon, 2002, 94-96). Porter (1987, 131) writes: 
Rousseau in The Government of Poland (1772) had advocated a 
people's army in which every citizen would serve as a soldier .... In 
the 1770s and 1780s, numerous other French phi/osophes-
Montesquieu, Joseph Servan, the Abbe Mably-came out in favor of a 
citizen's army ... The much vaunted nationalism of this enlarged 
French army (the army based in universal conscription, the levee en 
masse) was hardly a spontaneous phenomenon. From the beginning 
the state fostered and manipulated the nationalism that sustained it .. 
. the mass mobilization of 1793-94 portended the manipulation of 
nationalism that would become commonplace in the twentieth century. 
The work of these great pedagogical regulators is positively construed in 
most contemporary edu,ational narratives. However, the educational fathers 
of the contemporary era-those who put together the machinic assemblage-
were great systematizers, regularizers, nationalizers and militarizers-
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certainly not enlightened distributors of uninterested knowledge to previously 
benighted populations. Cubberly, Mann, Harris and Dewey were the 
champions of the pedagogy of rational militarist capitalist statism much more 
than they were developers of sites/sights of liberal freedom. The 
psychologizers of education, for example Thorndike and Kirkpatrick, figure 
importantly in this process, as do the pedagogical reductionists 
(technologists), most especially Tyler (1949) and Bloom (1956). 
The developers of the machinic assemblage include Ryerson in Canada and 
his U.S. counterpart William Torrey Harris, the systematizers (and 
Prussianizers) of North American education. Most importantly, the financial 
and political heads of the U.S. plutocracy, the U.S. capitalist monopolists of 
the era, especially Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller, and many politicians, 
especially U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, led the development of the 
assemblage that is still considered to be "education" per se ( cf. Cremin, 
1976; Green, 1990; Hlebowitsh 1993; Lawton and Gordon, 2002; Melton, 
1988, Pinar et al., 1995; Schleunes, 1988; Spring, 1989, 1998). 
These men and their functionaries, the owners and managers of large 
segments of capital, institutionalized plutocratic capitalism through the 
development of education as the primary system for subjective control 
(formation). The role of the large charitable foundations, organizations 
granted tax exemption by the U.S. congress, especially the Ford, Mellon, 
Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, in determining what constituted 
education during the twentieth century cannot be overemphasized. While 
this plutocratic power was mitigated by the formative influence of the state 
during the Second World War and the Cold War (circa 1940-1990), with the 
rise of "skills discourse" in the 1980s, the influence of the capitalist 
0 plutocracy again became evident. 
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In effect, at the beginning of the twentieth century and then again at the end 
of the century in North America, "business" (capitalism) defined education as 
much as the state or the military (they formed an irreducible whole). John 
Taylor Gatto (2001), in his "hidden history of American education," laid out a 
case for this conclusion. 31 From the early twentieth century, in North 
America and Europe, education took on its contemporary role as a co-
manager of capitalism (251-257). Education-not schooling-but the 
"School" as Althusser puts it-provided the means by which plutocratic 
capitalism came to be defined as democracy (and freedom). 
During the twentieth century, education as a social practice and discourse, as 
a doctrine and as a set of institutions, was reduced to a comprehensive 
theory for the provision and regulation of credentials. This system provided 
the formal means for subjective formation and management, whether the 
issue at hand was the formation of elites or masses, lawyers or dishwashers, 
the inculcation of gender or class position. By the mid-twentieth century, 
this credentialing system itself, a person's place within it in, largely 
determined existential possibilities for the great majority of industrialized 
persons (the growth of the "professions" was symptomatic of this process). 
Education provided the vehicle of choice for the great monopolists of the late 
nineteenth century; education-not schooling--provided the means by the 
industrial and financial oligarchy could gain and maintain legitimacy and 
stability. From the conclusions of a U.S. congressional commission created in 
1913 to investigate the influence of the "new foundations" (252): "The 
domination of men in whose hands the final control of a large part of 
American industry rests is not limited to their employees, but is being rapidly 
extended to control the education and social services of the nation." 
The industrialist Carnegie had understood the requirement for this "safety 
valve" early on if monopoly capitalism was to be protected. He deliberately 
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planned this credentialing system to control access to plutocratic power so 
that it could continue relatively unmolested (cf. Carnegie, 1902). By the end 
of the 1930s education in North America most especially, had become an 
economy of subjective formation based upon virtual achievement designed to 
control (channel) the production of "socially-useful" consciousness and of 
consciousness surplus to the needs of production (cf. Bahro, 1978). 
The "progressivists," notably Dewey, Rugg and Kilpatrick, under whose 
banner the educational system was designed according to the parameters 
supplied by monopoly capital, knowingly or unknowingly, developed an 
educational system (machinic assemblage) that matched the requirements of 
industrial capitalism. Rugg (1933, 3), an associate of Dewey's at Columbia 
Teachers College, an institution which like the University of Chicago, was 
heavily endowed by the Rockefellers, captured the "progressive tenor" in this 
famous quotation taken from his aptly titled book The Great Technology: 
A new public mind is to be created. How? Only by creating tens of 
millions of new individual minds and welding them into a new social 
mind. Old stereotypes must be broken up and new "climates of 
opinion" formed in the neighborhoods of America. 
Rugg (278) also supplied the way in which this was to be done: 
First and foremost, the development of a new philosophy of life and 
education which will be fully appropriate to the new social order; 
second, the building of an adequate plan for the production of a new 
race of educational workers; third, the making of new activities and 
materials for the curriculum. 
This process was described in Chapter 2 as the forced breakdown of a 
"structured milieu;" education provided the technology par excellence with 
which to do this. A massive psychological campaign (psyop) resulted from 
the work of the "progressives" that initially had been funded, directly and the 
indirectly, by the major "non-profit foundations." This operation changed the 
face of education in North America as well as the type of subjectivity 
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produced by it. By this means, the production of consciousness surplus to 
systemic needs was contained (this is an-going struggle often approached 
dialectically, and in this instance through the "war machine" offered by 
Deleuze and Guatarri). 
Categorized disciplinary knowledge, the hierarchal graded school, the 
university of regularized progression and a workplace that subscribed to the 
credentialing ethic, ensured that mass subjectivity would be produced 
according to the "virtual" needs of capitalism. This educational system 
(machinic assemblage) by controlling class access and forcing those who 
change class to emulate preset behaviours and affect, effectively policed 
(regularized) subjectivity (cf. Apple, 1982; Willis, 1977; Bourdieux, 1990; 
Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Goffman, 1959). This massive educative 
infrastructure (assemblage) provided the generally accepted route to reward. 
It provided the foundation for advanced capitalism. As the German 
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (1989, 97) writes: 
There are within the psyche processes that are blatantly analogous to 
those that are involved in the accumulation of capital-and not just in 
a metaphorical sense. Producing subjects have to a great extent been 
organized in the form of subjective capital or learning mental 
machinery; subjective capitalism is the physic reality of intellectual 
subcultures. Perhaps this is the source of the desolate lack of 
solidarity perceived by those who try to communicate with the 
intellectual public in a language that remains unwieldy in the face of 
the compulsions toward accumulation and the self-armament 
characteristic of combative and self-exploitive intellects. 
This aesthetic economy of perceptual and conceptual regulation and control 
as developed in the 1920s remained in place almost unchanged well into the 
latter half of the twentieth century. At that time, it again changed, and again 
according to parameters determined by (postindustrial) military/capitalism. 
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Capitalization 
The capitalization (privatization) of the statist educative "assemblage" is a 
recent phenomenon. Beginning in the 1970s, and escalating until the end of 
the twentieth century, education was transformed into a market good valued 
not so much for its ontological promise to change the world as for its market 
potential. Education itself-not its products (human subjectivity)-but the 
process/practice itself became the primary economic driver in all 
postindustrial jurisdictions during that period. The constant unrelenting 
(24/7) production of knowledge and learning is a primary way in which post-
industrial economies differ from their industrial predecessors. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), three leading ultra-
national institutions of global governance, in the last several years have 
concentrated on the development of education as a vehicle for the market 
development of persons and as a marketable commodity. The General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), an agreement under constant 
negotiation in a non-public WTO forum, extends ultra-national market 
jurisdiction into the education "service industry" that has been under almost 
exclusive statist control in all industrial jurisdictions since the nineteenth 
century. It should be pointed out that the state has voluntarily relinquished 
its authority over the determination and dissemination of former "public 
goods," often without the awareness or in spite the fierce opposition of 
citizens. 
KPMG Consulting, one of the transnational consulting firms increasingly 
charged with redesigning former public goods within the parameters of 
Market, recently produced an influential report addressing the contemporary 
commodification of knowledge and education. From Transforming Higher 
Education: At the Gateway of the Knowledge Economy (KPMG Consulting, 
1999): 
We are entering a new economy, where knowledge is the primary 
basis of exchange and wealth creation. Higher education stands at the 
gateway of this economy, as the "treasury" that mints the new 
"currency"-knowledge-on which it runs. 
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This formal repositioning of education within parameters defined by 
postindustrial capitalism is based in the marketization of knowledge and 
education without the regard for the concept of "national interest," the 
integrity of nation-state, or indeed of the liberal humanist concept of the 
person, regulatory concepts that have defined educational practice since its 
massification in nineteenth century Europe and North America. Decrying the 
displacement of "education" by "training" or the "vocationalization" of the 
university does not address the profundity of the change in process, the 
global realization of the process that Heidegger some fifty years ago 
identified as a crisis of the university and of knowledge. 
Though formal electronic reportage of these changes has been limited, the 
GuardianEducation.co. in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the Chronicle of 
Higher Education in the U.S. have documented the privatization and 
marketization of education for a number of years. The Guardian reported 
(Kalaftides, L., 2001): 
Total spending on education amounts to $2 trillion, or one 20th of 
world GDP. As Glenn R Jones sees it: "Education is one of the fastest-
growing of all markets. Private training and the adult education 
industry are expected to achieve double-digit growth throughout the 
next decade." 
Jones, CEO of virtual university Jones International Inc, is head of the 
Global Alliance for Transnational Education, one of the principal 
lobbying groups offering consultation to the WTO in its efforts to 
eliminate barriers to trade. 
No wonder GATS is attracting so many covetous eyes, and no wonder 
funding for state education is being cut back. In the words of the 
OECD's Moyoto Kamiya: "Massive reforms are taking place in the state 
education sector, oriented towards and guided by the market." 
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Education reconceptualized ideally and reformed materially is the world's 
leading industry (2 trillion $US). However, not only the means, but also the 
ends to which education is put have been privatized, especially since the end 
of the Second World War. Nikolas Rose (1999, 161), one of the West's 
leading theorists of pastoral power (governance of mind/psyche/soul), 
describes the subject formed and reformed by the contemporary educative 
process: 
The new citizen is required to engage in a ceaseless work of training 
and retraining, skilling and reskilling, enhancements of credentials and 
preparation for a life of incessant job seeking: life is to become a 
continuous capitalization of the self. 
While the "capitalization of the self" has been evident en masse since the 
embourgeoisment of Northwest Europe, the "banking" model of education 
has been subject to significant recent reform [recoding]. The ability of the 
subject to invest in learning and live off its interest has been significantly 
disrupted, with the contemporary progressive human (homo economicus 
redux) exhibiting characteristics that might well have been considered 
retrograde or even pathological in the era of humanistic psychology and 
education. Indeed, it is questionable if normative concepts as individuation 
and dissociation can maintain psychological currency in a subjective economy 
geared to the constant destabilization and reconstruction of the marketable 
self. 
A one-time capital self-investment has been modified so that constant 
reinvestment, or the ap19earance of it, is required if an individual is to profile 
appropriate skills, dispositions, competencies and knowledge. The concept of 
"skill decay" is employed in training and policy literature to account for this 
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built-in technological redundancy, capturing the increasingly short shelf life 
allotted any particular "skills set" when set in a framework provided by 
human capital theory (cf. Moe, H. & Blodgett, D., 2000, 229). Immaterial 
consumptive goods (Derrida's "invisible materiality" now emulate the 
obsolescence or redundancy built into material consumptive goods, in this 
instance the human and its education (the cannibalization of the self). 
In North America, the educational discourse to promote the development of 
the socially malleable self was legitimized through studies conducted by the 
American Society for Training and Development (Carnevale, Gainer, and 
Meltzer, 1990) and by the Secretary's (Office of the U.S. Secretary of 
Education) Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills (SCANS, 1991). 
Interestingly, the Kellogg and Carnegie Foundations funded much of the 
subsequent work in the development of "skills discourse" in the U.S. 32 In 
Canada, the country's premier business lobby, the Conference Board of 
Canada, assumed a similar role (Conference Board, n.d.): 
The Conference Board helps leaders work together to develop a skilled 
and innovative society that will prepare Canadians for today's 
knowledge-based economy. We conduct leading-edge research, 
facilitate dialogue, recognize excellence and communicate results, 
creating maximum impact and change in Canada's educational 
practices and policies. 
In 1990, The Conference Board established the National Business and 
Education Centre (NBEC) to work with member organizations in 
developing and promoting Canada's education and learning systems. 
NBEC member organizations participate in the National Council on 
Education and the Employability Skills Forum. 
In the U.S., this educative reconfiguration of subjectivity developed in a 
climate of urgency, even moral panic. Induced by the Japanese "economic 
challenge," the U.S. loss of the Vietnam War, the 1972 "oil crisis," by falling 
0 
rates of corporate profit, and a federal government without moral authority 
(Watergate), a "productivity crisis" symptomatic of the fundamental 
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contradiction of capitalism (overaccumulation, see Chapter 5) was blamed on 
an ill trained work force and statist regulation (the efficiency discourse, the 
theory of "lean and mean" for all but the wealthy). 
Well funded work involving the chief officers of the largest corporations 
domiciled in the U.S. and the most senior bureaucrats charged with labour 
· .. force oversight resulted in the imposition of a variety of educational reforms 
throughout the 1980s and 90s. This included the abolition of the Adult 
Education Act of 1964, which had provided U.S. federal government support 
for those enrolled in Adult Basic Education in the U.S. A revised Perkins Act 
of 1998n(Academic Innovations, n.d.) focused U.S. federal educational effort 
more directly on ostensible labour market requirements through legislating 
educational accountability and standards and, ironically as always, providing 
state subsidy for business, though workforce training in this instance: 
Perhaps the most significant change in the re-authorized Perkins Act is 
the emphasis placed on academic standards. Where the 1990 Act 
focused solely on the integration of academic and vocational 
proficiencies, the 1998 Act identifies development of rigorous academic 
standards and accountability as additional priorities. The Secretary of 
Education will not be involved in the development of state performance 
measures, as each state will determine its own. However, power is 
given to the Secretary to impose sanctions on states that fail to meet 
performance levels for 2 or more consecutive years. 
The Act also outlines various opportunities for states and local areas to 
integrate the vocational education and workforce investment systems. 
However, new and strict barriers are placed on linkages between vocational 
education and School-to-Work programs. 
Official statist rhetoric emanating from the U.S. Department of Education had 
inflamed educational discontent in the U.S. for at least a decade before the 
full-blown initiative to d~velop and impose "skills discourse." Similar 
rationalization efforts already conducted under the banners of social 
accountability and relevancy had laid the groundwork for more substantial 
167 
reformation. Systemic efficiency had been an issue since the 1970s, 
evidenced for example in the imposition of "performance indicators" in at the 
state level. The development and institutionalization of competency based 
education (CBE) and outcomes based education (OBE) was well established 
already when rhetorical (virtual) educational warfare was declared in the U.S. 
In one regard, this reformatory effort was unremarkable. Prussia, France, 
England, Japan, Turkey and Egypt all employed education when faced with 
economic and military defeat and challenge. The U.S. itself had employed 
this strategy only twenty five years earlier (National Defense Act of 1958, 
n.d.). The Act reads in part: "The Congress finds that an educational 
emergency exists and requires action by the federal government. Assistance 
will come from Washington to help develop as rapidly as possible those skills 
essential to national defense." 
In 1983, William Bennett, U.S. Secretary of Education in the Reagan 
administration, again employed the strategy to rhetorically fuel the "panic." 
From A Nation at Risk, an "open letter to the American people," published 
under Bennett's auspices (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 
1983) 
If an unfriendly power had attempted to impose on America the 
mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well 
have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to 
happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in 
achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, 
we have dismantled essential support systems that helped make those 
gains possible. We have, in effect, been committing an act of 
unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament. 
This "letter" was echoed at the same time by the Carnegie Forum on 
Education and the Economy A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the Twentieth 
0 
First Century (1986). 33 
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In the United Kingdom, the educational system was changed at the same 
time through a series of Education Acts declared throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. By century's end, the purpose and means for education as laid out in 
the Education Act of 1944 had been altered radically. The act of 1944 had 
brought British educational practice in line with that of other industrial 
jurisdictions by raising compulsed attendance at school to age 15 and 
supplying expanded forms of "free" schooling. The reform acts instituted in 
the 1980s and 1990s took a global lead in using education as a primary 
means with which to institute a new subjective (moral) economy of education 
that differed quite considerably from the moral economy that expressed the 
liberal political consensus that had been in place in all Anglophonic 
jurisdictions since the Second World War. 
Soon after the first initiatives in the United Kingdom, New Zealand reformed 
its educational system more radically than any other Anglophonic jurisdiction, 
for example introducing its version of a National Council for Vocational 
Qualifications (NCVQ's) that destroyed the integrity of that country's system 
for vocational credentialing. As in the U.K., this system was reworked 
several years after its introduction, but not before the educational terrain had 
been reformed by privatizing much of the cost, the benefits, the contents and 
the means that together constitute educational practice. 
While education by its nature is a highly political project, nothing so much 
signaled the end of the postwar political consensus (social contract) in 
Anglophone jurisdictions as the way in which education was openly politicized 
in every nee-liberal jurisdiction. In this regard, the concept "lifelong 
learning" proved particularly attractive to educational planners. While the 
term had been in use for at least a hundred years, it was employed in the 
1980s as means to reinvest the individual with sole moral responsibility for 
the self, while at the same removing the limited moral-and financial-
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responsibility for the self assumed by the state in Anglophonic jurisdictions 
since the Second World War. 
In 2001, a new education ministry again was established in England, this 
time the Department for Education and Skills "with the purpose of creating 
opportunity, releasing potential and achieving excellence for all." 
Significantly, any reference to education, schooling or learning is absent from 
this statement of purpose; opportunity, potential and excellence are nee-
liberal code words for forming the student according to the parameters of 
postindustrial capitalism. Three objectives ostensibly focus systemic effort 
(Education and Skills, n.d.): 
Give children an excellent start in education so that they have a better 
foundation for future learning 
Enable all young people to develop and to equip themselves with the 
skills, knowledge and personal qualities needed for life and work 
Encourage and enable adults to learn, improve their skills and enrich 
their lives. 
Such cliched codings (recoding) provided the preferred vehicle by which nee-
liberal educational reforms were instituted in many different parts of the 
world. Canada, the U.S. and Australia all launched "lifelong learning" 
initiatives in the 1980s, ostensibly in order to upgrade the work force and 
make those nations more economically competitive, that is more attractive to 
trans-national capital. 34 
Today, total learning systems in all postindustrial jurisdictions engage the 
contemporary subject in a learning project stretching from womb to tomb. 
These systems are emblematic of postindustrialism. These systems, the 
curriculum and, increasingly, the knowledge (content) they disseminate are 
~ 
proprietarily held (e.g. Thomson Learning Corporation, Reed Elsevier, 
Microsoft elearn, the University of Phoenix, Universitas 21). The Eis for 
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Everything: E-commerce, E-Business, and E-Learning in Higher Education 
(2000) by Jossey-Bass Publishers and EDUCAUSE exemplifies the sea change 
in the field of education (circa 1950-2000). The title and the companies that 
produced it speak equally to the change that still is less than obvious to 
many practitioners. Jossey-Bass Publishers, one of world's largest publishers 
of education-related titles, was "taken over" by John Wiley and Sons in 1999. 
Wiley itself "had gone public" in 1962 and was listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange in 1995. To quote from the corporate website (About Wiley, n.d.): 
Wiley is a global publisher of print and electronic products, specializing 
in scientific, technical, and medical books and journals; professional 
and consumer books and subscription services; and textbooks and 
other educational materials for undergraduate and graduate students 
as well as lifelong learners. Wiley has approximately 22,700 active 
titles and about 400 journals, and publishes about 2000 new titles in a 
variety of print and electronic formats each year. 
With about 3,150 employees worldwide, Wiley has operations in the 
United States, Europe (England and Germany), Canada, Asia, and 
Australia. The Company has U.S. publishing, marketing, and 
distribution centers in New York, Colorado, Maryland, New Jersey, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. Wiley's worldwide headquarters are newly 
located in Hoboken, New Jersey, just across the river from Manhattan. 
Wiley content travels well. Approximately 40% of the company's 
revenues are generated outside the United States. 
And to quote from the EDUCAUSE website (About EDUCAUSE, n.d.): 
EDUCAUSE is a nonprofit association whose mission is to advance 
higher education by promoting the intelligent use of information 
technology. 
Membership is open to institutions of higher education, corporations 
serving the higher education information technology market, and other 
related associations and organizations. EDUCAUSE programs include 
professional development activities, print and electronic publications, 
strategic policy initiatives, research, awards for leadership and 
exemplary practices, and a wealth of online information services. The 
current membership comprises more than 1,800 colleges, universities, 
and education organizations, including over 180 corporations. 
EDUCAUSE has offices in Boulder, CO, and Washington, D.C. 
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The most prestigious of educational institutions in thirty-five of the world's 
wealthiest countries are EDUCAUSE members. Interestingly, EDUCAUSE is 
currently involved in "hardening" electronic education in the U.S. per the U.S. 
president's Executive Order in Critical Infrastructure Protection issued on 
October 16, 2001. From the press release of September 18, 2002 
announcing the postmilitary/industrial strategy proposed by EDUCAUSE 
(Higher education helps, 2002): 
Higher education will play a major role in advancing the cybersecurity 
of America. In remarks at Stanford University today, where the White 
House released the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 
EDUCAUSE Vice President Mark Luker said, "The advanced computer 
networks of higher education represent the emerging systems of the 
future ... and successful security solutions in this sector can serve as 
models for the nation at large." 
At the same time as delivery has been electronified, the dissemination of the 
academic technical knowledge has been split between Reed Elsevier (£8.SB 
in fiscal 2001), an amalgamation of a Dutch and British publishing 
conglomerates, and Thomson Corporation of Canada. Reed Elsevier's self-
description (About us [Reed Elsevier], n .d.): 
Reed Elsevier is a world leading publisher and information provider, 
operating in four core segments: Science and Medical, Legal, 
Education, Business 
Its principal activities are in North America and Europe and the 
company employs approximately 37,000 people. 
Reed Elsevier's key objective is to be the indispensable source of 
information-driven services and solutions to its target customers, 
through the delivery of highly valued and demonstrably superior and 
flexible solutions, increasingly via the internet. 
Thomson Corporation (Thomson Corporation, About Us, n.d.), the other 
monopolist purveyor of knowledge, sells the same product-information in 
health care, science, business, law and regulation and education ($7.2 Billion 
U.S. in fiscal 2001). 
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Universitas 21 was a market leader in that it was one of the first electronic 
purveyors of knowledge to employ its exclusive "brands" to market its 
product From its self-description (Universitas 21, Introduction, n.d.): 
Universitas 21 is an international network of leading research-intensive 
universities. Incorporated in Guernsey, it has 17 member universities 
in 10 countries. Collectively, its members enrol about 500,000 
students, employ some 44,000 academics and researchers, provide 
over 700,000 Internet addresses, have over 2 million alumni, and 
have a combined operating budget of about $US9.5 billion. 
The Company's core business is provision of a pre-eminent brand for 
educational services supported by a strong quality assurance 
framework. It offers experience and expertise across a range of vital 
educational functions, a proven quality assurance capability and high 
brand value. 
And Microsoft elearn (Welcome to Microsoft elearn, n.d.): 
Learning Resource Interchange (LRN) is Microsoft's implementation of 
the Instructional Management Systems Global Learning Consortium 
(IMS) Content Packaging 1.1 and Metadata 1.2 Specifications, an 
industry standard for the interchange of online learning content. LRN 
also supports the Sharable Content Object Reference Model (SCORM) 
1.2 reference model developed by the ADL. Microsoft is partnering 
with industry leaders to deliver standards-based online learning 
content to assure customers that their investment in content and 
technology is protected. 
An understanding of the technologies referenced is not needed to make 
sense of the argot. The protocols for electronic on-line delivery have been 
standardized (IMS); LRN is the Microsoft Corporation system for on-line 
content delivery that respects those protocols. Microsoft is working with 
other large corporations concerned with data delivery to deliver a technically 
uniform product that can ensure the customer, for example a university with 
an on-line distance education program, will be protected at the macro-level 
of data dissemination in. terms of proprietary content and local level 
technology-and to ensure it can protect its monopoly position in data 
delivery architecture. 
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In market vernacular, this is an example of the "shakedown" that occurs as 
industries "mature." The concurrent processes of technological 
standardization, industry rationalization, re-regulation and ownership 
concentration are evidenced in these and many other sites on the Internet. 
Common and select education in formal, non-formal or informal form has 
been overhauled, uniformly redesigned in terms of technology and content. 
It is now a saleable commodity in its own right and rededicated to the 
production of an equally saleable (i.e. employable, flexible, adaptable, 
generically skilled, tacitly [not explicitly] knowledgeable) human marketed 
(proudly most often) as just one more capital input. 
An unstable self (subject) who can change or appear to change on-demand 
and just-in-time provides the "ideal type" (Weber) in this finely engineered 
"total education" model regardless of any actual economic need for this new 
socioeconomic amalgam, the "posthuman", again an ideal type (Weber, 
1968), similar to the human occupying Heidegger's "standing reserve" 
(Bestand). 35 As Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 399) so aptly put it: 
"Undoubtedly, whenever a State appropriates the war machine, it tends to 
assimilate the education of the citizen to the training of the worker to the 
apprenticeship of the soldier." 
Recent educative developments, whether or not directly war related, are by-
products of war and the preparation for it, and indeed postindustrialism itself 
is predicated on war, or more correctly, on the preparation for it. The 
"information age" is itself a "spin-off" of U.S. military research and 
development. For example, the U.S. armed forces recently spent 
approximately $1B developing elearning. 36 Indeed, postindustrialism-the 
select reterritorialization of the human, the naming of the electronification of 
the human as a machinic assemblage-is itself-as is the human it produces 
(reterritorializes)-a byproduct of the blended economy, of 
capitalism/war/militarism. 
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Chapter Notes 
1 In his memoirs (Memoirs, Otto von Bismarck, n.d.), Bismarck describes the way 
in which he precipitated war with France. The Prussian king was at Ems, a 
well-known European watering hole, when the French ambassador approached 
him and demanded that the king should pledge himself not to allow the 
Hohenzollern (a powerful Germanic "royal house") prince to become a 
candidate for the Spanish throne once again (the much contested Spanish 
imperial succession was the galvanizing event for the war of 1870, much like 
the assassination of an Austro-Hungarian archduke was for the First World War 
twenty-five years later, symptomatic perhaps of the [residual, symbolic] last 
gasp of dynastic empire). The Prussian King William [the soon-to-be pan-
German Kaiser] refused to do this, and sent word to the French ambassador 
that he would not see him again. He telegraphed the news of this to Bismarck, 
and.gave him permission to publish the telegram in newspapers if he wished. 
Regarding the telegram, Bismarck wrote: 
All considerations, conscious and unconscious, strengthened my opinion 
that war could only be avoided at the cost of the honor of Prussia and of the 
national [i.e. pan-German] confidence in her. Under this conviction I made 
use of the royal authorization communicated to me through Abeken 
[Councillor of the Legation of the North German Confederation] to publish 
the contents of the telegram; and in the presence of my two guests 
[General Moltke and General Roon] I reduced the telegram by striking out 
words, but without adding or altering anything .... 
After I had read out the concentrated edition to my two guests, Moltke 
remarked: "Now it'has a different ring; in its original form it sounded like a 
parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." I went on to 
explain: "If, in execution of his Majesty's order, I at once communicate this 
text, which contains no alteration in or addition to the telegram, not only to 
the newspapers, but also by telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known 
in Paris before midnight, and not only on account of its contents, but also on 
account of the manner of its distribution, will have the effect of a red rag 
upon the Gallic bull. 
"Fight we must if we do not want to act the part of the vanquished without 
a battle. Success, however, depends essentially upon the impression which 
the origination of the war makes upon us and others; it is important that we 
should be the ones attacked, and the Gallic insolence and touchiness will 
bring about this result if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we 
can without the speaking tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the 
public threats of France." 
Bismarck once already had tried to convince the Prussian oligarchy to declare 
war on France and failed. His telegram played to various audiences 
simultaneously. 
2 Speed itself has always been a war weapon, or, as Deleuze and Guatarri say, a 
"weapons system." And speed itself is a primary component of the 
contemporary aesthetic economy generally and the teaching machine 
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specifically. As Virilio (1994, 1998) pointed out, it is speed generated by 
technologies-speed as the medium, speed as the message, speed tamed by 
the State that provides the crucial reterritorializing variable. Speed in 
transmission and reception (though there are absolute limits) allows perception 
to be produced in tighter vectors, with greater attention to both form and detail 
(the dialectical process whereby quantitative change becomes qualitative). For 
Deleuze and Guatarri (1987, 398) the "war machine" assemblage is the cause 
of "weapons." As such weapons differ from tools in that: "from the point of 
view of force, the tool is tied to a gravity-displacement system, weight-height 
system, and the weapon to the speed-perpetuum mobile [in original] system (it 
is in this sense that it can be said that speed in itself is a "weapons system.)" 
3 Donald Lowe (1982), following Merleau-Ponty, writes: 
Perception as the crucial connection includes the subject as the perceiver, 
the act of perceiving, and the content of the perceived ... The act of 
perceiving unites the subject with the perceived. And the content of the 
perceived, which results from that act, affects the subject's bearing in the 
world [i.e. subjectivity]. .. This perception is bounded by three factors, 
namely: (i) the communications media which frame and facilitate the act of 
perceiving; (ii) the hierarchy of sensing [i.e. the sensorium] ... which 
structures the subject as an embodied perceiver; and (iii) the epistemic 
presuppositions which order the content of the perceived. The three are 
related, interacting with each other. Together they constitute a field of 
perception, within which specific knowledge becomes possible ... the 
perceptual field constituted by them differs from period to period." 
Integral to Merleau-Ponty's project is the foundation of the Cogito. Merleau-
Ponty (1964, 3f) writes: 
The perceiving mind is an incarnated mind. I have tried, first of all, to re-
establish the roots of the mind in its body and in its world, going against 
doctrines which treat perception as a simple result of the action of external 
things on our body as well as against those which insist on the autonomy of 
consciousness. These philosophies commonly forget-in favor of a pure 
exteriority or of a pure interiority-the insertion of the mind in corporeality, 
the ambiguous relation which we entertain with our body and, correlatively, 
with perceived things. 
When perception conceived of this way is attached to the concept of 
"distributed cognition" (knowledge as always social, modal, non-discrete)-
developed in a "mind" that is a "disunified, heterogeneous, collection of 
processes" (Varela, as quoted in Hayles 155-156), the humanist "individual" is 
taken out of discursive play. 
4 This statement contains a good deal of hyperbole of course. As Gramsci and 
Foucault taught, resistance is always a part of hegemony, is itself a function of 
power. Yet, mass manipulation was evident with advent of the daily press; 
since the mid-1800s, the "manufacturing of opinion" is what politics has been 
all about (cf. Adorno~and Horkheimer; 1972; Baudrillard, 1994; Ewen, 1976; 
Jowett and O'Donnel, 1999; Virilio, 1994). 
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5 Total mobilization under C.D. Howe saw Canada industrialize and urbanize more 
quickly than any country before or since. The volume of war material produced 
by Canadian industry was astounding. Over 500,000 vehicles, 600 ships, 
85,000 heavy guns, and millions of tons of military supplies were manufactured 
and shipped overseas. By the end of World War II, Canada had the second 
largest navy in the world, the third largest merchant marine and produced 40 
percent of the world's aluminum. It was a leading producer in many sectors of 
the world economy including petrochemicals and propaganda (the National Film 
Board). C.D. Howe was U.S. citizen; the Canadian and U.S. economies became 
integrated under to an unprecedented degree under his stewardship (Canadians 
in the World, n.d.). 
6 In the U.S., James Madison, a "founding father" and president supplied this 
gloss on public opinion. It effectively presents the liberal conception of the 
relationship between the state and the people, whereby the people through the 
"free" dissemination of information, make informed decisions to which the 
government is obliged to be responsive. From Madison's 1791 essay Popular 
Basis of Public Opinion (n.d.), Papers 14, 170:. 
Public opinion set bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in 
every free one. 
As there are cases where the public opinion must be obeyed by the 
government; so there are cases, where not being fixed, it may be 
influenced by the government. This distinction, if kept in view, would 
prevent or decide many debates on the respect due from the government to 
the sentiments of the people. 
7 Theorists as Sombart, Mumford, Weber, Ellul and Virilio developed the 
relationships between time, space, movement, war, capitalism, science, 
technology, religion, machine and industry. Mumford ([1934], 1962, 14-18) 
writes: 
The clock, not the steam-engine, is the key machine of the modern, 
industrial age ... The clock, moreover, is a piece of power-machinery whose 
"product" is seconds and minutes: by its essential nature it disassociated 
time from human events and helped create the belief in an independent 
world of mathematically measurable sequences: the special world of 
science ... The modern industrial regime could do without coal and iron and 
steam before it could without the clock. 
Regarding space, time and movement, he writes (22): 
The categories of time and space, once practically dissociated [in the 
Medieval period], had become united: and the abstractions of measured 
time and measured space undermined the earlier conceptions of infinity and 
eternity, since measurement must begin with an arbitrary here and now 
even if space and time be empty. The itch to use [in original] space and 
time had broken out: and once they were coordinated with movement, they 
could be contracted and expanded: the conquest of space and time had 
begun. (It is interesting to note that the very concept of acceleration, which 
is part of out daily mechanical experience, was not formulated until the 
seventeenth century). 
Virilio sounds much like an updated Ellul/Mumford. 
8 Keeley (1996, 131) writes: 
The social-solidarity values that oppose "us" to "them" help foment the 
collective violence of war from disputes between individuals of different 
societies. For this reason, much of the "'information" exchanged across 
social boundaries and frontiers may be acrimonious and include 
uncomplimentary ethnic epithets. 
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9 Robert Oppenheimer (Transcript, n.d.), the head of the Manhattan project, 
provides a basis for these statements. He once said that physicists in the U.S. 
built the atom bomb because they could. Interestingly, after the World War II, 
Oppenheimer fought against his fellow Manhattan project physicist, the 
expatriate Edward Teller who was lobbying U.S. President Truman for funding 
to produce a hydrogen bomb. Teller won out and Oppenheimer became more 
and more outspoken in his opposition to the use of nuclear weapons. He was 
declared was a security risk because of "communist sympathies" in 1953. His 
brother Frank, who served as his assistant, shared the same sentiments 
regarding building the atom bomb and provided this explanation: 
It's amazing how the technology tools trap one. They're so powerful . . . I 
was impressed because most of the sort of fervor for developing the bomb 
came as a kind of anti-Fascist fervor against Germany. But when V-E Day 
came along, nobody slowed up one little bit. No one said, 'Ah well, it 
doesn't matter now.' 
We all kept working. 
And it wasn't because we understood the significance against Japan. It was 
because the machinery had caught us in its trap and we were anxious to get 
this thing developed, from 
http://www.pbs.org/hollywoodpresents/copenhagen/story/transcript1.html. 
10 In the ancient era, Sun-Tzu, the other theorist of war comparable to 
Clausewitz, had already identified war as centrally concerned with control of the 
"field of perception." He advocated using the "tricks of the trade" (purposive 
deception) to do so. Paul Virilio, in War and Cinema, The Logics of Perception 
introduced the martial "logics of perception" to social theory in 1984. 
11 The Socratic narrative of "pure loss" addressed by Derrida, and following 
Derrida, has been superceded. "Mediated communication," whether writing on 
paper or electronic expression, can no longer be placed in an unequal binary 
with speaking. For Socrates, "pure loss" accompanied the loss of orality as the 
primary means of knowledge storage and dissemination. For Socrates, the 
memory loss that accompanied the technological overthrow of orality, far from 
increasing knowledge, diminished it. In this narrative, no doubt knowledge is 
"lost," but other knowledge is "found"-reconfiguration, not pure loss (cf. 
Derrida, 1981). What knowledge may be of "most worth" is moot; the 
knowledge worth most is the knowledge that is power. 
12 Kafka similarly remarked: "the cinema involves putting the eye in uniform." 
(cTheory, vol. 23, 3, 2). 
13 Jay (1993: 497) writes: 
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I don't know what perception is and I don't believe anything like perception 
exists," he [Derrida] once exclaimed-the hypertrophy of something 
designated vision per se could not be subjected to a critique, even if 
deconstruction permitted such an approach. The blind spots-"punctum 
caecum" was a privileged deconstructionist term-revealed by double 
readings were metaphors for the unknown that no amount of revelation 
could illuminate. However "apocalyptic" the tone of deconstruction might 
be, it was "an apocalypse without vision, without truth, without revelation. 
14 French literature/philosophy for the last hundred years has been located 
between the Nietzschean question "qui parle?" and Stephane Mallarme's 
(French Symbolist poet 1842-98) response, " ... the word itself-not the meaning 
of the word, but its enigmatic and precarious being" is speaking. With 
Mallarme, the word is granted a performative autotelic that allows text to 
operate according to immanent conditions. As Megill (1985, 291) relates, 
"according to Derrida, Mallarme's crise de vers 'shakes up [sollicite] the very 
bases of literature, depriving it, in its play, of any foundation outside itself. 
Literature is at once reassured and threatened by the fact of depending only on 
itself, standing in the air, all alone, separated from being'." 
15 Jay is referring to Hans Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the 
Phenomenology of the senses" in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a 
Philosophical Biology (Chicago, 1982). 
16 Heidegger (1954) also addresses formal shifts in perception: 
In theoria transformed into contemplatio [the Roman colonization of Greek 
truth] there comes to the fore the impulse, already prepared in Greek 
thinking, of a looking at that sunders and compartmentalizes. A type of 
encroaching advance by successive interrelated steps toward that which is 
to be grasped by the eye makes itself normative in knowing. 
This sundering and compartmentalizing, as Foucault (Order of Things, 1979) so 
meticulously laid out, constitutes much of Western knowledge, its "encroaching 
advance," the modernizing "effect" exposed (estranged) by Foucault that 
makes "itself normative in knowing." This encroaching advance, the sundering 
and compartmentalizing perhaps reaches a "terminal stage" in the postwar 
"media conflagration." Perhaps inevitably, as Foucault, Virilio and Baudrillard, 
in very different ways point out, it too (this division of knowledge) lead to the 
militarization of being during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
17 "Specular" unity ( correspondence theory of truth, ocularcentrism, Cartesian 
perspectivalism) displaced the multiperspectival regime of the "middle ages" 
during the Florentine Renaissance. The imposition of modern ocularcentrism 
(the bias inherent in specular unity/sameness) dates to Alberti's development 
of the ocular physics that explicated Brunelleschi's aesthetics (the development 
of perspective in Della Pittura, Alberti's explication of Brunelleschi's concepts of 
perspective dating to 1435, Florence). Michelet thought Brunelleschi's work so 
significant that he characterized him "as the destroyer of the Gothic" (Hauser, 
.. 
vol. 2, 5). Perhaps significantly, the normative (scientific) explanation 
(Alberti's physics) of perspective was pre-figured (i.e. pre-scripted) by its 
aesthetic apprehension, Brunelleschi's drawings and architecture. In effect, a 
180 
"Venetian blind" (perspectivalism - an encompassing epistemology, ontology 
and ideology described by the conical vision allowed by Alberti's optical physics) 
closed over other ways of seeing and over hearing. 
18 The geometrics of the sovereign observer (the fictive subject of liberal 
capitalism) reduce to this equation [I = eye] (Ong) whereby truth/reality 
evidences in the "eye of the beholder," in the instance of print, in the eye (I) of 
the Author. 
19 Jay (1993, 57-58) writes: 
Making a strong case for the causal relationship between the invention of 
perspective and the rise of capitalism may be problematic, so it would be 
better to fall back on the term Max Weber introduced in his celebrated 
account of the Protestant ethic and speak instead of an "elective affinity" 
between the two. A number of observers have suggested its various 
dimensions. According to Edgerton, Florentine businessmen with their 
newly invented technique of double entry bookkeeping may have been 
"more and more disposed to a visual order that would accord with the tidy 
principles of mathematical order that they applied to their bank ledgers." .. 
. John Berger adds that more appropriate than Alberti's shatterproof window 
on the world would be that of a "safe let into a wall, a safe in which the 
visible had been deposited." 
20 This theme was developed initially by the Frankfurt School, especially Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Benjamin (cf. Adorno & Horkheimer (1944), "The Culture 
Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" in Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Benjamin (1928), "One Way Street" in Reflections. 
21 Lutherian Protestantism encouraged the development of a new kind (ideal type, 
Weber) of subjectivity based in direct (personal) access to a new form of God, a 
personal God that until then had been accessed only impersonally through 
Churchly-mediation (except of course for the many mystics, iconoclasts, 
scholars). This theological inversion threatened the basis of Roman 
Catholicism, and was battled by the armies of Charles V, the Emperor of the 
still functioning Holy Roman Empire (HRE). Ignatius Loyola's (1491-1556) 
newly-formed paramilitary Society of Jesus (Jesuits) joined with the HRE to 
supplement its military warring with a propaganda counteroffensive (Counter-
Reformation), a psychological operation ("psyop" in contemporary warspeak) 
that employed education, science, diplomacy and high technology-the magic 
lantern, mass advertising, art, schooling-to (re)colonize populations and 
(de)limit emergent Protestantisms in Europe and "abroad". 
22 Althusser (1971, 156-57) "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses" in Lenin 
and philosophy: and other essays explains how it is that one component of the 
teaching machine (the school) sets about programming people: 
[It] is by apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in the 
massive inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that the relations of 
production in a ½Ppitalist social formation, i.e. the relations of exploited to 
exploiters and exploiters to exploited, are largely reproduced. The 
mechanisms which produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are 
naturally covered up and concealed by a universally reining ideology of the 
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School, universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the 
ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the School as a 
neutral environment purged of ideology (because it is ... lay [i.e. secular]) 
where teachers respectful of the "conscience" and "freedom" of the children 
who are entrusted to them (in complete confidence) by their "parents" (who 
are free too i.e. the owners of their children) open up for them the path to 
their freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, 
by knowing, literature and their "liberating" values. 
23 Another Luther piece (LW 46:209-258), A Sermon on Keeping Children in 
School reads in part: 
For it is hardly likely that in so great a city with such a large population the 
devil will not try his arts and tempt some to despise the word of God and 
the schools. This is true particularly because there are many things there 
(especially trade and commerce) to turn the children away from the schools 
to the service of Mammon. The devil undoubtedly thinks that if he could 
cause the word and the schools to be despised in Nurnberg, his purpose 
would in large measure have been accomplished, for he would have set an 
example that would carry great weight throughout Germany and be a real 
blow to the schools in all the other cities. For Nurnberg truly shines 
throughout all Germany like a sun among the moon and stars, and what is 
practiced there has a powerful influence on other cities. 
Does this piece not resonate with contemporary concerns regarding media-the 
corrupting influence of TV, consumer culture, etc? That current workplace, 
religious, political and educational reform projects mirror Luther's concerns 
almost exactly. The U.S. education policy reformation initiative of the moment, 
the sweeping and reactionary No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is based in the 
same concerns as those which Luther so feared, namely unnamed threats to 
education and godliness. The U.S, act of 2001 provides enabling legislation for 
further de facto and de jure discrimination in U.S. schools by granting greater 
"local autonomy," forcing more "accountability"-holding schools to account 
according to tightly defined performance indicators, more school "choice" which 
amounts to greater class-based educational resource distribution, and an 
emphasis on "proven teaching methods", conservative pedagogies that 
emphasize the 3R's. 
24 Marx addresses the question of religion and the state in "On the Jewish 
Question" (in Tucker, 1972, 22-36). He (33) writes: 
Political emancipation certainly represents a great progress. It is not, 
indeed, the final form of human emancipation, but it is the final form of 
human emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order. It 
goes without saying that we are speaking here of real, practical 
emancipation. 
Man emancipates himself politically from religion by expelling it from the 
sphere of public 19w to that of private law. Religion is no longer the spirit of 
the state, in which man behaves, albeit in a specific and limited way and in 
a particular sphere, as a species-being, in community with other men ... It 
[religion] is no longer the essence of community but the essence of 
differentiation [italics in original]. 
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25 Bill Readings (1996) provides a history of the development and changing 
purpose of the modern university, addressing its development in Germany and 
its role in the formation of "nation," as adjudicator and guardian of "national 
culture," and of the way in which that role has been rendered antique because 
of the recent commercialization of academic culture (the "culture of 
excellence"). 
26 The role of "nation building"-and too often war preparation-became a central 
mandate of educational institutions in the twentieth century-not only through 
the development and dissemination of "nationalized" literature, but through 
history, social studies and civics. At the same time, warfare became 
academically regulated (educationalized). 
27 This discovery of cynical perception (of the understanding that 
language/imagery is political, partial and contingent), or put the other way, the 
transparency of naive perception has been theorized as a "crisis of 
representation, a crisis being the point of epistemological break down. It is 
described by Jameson (1984, viii) in his introduction to Lyotard's The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Stating that the crisis is 
usually perceived as an "aesthetic one, although it has relatively immediate 
philosophical and ideological analogues," Jameson writes, "I am referring to the 
so-called crisis of representation, in which an essentially realistic epistemology, 
which conceives of representation as the reproduction for subjectivity, of an 
objectivity that lies outside it-projects a mirror theory of knowledge and art, 
whose fundamental evaluative categories are those of adequacy, accuracy, and 
Truth itself." 
The crisis, in turn, has been constituted and reconstituted, this particular 
"genealogy of the text" common to Foucault, Barthes, Derrida, Lyotard and 
Baudrillard. Foucault (1970, 305-307) locates its inception in the Nietzschean 
question (qui parle?), saying the question itself was "made possible by the fact 
that, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the law of discourse having 
become detached from representation, the being of language itself became, as 
it were, fragmented." 
28 The term Kulturkampf dates to 1873; it was in large a battle between 
Protestant modernists and Catholic conservatives. Bismarck's Minister of 
Culture (Education) Adalbert von Falk carried Kulturkampf into East Prussia in 
an effort to force state schooling and secularism on the indigenous Catholic 
population. The "culture war" ended in failure; however Roman Catholic control 
of the school system was much reduced, the religiously oriented curriculum 
replaced by a secular, nationalist curriculum that emphasized the study of "new 
subjects" such as German literature and history. State control over education 
resulted (the Jesuit order in Germany was dissolved during the battle and civil 
marriages instituted). 
~ 
29 A hundred earlier the territory that formed the German nation-state in 1871 
had been comprised of some thousand separate principalities, which Napoleon 
during the French military occupation of the German states (1807-1814) had 
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amalgamated into thirty or so. Bismarck, through the Ems telegram (and the 
resulting war of 1870), completed (Austria excepted) the nation-state building 
ironically begun by Napoleon. 
30 The formation of U.S. Land Grant Colleges offers an exemplar. The U.S. during 
that country's Civil War established a federal system for education/training in 
three mandated areas, agricultural, mechanical and military (the Morrill 
Agricultural College Act of 1862). While military training has not entered the 
educational lexicon (that would give us Texas A,M & M), this vast college 
system has proven effective in providing "blended training," even credited by 
some theorists with allowing the U.S. to transition to a "knowledge economy." 
It has proven adaptable in adjusting to various forms of agriculture, industry 
and warfare, including the current adjustment to the establishment of select 
rather than mass recruitment for military officers (the number of military 
officers trained in the U.S. college and university system during WWII is 
staggering). 
Though not mentioning Land Grant colleges specifically, Porter (1994, 261-62) 
outlines the way in which war imperatives in the early 1860s proved formative 
of the national institutional fabric of the U.S.: 
In addition to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the war saw the founding of 
the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of Immigration, and the 
National; Academy of Sciences, founded in 1863 in the hope of harnessing 
science to the war effort. An activist Congress passed the Homestead Act of 
1862, and the Immigration Act of 1864; it also established the Union Pacific 
and Central Pacific Railroad companies as federally chartered corporations. 
All these measures had some link to the war effort. 
This same process occurred in Canada during World War I. The reader may 
know that income tax was introduced during World War I in Canada and the 
U.S. as a temporary measure. This "war measure" provided the means for the 
development of regulatory welfare state until recently. 
31 Work critical of statist education in the U.S. most often has been written by 
social conservatives, elitist and populist. Notable are conservatives E.D. Hirsch 
and Harold Bloom and notable populist critics Sheldon Richman and John Taylor 
Gatto. 
32 The recently produced "Koret Report," (2003) Our Schools and Our Future: Are 
We Still at Risk? examines the progress made since the original SCANS report 
was produced. The report originates with two privately funded organizations, 
the Hoover Institution of Stanford University and the San Francisco-based Koret 
Foundation. It concludes that there has been little improvement in U.S. schools 
because of the blockage of reform by U.S. teachers' unions. 
33 Here is a partial listing of U.S. "reform documents" dating to the same era 
(National University, n.d.): 
A Nation at Risk, The National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983. 
High School, The Cafnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1983. 
Action for Excellence, Education Commission of the States, 1983. 
Making the Grade, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1983. 
184 
Educating Americans for the 21st Century, A Report to the American People and 
the National Science Board, The National Science Board Commission on 
Precollege Education in Mathematics, Science, and Technology, 1983. 
Who Will Teach Our Children?, California Commission on the Teaching 
Profession, 1985 
A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century, Carnegie Forum on 
Education and the Economy, 1986. 
Time for Results? The Governors' 1991 Report on Education, National 
Governors' Association Center for Policy Research and Analysis, 1986. 
First Lessons, William J. Bennett, U.S. Secretary of Education, 1987. 
Caught in the Middle, California State Department of Education, 1987. 
Agenda for the Twenty First Century: A Blueprint for Education, California State 
Department of Education, 1987. 
34 Ironically, the educative system being set in place now resembles ecumenical 
Roman Catholic education before the Protestant revolution. A new capitalist 
digitized ecumenical education system is displacing the parochial textual 
(bookish) system that dates to Luther. 
35 Weber's (1978, 21) "ideal type" is an abstraction, a useful heuristic device. He 
explains: 
The more sharply and precisely the ideal type has been constructed, thus 
the more abstract and unrealistic in this it is, the better able it is to perform 
its functions in formulating terminology, classifications and hypotheses. 
This Weberian concept underlies the author's use of terms such as subjectivity 
and posthuman. They too are meant as heuristics devices, ways to formulate 
terminology, classifications and hypotheses. Following this method, the author 
elsewhere has divided modern subjectivity in three ideal types: the 
preindustrial, industrial and postindustrial. Those classifications provide a 
background for this work. 
The work does not draw on Weber's "rationalization thesis" whereby the 
process of rationalization itself leads inexorable to the human existing in "steel 
cage of bureaucracy." The work reads rationalization as itself symptomatic of 
the social practices of war and capitalism, as growing out of those practices 
rather than those practices being emblematic of "rationalization." 
36 The contemporary military, industrial education complex is evident in Joyce 
Lynn's article titled Control, fear, and the New World Order, Part 1: Carnegie 
Mellon University and the Federalization of Academia (Online Journal, Feb. 6, 
2003) writes: 
... within the first five months of 2002, Carnegie Mellon received a huge 
NASA research grant, a $750,000 Centers for Disease Control grant, and, in 
June, G.W. Bush named the Carnegie Mellon president to a Homeland 
0 Security post. 
On February 5, 2002, NASA's Ames Research Center at Moffett Field, 
California, in the Silicon Valley, awarded Carnegie Mellon's School of 
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Computer Science a five-year, $23 million research grant to measure and 
improve the dependability of NASA's systems. 
Last July, the National Robotics Engineering Consortium (NREC), part of the 
Robotics Institute in the School of Computer Science, announced a $5.5 
million, 18-month "award" from the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) to build and test a prototype robotic unmanned all-terrain 
combat vehicle. NREC researchers have been working with subcontractors 
Boeing Co. (Chicago), PEI Electronics (Huntsville, Alabama) and Timoney 
Technology (Meath, Ireland) for a year and a half to develop the crewless 
vehicle. 
The statement of PEI president and CEO Tom Keenan makes clear the tilt 
toward the business of war. Carnegie Mellon's press release quotes Keenan 
as saying this project will "enhance the effectiveness of tomorrow's war 
fighter. We ... stand ready to successfully meet the challenges associated 
with the future battle space." 
Last fall, Carnegie Mellon announced the creation of the Center for 
Computer and Communications Security (C3S) and a $35.5 million five-year 
grant .... Again, the Carnegie Mellon press release tells the story: This 
grant will create "a new network security paradigm to tackle the challenges 
related to Internet security, data storage, and privacy issues stemming from 
America's ongoing war against terrorism." Pradeep Khosla, head of the 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Department and the new C3S, is cited 
as saying the crucial role that information technology plays in warfare and 
homeland security inspired Carnegie Mellon to create the new center. 
The National Security Agency, one the nation's intelligence cops, has 
approved the Carnegie Mellon institute that will manage a graduate degree 
program in information security as part of the grant. 
Joyce concludes, saying, "The tentacles of military federalization-as the 
Carnegie Mellon grants show-reach far and wide." Other examples she 
provides concern other prestigious academic institutions, including Ohio 
State University, M.I.T. and Harvard University. 
CHAPTER 5: 
POSTINDUSTRIAL LEARNING 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the "weaponization of education and knowledge," 
providing four exemplars of the process. This examination leads to the 
conclusion that the complex of educational and research institutions that 
comprise the contemporary academy is arguably the greatest war weapon 
ever invented. 
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Highlighting ways in which education from its inception in Ancient Greece has 
demonstrably intimate connections to warfare, that education is warfare in 
ways that have been left inarticulate, the author asks if education as warfare 
is a permanent condition. A brief history of education as war is developed, 
demonstrating ways in which contemporary education is as formatively 
influenced by war as by the state and capitalism. 
Weapon ization 
If the reader remembers, Michael Mann (1988, 148) refers to a "pacific 
transnational sociology" being enshrined in pedagogy (see Chapter 1). 
Hacker and Hacker (1987, 744-745) are quoted in that same section: "That 
war often promotes technological change has become something of a truism 
since the Industrial Revolution allowed ideas to become weapons swiftly 
enough to reshape the reshape the war in progress-when, of course, money 
flows most freely." 
These statements contain the two elements this work has been addressing, 
the formative influence of warfare on education and the socius more 
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generally, and the way in which this connection has been ignored by the 
AngloAmerican academy, most especially in the field of education. These 
observations hold once again regarding the connection between 
postindustrialism and education. Peter Drucker, a "business" theorist and 
one of the many thousands of emigre scholars driven from Europe because of 
Nazism, was the first theorist to identify the phenomena that later came to 
be characterized as "postindustrialism" or the "information age" and its 
dependence upon education. 1 
In Landmarks of Tomorrow (1957, 123-124), Drucker articulated what he 
termed The Educated Society and The Educational Revolution: "The higher 
education of a country controls its military, its technological and it economic 
potential. In an age of superpowers and absolute weapons, higher education 
may indeed be the only area in which a country can still be ahead, can still 
gain decisive advantage." 
The greatest impact of the educational revolution is therefore on international 
power and politics. It has made the supply of highly educated people a 
decisive factor in the competition between powers-for leadership and 
perhaps even for survival. The conclusion from this is as simple as it is new: 
Educational development becomes a priority of national policy [in original]. 
Nothing so much plays out Weber's (1968, 225) assertion regarding 
Gesellschaft societies, "this means fundamentally domination through 
knowledge." Yet, the strategic value of constant knowledge production was 
known since the nineteenth century. As this work has argued, knowledge 
production and knowledge delivery had been weaponized at the same as it 
was nationalized and industrialized. The results were evident in the War of 
1870 (and the U.S. Civi~ War). It was as early as that the conditions for 
postindustrial ism began to become evident. As Beniger said: 
"Microprocessor and computer technologies, contrary to currently fashionable 
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opinion, are not new forces only recently unleashed upon an unprepared 
society, but merely the latest installment in the continuing development of 
the Control Revolution." He traces these forces to a period stretching from 
1870 to 1910. 
Four of the enabling technologies of postindustrial education are now 
examined as paradigmatic exemplars; all are rooted in the nineteenth 
century. Organic chemistry laid the groundwork for late twentieth century 
work in the development of polymer plastics, which contributed to the 
formation of the "information age" as much as the development of small 
scale electrical circuitry. Computers are an obvious enabler. Instructional 
technology and educational psychology may be less obvious. As for 
"propaganda" as an enabling technology (regulative technology), for one it 
appeared formatively in the way Bismarck created his casus be/Ii. Each of 
these technologies, including the theoretical regulative technology termed 
"psychology," was weaponized shortly after its academic inception or from 
the very beginning. 
Organic Chemistry 
The enhanced power of the academy in the form of the disciplinary industrial 
research university was first evident in Germany, where chemists working in 
research universities developed the science of organic chemistry, though first 
for industrial reasons (artificial dyes), then for war reasons (munitions), this 
unlike the development of computer science, systems theory or 
communications, which from the 1940s to the 1970s, were developed first 
and foremost as functions of war. However, organic chemistry, as much as 
computer science, laid the basis for contemporary warfare. Tracing the 
development of organic~chemistry may be instructive in as much as it 
demonstrates the way in which the research university, even when ostensibly 
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fulfilling a dual mission of Bi/dung and material power, lent itself to war right 
from the start. 
Organic chemistry, when first developed, concerned the expansion of the 
material applications of coal, especially as related to the production of aniline 
(organically synthesized) dyes. The knowledge that concerned using coal 
dye, ironically, had been invented in England originally, but that nation, 
either because there was no understanding of the implications of the 
knowledge or simply because of narrow commercial concern, allowed German 
companies to use the technology, which then led to the development of 
synthetic polymers in German research institutes (e.g. synthetic rubber, 
gasoline, plastics). 
This academic knowledge formed the technological basis for the German 
military and industrial penetration of the globe after the Franco-Prussian 
War. From this point in the late nineteenth century, academic knowledge 
development unilaterally grounded the institution of empire anywhere in the 
world. Armies and diplomats, teachers and advisors, industrialists and 
generals, became functions of the state of knowledge-of the technologies 
they employed for global conquest. Thus the constant development of new 
knowledge, as evidenced in the battleship race between the British and 
German Empires, assumed primary importance industrially and militarily (this 
included, of course, the development of a range of strategic materials 
including techniques of hygiene and medicines [e.g. sulfa drugs]). 
As Germany held large accessible coal deposits within its territories, making 
more of coal benefited the German Empire immeasurably. These particular 
scientific developments were one of the primary means by which German 
military, industrial and fJnancial power was developed, and the means by 
which Germany attracted crucial U.S. investment after World War I and 
subsequently redeveloped its war-making capacity after the Nazis took power 
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(see Salusy, 1947, I.G. Farben). Interestingly, after World War II, the 
German chemical cartel LG. Farben, which controlled much of the world 
knowledge about synthetic polymers, was broken into three transnationals, 
Bayer, Hoechst and BASF. Its U.S. assets, which had been seized by the 
U.S. federal government during WWII, were sold by public auction in 1965 
when Robert Kennedy was the U.S. Attorney General responsible. Today, 
this reconfigured corporate entity maintains, in conjunction with U.S. and 
Swiss firms, its global reach and power. 
Yet, organic chemistry was not a form of militarized academic knowledge 
from the outset; it was adapted to war after its invention, as were certain 
forms of mathematics in the United States and Great Britain, and, of course, 
physics. However, that production sequence, whereby academic "civil 
knowledge" was adapted to military use after its initial production, was 
inverted during the twentieth century. Beginning with World War I, 
knowledge that was militarized in its inception was then adapted to the "civil 
economy." Such, of course, was the case with the "information age," the 
contemporary electronic systems for communications (Dizard, 1997; Hables 
Gray, 1997; Hayles, 1999).2 
Propaganda 
The development of "propaganda"-a new form of academic knowledge that 
provided the basis for "advertising" after World War I (its civil application) 
provides a particularly instructive instance (Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999). 
Delwiche: 3 
The absence of public unity was a primary concern when America entered the 
war on April 6, 1917. In Washington, unwavering public support was 
~ 
considered to be crucial to the entire wartime effort. On April 13, 1917, 
Wilson created the Committee on Public Information (CPI) to promote the 
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war domestically while publicizing American war aims abroad. Under the 
leadership of a muckraking journalist named George Creel, the CPI recruited 
heavily from business, media, academia, and the art world. The CPI blended 
advertising techniques with a sophisticated understanding of human 
psychology, and its efforts represent the first time that a modern 
government disseminated propaganda on such a large scale. It is fascinating 
that this phenomenon, often linked with totalitarian regimes, emerged in a 
democratic state. 
With the recent work on warfare, the role of "liberal" U.S. governments in 
constructing contemporary forms of warfare has received much more 
attention (see Chapter 1). After the war, the applied science originally 
developed for martial application was used extensively in the civil economy. 
Edward Bernays, the so-called father of advertising, exposed the martial 
roots of the field of "public relations" and of many commercial advertising 
techniques in his book Propaganda (1928). This war weapon is, of course, 
still employed with great intensity. 
When the technologies of human perceptual formation naively called 
propaganda (perceptual pedagogy) are combined with the technologies of 
lifelong learning (perpetual pedagogy, McLaren and Porter, 1992), both 
postindustria/ism and the mass learning systems integral to it can be viewed 
as byproducts of war and militarism. This "learning machine" is so vast and 
important that without it, neither contemporary society nor contemporary 
warfare could exist. Both are functions of education as it is currently 
configured, the systemic and systematic production of specific forms of 
subjectivity and knowledge according to the requirements of the constantly 
revised material systems for knowledge and war production continually 
0 
rolling out of academic universities and foundations (new generations of 
weapons, new learning systems, etc.) 
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However, to suggest that academic martial inventions and their mass 
application did not engender academic resistance would be to misstate the 
case. For example, the noted U.S. philosopher and educationist John Dewey 
spoke out against the constant peacetime use of propaganda by the state 
and private sector after the First World War. Though Dewey joined with the 
U.S. ruling class in promoting World War I, after that war he became a 
"people's champion," warning of the dangers of propaganda and arguing that 
citizens should be taught the methods of propaganda so that they could 
defend themselves against this form of psychic warfare (Gary, 1991, 17). 
Thereby Dewey came to oppose many with whom he had agreed earlier in 
that his definition of democracy went beyond that of the "liberal realists" 
(e.g. Walter Lippmann, E.L. Bernays, Harold Lasswell) who viewed 
democracy as a formality to be respected even while substantive decisions 
were made by an elite behind closed doors (Gary, 1991).4 
Such elitist (liberal) resistance to the widespread civil use of propaganda 
outside periods of overt warfare led to the establishment of the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis in the U.S. That institute produced The Fine Art of 
Propaganda (1939), still the basic text to understand the perception-forming 
techniques now ubiquitous. However, by the time academic war inventions, 
whether of "information bombs" (Virilio, 2000) or nuclear weapons (e.g. 
hydrogen bomb), the inventions always already had irrevocably altered the 
conditions of quotidian existence. 
Educational Psychology and Instructional Technology 
Experimental psychology, unlike contemporary instructional technology, 
educational technology and educational psychology (the three are highly 
interrelated), was not a,function of military research and development. It 
was developed initially by Wilhelm Wundt and William James. When 
experimental psychology was applied to education, the sub-field of 
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educational psychology resulted. This "psychologization of education," like 
the initial industrialization and nationalization of education, is closely tied to 
the nineteenth century Germanification of education, especially the influence 
of the German academy in the U.S. (the state which superceded Germany in 
providing a global educational template). 
Experimental psychology was first established in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt 
(1832-1920). He established the first "psychological testing laboratory" in 
1875. His influence was so great that he is credited with moving the 
academic study termed "psychology" from the auspices of philosophy to 
those of the sciences (Wundt theorized apperception, an educational staple). 
Wundt's scientific work, like Hegel's statist philosophy, proved remarkably 
influential, especially in the U.S. Lionni, in The Leipzig Connection, (1993, 
14) traces Wundt's influence: 
The first of Wundt's American students to return to the United States 
was G. Stanley Hall. Returning from Leipzig in 1883, he joined the 
faculty of Baltimore's new Johns Hopkins University, which was being 
established after the model of the great German universities. Hall 
organized the psychology laboratory ... and, in 1887, established the 
American Journal of Psychology ... In 1892 he played a leading role 
in founding the American Psychological Association .... Hall was also 
instrumental in furthering the career of a man who was to have an 
unusually profound effect on the course of American education: John 
Dewey. 
Dewey published Psychology, the first American textbook on the 
revised subject. He taught at the universities of Michigan and 
Minnesota. In 1895 he was invited to join the faculty of the 
Rockefeller-endowed University of Chicago as head of the departments 
of philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy (teaching). 
Lionni goes on to trace the way in which educational psychology came to 
permeate the social practice of education through the influence of 
"progressivism," that confluence of nation-ism, statism and scientism. He 
attributes a generative role to Teacher's College (Columbia University) as the 
institution responsible for the establishment of scientistic progressivism 
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including "social efficiency" in the U.S. (and through Kirkpatrick in Canada). 
There, is, of course, much more to it than this, for one the influence of the 
work of William James. However, the point is that educational psychology 
had entered the lexicon and practice of education; it was another of the 
nineteenth century rationalization processes. The First World War provided 
educational psychology a major impetus. From The Classroom Arsenal 
(Noble, 1991, 24): 
the intelligence testing movement had its original impetus from the 
alpha and beta testing of American soldiers during World War I .... 
Although, in Gould's hindsight account [Stephen J. Gould, 1981], the 
alpha and beta testing represented a travesty of scientific experiment, 
a gross 'mismeasure of man', nonetheless the legitimation sought by 
its exponents was won; Gould traces the postwar influence of the 
testing movements on educators and the public schools. 
Noble (24-26) traces the influence of World War II and the subsequent U.S. 
government funding of experimental psychology. He notes the key role 
played by Robert Gagne and Robert Glaser in promoting military technologies 
in public education (i.e. learning theory, instructional design). Noble (25) 
comments: "military influence on education has become invisible to most 
observers, who are content to trace educational programs and technologies 
to 'educational psychology'." This sentiment is expressed as well by 
Jonassen (1996, 58-59): 
The influence of the behavioral theory on instructional design can be 
traced from writings by Dewey, Thorndike, and, of course, B.F. 
Skinner. In addition, during World War II, military trainers (and 
psychologists) stated learning outcomes in terms of "performance" and 
found the need to identify specific "tasks" for a specific job (Gropper, 
1983). Based on training in the military during the Second World War, 
a commitment to achieve practice and reinforcement became major 
components to the behaviorist-developed instructional design model 
(as well as other nonbehavioristic models). 
All three areas-educational technology, instructional technology (design, 
programming) and educational psychology are so tightly related as to make 
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them almost inseparable. For example, programmed instruction was based in 
educational psychology (learning theory) combined with educational 
technology developed during World War II by the U.S. military (e.g. the use 
of films in classrooms, the layout for textbooks, extensive of graphs and 
charts, instructional design). 
Again, from Jonassen's (1996, 26) brief intellectual history of the influence of 
war and militarism on education: 
specific military discourses entered the field at this point in time 
(World War II) and helped shape educational technology in the 
academy. Both psychological and military discourses are evident in 
the WWII research texts. Furthermore, we believe that the juncture of 
behaviorism {this time, operant conditioning, not connectionism) and 
military pedagogy was fortuitous {a marriage made in heaven), and 
together they formed a solid theoretical base for the field. The way 
knowledge was structured in operant conditioning and military 
pedagogy was quite similar. 
This "marriage made in heaven" has only strengthened, however, with recent 
distinct differences. The "blending" evidenced now, the "man-machine" 
interface, the privatization of public goods (state violence, see below), the 
postindustrialization of education (computer based education)-the 
postindustrial economy itself is evidenced again by the pioneering efforts of 
the U.S. military. Addressing the "engineering of education," Noble (1991, 
26) concludes: 
Training specialists, educational technologists and education 
psychologists have not been the only ones whose military endeavours 
have shaped and colored educational research. In military research on 
new weapons systems, psychologists and engineers are increasingly 
viewed as working on two complementary components of the same 
man machine system. Training, too, and the research and design of 
training systems, are also being perceived of as engineering 
disciplines. 
This engineering work (see D.A.R.P.A below as well) is leading to existence 
as Baudrillard understood it. The digital and real are being fused to present 
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as "hyperreality," a totally blended operating system functioning in a "totally 
blended" environment. In All but War is Simulation: The Military 
Entertainment Complex (2000), Lenoir documents the military development 
of "man-machine" systems. He says, "I have also found that in they course 
of the development [machine-"man" blending] a fusion of the digital and the 
real has taken place, and with it the disappearance of the boundary between 
reality and fantasy." The present as the "postrealist" novelists and French 
"bimodernists" had it. Military educational work (and I'm sure the reader will 
agree that the term "training" does not do it justice), like the running of the 
military itself, is being "farmed out" (Burton Rose and Madsen, 1999). From 
The Chronicle of Higher Education (November 17, 2000), Colleges and 
Companies Team Up to Vie for Role in Army Program: 
Companies that have announced plans to compete for the [$600M 
elearning] contract include International Business Machines, NCS 
Pearson (a division of the giant publishing company), and the 
consulting and technology-outsourcing companies 
PricewaterhouseCoopers [now IBM Consulting], Arthur Andersen [now 
Accenture], Computer Sciences Corporation, Electronic Data Systems, 
and Science Applications International Corporation .... 
Some teams include hundreds of academic institutions, of various 
types. I.B.M.'s team, for example, includes Georgia Virtual Technical 
College, the Historically Black Colleges and Universities/Minority 
Institutions Research Alliance, Texas A&M University at Kingsville, 
University of Maryland University College, and the University of 
Oklahoma. 
In July, Army officials announced that they would spend more than 
$600-million over the next six years on the new program. Last month 
they issued a request for proposals asking for companies and consortia 
to respond with plans outlining how to begin and manage the program. 
Military and college officials have compared the initiative to the G.I. 
Bill of Rights in terms of its magnitude and its impact on both soldiers 
and higher education. 
0 
The Chronicle (Army Picks Consulting Group to Run Distance-Education 
Effort, January 5, 2001) reports that the PriceWaterhouseCoopers (IBM 
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Consulting) "will lead a $453 million project to deliver distance education to 
soldiers all over the world." 
The Chronicle (Navy Picks Institutions for Online-Learning Effort, November 
17, 2000) also documented a U.S. Navy initiative: 
The U.S. Navy has struck deals with 16 colleges to offer distance-
learning degrees for sailors through a program that will begin on a 
pilot basis this January. The program will likely be expanded to include 
additional colleges within the next few years. 
Mr. Danzig [secretary of the Navy] says all of the participating colleges 
will be offering full degree programs approved by the Navy, rather 
than individual courses. Navy officials formed the partnerships to help 
with sailor recruitment and retention, he adds. 
Unlike a distance-learning initiative announced this summer by the 
U.S. Army, the Navy's program does not involve the awarding of a 
contract to a single institution or consortium that would coordinate the 
project and receive a lump sum of money. The Navy will work directly 
with colleges, and will promote the colleges' degree programs to 
interested sailors .... 
Susan Woodward, one of the Navy commanders who helped develop 
the program, says the partnership approach "allows greater flexibility, 
as well as a more open approach to generating ideas." "These 16 new 
partnerships are the first step in providing sailors with opportunities to 
complete distance-learning degrees, she says. "The Navy will seek 
additional education partnerships in the spring of 2001." 
Mr. Danzig says a key criterion in selecting the initial colleges was 
"their experience in distance learning." ... The other institutions 
working with the Navy on the project are: City University, in Renton, 
Wash.; Coastline Community College, in Fountain Valley, Calif.; 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, in Daytona Beach, Fla.; Empire 
State University, in Saratoga Springs, N.Y.; Florida Community College 
at Jacksonville; Florida State University, in Tallahassee; Fort Hays 
State University, in Hays, Kan.; Old Dominion University, in Norfolk, 
Va.; Rogers State University, in Claremore, Okla.; Thomas Edison 
State College, in Trenton, N.J.; Troy State University, in Alabama; and 
Vincennes University, in Indiana. 
What is on offer here is the "civilianization of the military," with military 
personnel encouraged to access a host of undergraduate programs from a 
variety of suppliers. As well, this military "contracting out" evidences the 
continuing privatization of the public sector. Again, postindustrialism 
presents as "totally blended," a 
postmilitary/industrial/educational/entertainment complex. 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
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The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the academic 
research coordination agency of the U.S. Department of Defense was 
established in 1958 in response to the "sputnik emergency." DARPA, which 
maintained as remarkably low profile until recently, is the exemplar par 
excellence of the "total influence" of the "military-industrial-university 
complex" on every aspect of contemporary existence. 
The pivotal role of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in 
building the enabling technologies of postindustrialism is documented in 
some detail in U.S. National Science Foundation Report, Funding a 
Revolution: Government Support for Computing Research (1999). As with 
Hughes (1998) in Rescuing Prometheus, this report documents the central 
role of DARPA in developing the telecommunications systems and computing 
infrastructure that allowed for the information economy (postindustrialism) 
and the systems theory and artificial intelligence models that allowed for 
research of a large scale and complexity to be carried out and managed. 
Simply, this obscure U.S. government agency managed the production of 
contemporary postindustrial existence. Life as we know it (the "information 
age"), without exaggeration, is an offshoot of post World War II U.S. war 
weapons research and development. From DARPA publicity materials: 5 
The Defense Advanted Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was 
established in 1958 as the first U.S. response to the Soviet launching 
of Sputnik. Since that time DARPA's mission has been to assure that 
the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology for 
military capabilities and to prevent technological surprise from her 
adversaries. 
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The success of the agency in developing an array of technologies for the 
purposes of warfare-or simply for absorbing capital to forestall and deflect 
various crises of capital overaccumulation is available in a 1997 DARPA 
report titled Technology Transition. 6 The role of the agency is outlined: 
DARPA began to invest in information technology nearly thirty-five 
years ago. The period since then has seen significant changes in the 
field unlike any in the history of technology. In 1962 computers were 
scarce and expensive. Mainframes, the only available computers, 
were accessible to a few individuals who had direct access to a 
computation center. There was no field of computer science nor any 
computer science departments in our universities. There were no 
computer networks ... Today, only thirty-five years later, the Internet 
links tens of millions of users across the world. Real-time digital 
communications systems link individual war fighters and weapon 
systems on the battlefield to their commanders and on to the National 
Command Authority. Nearly every office worker has a computer on his 
or her desk, usually linked to a network. Weapon systems such as the 
F-22 will have millions of lines of software to control the aircraft, its 
avionics, and weapon systems. The peak processing power of leading-
edge computers has increased by 6,000,000 times. DARPA, more than 
any other government agency or any single corporation, has been 
responsible for this revolution. 
Yet, that statement, as the full report attests, is much too modest-for not 
only was DARPA "more than any other agency governmental agency 
responsible" for the "computer revolution," DARPA's role in fueling the 
information revolution in its entirety has been pervasive and enduring. 
DARPA has been credited with "between a third and a half of all the major 
innovations in computer science and technology (What Will Be, by Michael 
Dertouzos, Harper Collins, 1997)." 
This work was based in one funding source, the U.S. government funding of 
university research (Hughes, 1998, 3; U.S. National Science Foundation 
Report (1999), Funding a Revolution: Government Support for Computing 
Research). In Hughes' phrase, DARPA is the "military-industrial-university 
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complex." While these reports document the reach of U.S. Department of 
Defense spending, their understanding of the implications is limited to 
addressing the development of the enabling technologies for the "information 
revolution." The qualitative impact of this spending upon quotidian 
existence, and the social implications of a "permanent arms economy," are 
not examined. 
However, research programs falling under DARPA's auspices that have been 
initiated since the September 2002 attacks on New York and Washington 
may have an even greater effect on quotidian existence-for they are being 
designed to function in the quotidian environment, in our everyday lives that 
are now the battlefield in the new war on terrorism (World War IV). Two of 
the literally hundreds of research programs currently being conducted by 
DARPA will be used as exemplars. 
The first is the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program, one of thirteen 
current research projects of the Information Awareness Office. 7 It should be 
noted that the implementation of all the aspects the TIA program has run 
into resistance in the U.S. Congress. To summarize: 
The Total Information Awareness {TIA) program is a FY02 new-start 
program. The goal of the Total Information Awareness {TIA) program 
is to revolutionize the ability of the United States to detect, classify 
and identify foreign terrorists-and decipher their plans-and thereby 
enable the U.S. to take timely action to successfully preempt and 
defeat terrorist acts. 
This total surveillance system is based in accesing and reading the everyday 
environment, reading the mass conglomerate of all human activity in real-
time, according to various sets of "critical indicators." The Information Office 
Vision mission statement outlines the means for this detailed monitoring: 
~ 
To effectively and efficiently carry this out [identifying terrorism], we 
must promote sharing, collaborating and reasoning to convert 
nebulous data to knowledge and actionable options [italics added]. 
IAO will accomplish this by pursuing the development of technologies, 
components, and applications to produce a proto-type system. 
Example technologies include: 
Collaboration and sharing over TCP/IP networks across agency 
boundaries 
Large, distributed repositories with dynamic schemas that can be 
changed interactively by users 
Foreign language machine translation and speech recognition 
Biometric signatures of humans 
Real time learning, pattern matching and anomalous pattern detection 
Entity extraction from natural language text 
Human network analysis and behavior model building engines 
Event prediction and capability development model building engines 
Structured argumentation and evidential reasoning Story telling, 
change detection, and truth maintenance 
Business rules sub-systems for access control and process 
management 
Biologically inspired algorithms for agent control 
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In essence, what is happening through DARPA is the electronic machination 
of functions that historically comprised Education-defined liberally or 
functionally, as expert knowledge, rational judgment or critical thinking. Of 
necessity and by definition, these functions-the function of thinking-until 
recently were conducted by humans. In this instance and in many others, 
post-realist narrative has proven to be more reflective of actually existing 
material conditions than supposed reality ostensibly accessible only 
empirically. Indeed, this futuristic scenario, even if not realized in full by 
DARPA provides a constitution for postindustrial learning, a statement of 
education and its purposes in the age of terror as defined by the U.S. 
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Language as indeterminate grounds these systems, truth is rendered an 
effect/affect, reality comes out as a function of "evidential reasoning," total 
memory is machined in vast databases, information sharing is seamless, 
rendering human memory even more redundant than it was in oral culture 
after the invention of writing. Performativity is evidenced as the ultimate 
social ethic, a peace more terrifying than war, biologically inspired algorithms 
(real life simulations) provide for human systems control. 
This reterritorialization, this electronic enclosure movement of the twenty-
first century, even if this particular DARPA scheme doesn't work, empirically 
corroborates the theory of the "bimodernists"-Derrida, Deleuze, Baudrillard, 
Guatarri, Lyotard, Foucault. The slippery signifier reigns, the signified gone 
missing, the virtual is the real and the real a place of nostalgia. With 
education gone virtual-and indeed this is the case-the university and the 
school, those proud institutions of modernity, have been transformed, 
emerging into the twentieth first century as postindustrial Learning 
Institutions concerned less and less with Knowledge. 
Education as Warfare: A Permanent Condition? 
This work has argued that war has been socially formative from "pre-
history," throughout "history" and until now. The work argued that the 
influence of war did not diminish as civilization developed and Western 
culture flourished, but that, contrary to the "peaceable thesis," the influence 
of war increased, especially its influence on the quotidian. It has argued that 
industrialization exacerbated rather than mitigated the European 
militarization of existence-in spite of the history, philosophy and theory 
developed in Anglophonic jurisdictions in the nineteenth and twentieth 
0 
centuries that reflected the opposite. 
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The argument put forward purported that the collusion of industrialism, the 
state, education, capitalism and war led to quantity become quality, saw to a 
dialectical inversion whereby, in the twentieth century, war became peace 
and peace became war. Following Jameson (2002, 89-90), the work posited 
a dialectic whereby leaps from quantity to quality posited new types of 
differentiation, in Protestant Germany, during the onset of industrialism in 
North America and Europe, and, again, following World War II. 
The work posited that knowledge dissemination and knowledge production 
became more socially significant with each transformation until, at the end of 
the twentieth century those processes themselves-and the subjectivity they 
produced-provided the basis for war and the economy. Indeed these 
processes themselves had been turned into primary economic and war 
weapons. 
If any moral is to be taken from the story, it is that technologies will be used 
if they are developed, even if only as "deterrence." On this view, war has 
been "bred in the bone" of civilization, and commitment to it has been 
constant in spite of all oppositional rhetoric. At the same time, as Deleuze 
and Guatarri taught, the "war machine" can be opposed by the development 
of another "war machine," one, or so this author posits, whose "lines of 
flight" allow release from the "philosophy of state," from the logos, from 
representational thinking (that may well be happening). A "war machine" 
such as this would mean discarding Education as we know it (that may be 
happening too). For today education is overcoded, the transcendental 
signified of modernity. Yet maintaining logocentrism (philosophy, 
metaphysics) in all likelihood means maintaining warfare and its control of 
the socius. 
Education and knowledge has been grounded in warfare from the beginning. 
The Homeric myths (c.8th. C. BC), those great truths of Western civilization, 
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were tales of warfare that still ground the cultural imaginary. Herodotus 
(c.484-425 B.C.E.) was not only the first "travel writer," but the "father of 
history" (Cicero) because of his textual (written) access to the Ancient world, 
most especially his histories of the wars between the Greeks and barbarians 
(Persia). His successor Thycidides (460-395 B.C.E.) was not only the 
Western world's first realist historian and historian of record for the 
Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 B.C.E), but also the first great theorist of war. 
Interested not only in realistically chronicling what he observed, Thycidides 
was concerned as well with the causes of the Wars. 
For generations, Thycidides' history was considered the foundation of a 
proper (classical) education, and no doubt, some still consider it so. His 
chronicles and speculations formed the primary model for the study of the 
past in the Western academy, and proffered the binary model for historical 
change that is still on offer in "history" and most any other academic 
discipline framed by the conventions of mechanical (meaningful, linear) 
historical movement. 
Plato (427-347 B.C.E.) wrote The Republic, one of the founding documents of 
educative discourse, in part at least in response to the defeat of the Athenian 
empire by Spartan warriors, who, or so the myth has it, prevailed over their 
archrival Athens because the Spartan fighters had been subject to rigorous 
physical training, good leadership and exemplary mental modeling. His most 
beautiful treatise is still employed as an ideological apology for the use of 
education in the service of select forms of power. 
However, at the same time, Thycidides' history of the wars complicates any 
straightforward dichotomous narrative whereby history breaks down as a 
Manichean struggle. Hi'S "realism" has been used to temper aggressive 
governance for centuries. Thycidides' commentary on the political 
considerations that governed the Athenian ruler Pericles unsuccessful naval 
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strategy for the defence-and aggrandizement-of the Athenian empire have 
stood for millennia as a warning against unwonted ambition. 
The Athenian war leader Pericles, who died in a war-related plague which 
destroyed more than a quarter of the population of Athens, saw to the ruin of 
Athens, the annihilation of its navy-the ultimate source of Athenian power in 
the Ancient world-the humiliating defeat of the Athenian army, and 
ultimately, the reduction of imperial Athens to colonial status. Thycidides 
supplied us that-and with it a set of imperial guidelines that have in part 
constituted the "educated person" (the cultured, civilized person) for 
centuries. As Weber (1978, 473) so offhandedly put it: "the educated Greek 
always remained a warrior, at least in theory"-and so the theory produced 
by educated Greeks retained the warrior, at least in part. 
Thycidides' recording of Pericles' oration commemorating Peloponnesian war 
dead still provides a rhetorical model by which humans are interpellated to 
nation, empire and war. Indeed, Pericles' "funeral oration" can stand as the 
great founding document for the ideology of nation and empire. For 
example, Pericles' address provided the model for U.S. President Lincoln's 
Gettysburg Address (1863), a primary discursive foundation for the federal 
reconstitution of the U.S. and the national redevelopment of imperial U.S. 
power (cf. Wills, 1992). 
During the classical period, even Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.E.), who with Plato 
provided many of the concepts that still constitute virtuous education, 
apparently thought war entirely unexceptional: "It is therefore evident that 
the business of war is to be considered commendable, not as a final end, but 
as the means of procuring it." (Wright, 1965, 140). Clausewitz sounds like a 
latter day Aristotle in lclis formulation of modern Realpolitik as "simply the 
continuation of politics [Politik] by other means" (On War, 1832). Education, 
of course, was the conduit for the dissemination of such "pragmatic realism." 
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Aristotle was teacher to the man mythologized in the West as the world's 
greatest warrior. Fittingly, his pupil Alexander seems to express a 
supposedly modern view of the relationship between knowledge and power 
(Popovic, n.d.): 
It would appear that Alexander received from him (Aristotle) not only 
his doctrines of Morals and of Politics, but also something of those 
more abstruse and profound theories which these philosophers, by the 
very names they gave them, professed to reserve for oral 
communication to the initiated, and did not allow many to become 
acquainted with. For when he (Alexander) was in Asia, and heard 
Aristotle had published some treatises of that kind, he wrote to him, 
using very plain language to him in behalf of philosophy, the following 
letter: 
"Alexander to Aristotle, greeting. You have not done well to publish 
your books of oral doctrine; for what is there now that we excel others 
in, if those things which we have been particularly instructed in be laid 
open to all? For my part, I assure you, I had rather excel others in the 
knowledge of what is excellent, than in the extent of my power and 
dominion. Farewell." 
While Alexander's admonishment of the great Aristotle may suggest the 
profound suspicion engendered by the infusion of the technology of writing 
into oral culture, it may at the same time suggest that Alexander understood 
the strategic value of knowledge. Regardless, these men were progenitors of 
discursive fields as Foucault (1977b, 131) developed the term, as "initiators 
of discursive practices" as "they cleared a space for the introduction of 
elements other than their own within the field of discourse they initiated." 
They (the discursive structures that go by their names) provided much of the 
formative conceptual and rhetorical structure for Western education, and 
indeed much of the template for Western civilization and empire. However, 
that this template in good part was forged in war, that warfare provided a 
formative moment for founding documents of the "great Western project," 
~ 
has gone missing, or, if readily available, has been ignored almost 
completely. 
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Is not the rhetorical and conceptual structure of the West apparent when 
civil(ized) Athens confronted the barbaric Other (difference), or when 
Alexander excited the Western exoticization/eroticization of Difference-of 
Persia and the Indian sub-continent? Are not foundational hierarchical 
binaries such as good/bad, civil/barbaric, reality/appearance, even self and 
other, where the first element is regarded as superior to the second, this 
itself, as Derrida explains, a generative violence, evidenced in these 
foundational stories, in these myths (great truths) that ground the mythical 
discourse termed Western civilization? Is Western formal education at root 
not based in the binary conceptual control structure Derrida termed 
logocentrism, coming out of and concerned with ways to form and maintain 
power through the deployment of the conceptual architectures (logos) 
developed in classical Greece by figures who were themselves, in part at 
least, formed by and concerned with warfare? 
And why Aristotle? Why not others, perhaps Diogenes (4th C. B.C.E.), the 
shave-headed barrel-clad "kynic" who embodied experience (use of the 
material self as theatre) as the means to reveal truth that may have escaped 
apprehension through application of more domesticated conceptual 
structures, such as the skepticism promoted by the domesticator Socrates 
and the Sophists? (cf. Sloterjidk, 1987). Why Plato, not Epicurus (341-271 
B.C.E.), the progenitor of "the good life" elementally different from the 
triumphant classical form? 
Did Epicurus' hedonistic materialism have less to offer following generations 
than the ascetic idealism of Plato, his interpellation of the specialized citizen 
(ruling class) who could lead wisely and so deal with the threat posed by 
warfare? Why did conservative thought prevail when other thought extant 
during this generative period may have provided more discursive space for 
the possibility of less restricted human expression, even then perhaps 
education's ostensible goal? 
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And what of Aristotle's classificatory system that hived education into 
elements that privileged the theoretical over and above the practical, that 
privileged the labour of thought over and above labour of the manual sort? 
Why the elemental distinction? Cui bono? Who benefits? Was not Western 
education elementally delimited in the choice of discursive fathers, especially 
when other such fathers were readily available when the discourse was 
formed? 
Was educational design not controlled from its mythical beginnings by the 
economically and socially privileged, those mythologized citizens of the 
ancient Grecian empires, to favour select rather than inclusive forms of social 
development? Liberal ideology aside, why is it that the history of the world 
remains the history of the ruling classes after 2,000 years of Hellenic 
educational influence and development? Could it be that these ideas have 
survived the ages more because they offer an apology for elite forms of 
power-which employs warfare as a maintenance strategy-than because of 
intrinsic value? 
What became of the Epicurean aesthetic? Surely, it provides more solid 
ground for informed citizenship than Plato's educationally formed class of 
statist guardians, his philosophic placement of the socius in loco parentis. 
Did not the Epicurean Aesthetes and Decadents of the Victorian era have as 
much to tell us about our self and its formation as their contemporaries who 
are still employed pedagogically, for example Tennyson and Wordsworth? 
And why is it that Tennyson and Wordsworth are heard in Anglophonic 
~ 
classrooms extolling nation and nature, rather than their contemporaries 
Ruskin and Morris? The four were equally admired in their lifetimes, though 
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Morris, unlike Tennyson or Wordsworth, rejected the position of Poet 
Laureate. Why is the work of two theorists who pedagogically privileged the 
manual as well as the academic arts lost to contemporary mass learning 
while work that naturalizes the prevailing social "division of labour" continues 
to ground "learning systems" the world over? 
In addition, why has a polyglot education of the senses been given less social 
value than the more monolingual bodily and conceptual disciplines that 
constitute contemporary education? Could education possibly be meant to 
delimit those exposed to its strictures, to deny embodied experience and 
thereby constitute a specifically delimited subjective form? 
And why did the educational discourse formed from war and considerate of 
its preservation survive the ages when alternatives were available in the 
formative Grecian period, in the regenerative early modern period, today, 
and during the regenerative period of high European imperialism (circa 1870-
1910)? 
And, finally, what of Aristophanes, the acerbic playwright who provided a 
generative antiwar statement in his play Lysistrata? Why is his work, which 
was so critical of aggressive Athenian foreign policy, not studied instead of 
Pericles funeral, oration? Why is Socrates the educational father par 
excellence, rather than Aristophanes, whose critique of Socrates' work was 
so powerful that it contributed to the philosopher's death sentence? Why is 
Aristophanes' work, in its Dionysian glory, not featured prominently in 
schools of education in place of the Platonic valorization of the Socratic 
ethos? 
Could it be because a violent-war-saturated-developmental trajectory 
~ 
mitigated in favour of select rather than inclusive forms of social power, 
favoured hierarchy (and patriarchy) then and still now? Could war itself be a 
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primary means for generating certain types of social formations, subjectivity 
and power? Might war be the means by which humans have written 
history-not in terms of specific wars or battles-but in terms of the forms of 
power, governance, education and industry war fostered? 
Might twentieth century historians be wrong in writing out warfare to 
concentrate instead on "people's history," on social and economic history, 
without bringing the understanding that warfare provides a formative 
moment for all history? Even when war inflection seems distant and distinct 
from everyday life and the micro-levels of power, could war be the "power 
behind the throne," the means by which all else-including the Western 
conceptual schema (instrumental thought) has been constructed? Though a 
seemingly retrograde concept, could it be that the denial of the formative 
influence of war is an ideological moment, is a learned ignorance that 
provides a discursive basis for organized violence as power? Could it be that 
the answers to these questions are becoming increasingly evident? 
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Chapter Notes 
1 These exiles in effect were the cultural creators of late modernity (e.g. 
Schoenberg, Einstein, Brecht, Mann, Adorno, Arendt, Gropius). See Anthony 
Heilbut's (1983) Exiled In Paradise: German Refugee Artists and Intellectuals in 
America, from the 1930s to the Present, and Mark Anderson's (Ed.). (1998) 
Hilter's Exiles: Personal Stories of the Flight from Nazi Germany to America. 
2 The Cambridge-produced mathematicians who became the famous Bletchley 
Park "code-busters" ultimately defeated the power of Nazi Germany based in 
chemistry and physics (rocketry), just as the armies of the Soviet Union 
defeated the Germans on the battlefield. 
This martial application of highly abstract academic knowledge occurred in spite 
of the resolute separation of "pure" and "applied" cultures at Cambridge 
University, especially in the area of mathematics. It proved to be the rule 
rather than the exception as "the higher learning" was even more resolutely 
directed to martial imperatives during the Cold War than it had been during the 
Second World War. After the war, the war work of Allan Turing, the "hero of 
Bletchley Park," and the individual perhaps most responsible for "Allied" war 
victory, was combined with U.S. war-related systems and computer research, 
that of Vannevar Bush, Norbert Weiner and John van Neumann to provide the 
material and theoretical (technological and conceptual) foundations for the 
contemporary "information age." 
3 See http://carmen.artsci.washington.edu/propaganda/contents.htm 
4 These persons were the originators of the techniques for social formation that 
we take for granted today-public relations, polling, information management. 
5 See http://www.darpa.mil/body/overtheyears.html 
6 See DARPA (1997) Technology Transition. 
http://www.darpa.mil/body /pdf /transition. pdf 
7 The DARPA website provides a list of programs and details regarding various 
research programs. None of this, of course, is "secret information" or, by 
definition, relates to secret programs. Access to website is based in the 
acknowledgement that the address of the accessing computer is noted for 
"informational purposes." Rather than listing each specific site accessed on the 
DARPA website, please note that each is easily accessibly by going to DARPA 
home page at the address in endnote 99. 
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